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Resume. This thesis contributes to the general equilibrium modelling of monetary economies
from both the theoretical and empirical perspectives. Research outcomes are summarized in three
original research papers.
The rst introduces a non zero sovereign and private default probability in a large scale mone-
tary, open economy, search and matching model. The main research objective is testing whether the
emergence of a nancial wedge modelled in the form of a sovereign risk channel can reduce the size or
even reverse the sign of the Keynesian scal multiplier, conditional to alternative scal consolidation
measures. The subset of the model parameter space that satises the empirical identication require-
ments issubset of the model parameter space that satises the empirical identication requirements
is estimated with Bayesian techniques using a large set of data of EZ peripheral countries (Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). From stochastic simulation analyses conducted at the posterior
mean estimates posterior simulations it is shown that the unconditional relation between sovereign
risk and macroeconomic fundamentals is weak, and that scal contractions are self-defeating, such
that the sovereign risk channel, contrary to the theoretical predictions of a recent literature, ampli-
es the Keynesian e¤ects of the scal contraction. The consideration of a liquidity trap environment
does not reverse, but reinforces, these results.
The second paper introduces a distinction between the wage negotiated by newly hired workers
and incumbents in a monetary, open economy, search and matching model. The main research
objective is to evaluate the e¢ cacy of two labor market targeted scal policies, a hiring subsidy
and a wage subsidy for new hires of labor, and to compare them with that implied by standard
scal instruments. Even in this case, the subset of the model parameter space that satises the
empirical identication requirements is estimated with Bayesian techniques using data for high
unemployment countries of the EZ periphery (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). From
posterior simulations it is shown that, except Greece, the labor market policies are not superior
to standard scal expansions in stimulating economic activity, and their employment-enhanching
e¤ects are clearly dominant only in the long term and at the Greece and Irelands model parameter
estimates. The consideration of a liquidity trap environment reinforces these results, showing that
expansionary policy actions triggering a deation can be procyclical when the interest rate zero
lower bound binds.
The third paper addresses the issue of the consideration of heteogeneous consumers in general
equilibrium models. Heterogeneity in consumption behavior is generally recognized as a useful and
powerful modelling assumption from both the theoretical and empirical perspectives. This paper
shows that most of the analyses considering such an assumption are characterized by somehow strong
assumptions which make the apparent heterogeneity illusory in many respects. By relaxing some
of the contextual hypotheses in the labor market dimension that seem to be crucial in the previous
literature, and considering type-specic workers at the very root of the microfoundations, the paper
proves that substantial di¤erences emerge in both the static solutions and in model dynamics. By
means of a calibration experiment di¤erences are shown to be relevant not only for the labor market
variables but also for that of real and monetary variables.
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Abstract
We consider non zero sovereign and private default probabilities in a monetary, open economy, search
and matching model. We empirically evaluate whether the emergence of a nancial wedge in the form of a
sovereign risk channel can reduce the size or even reverse the sign of the Keynesian scal multiplier, condi-
tional to alternative scal consolidation measures. The model is estimated with Bayesian techniques using
data of EZ peripheral countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). From posterior simulations
we show that i) the unconditional relation between sovereign risk and macroeconomic fundamentals is
weak; ii) scal contractions are self-defeating, such that the sovereign risk channel amplies the Keynesian
e¤ects of the scal contraction. The consideration of a liquidity trap environment does not reverse, but
reinforces, these results.
JEL classication: E32, E52, E62, E63, C11
Keywords: Fiscal policy, monetary policy, default risk, spread, scal multiplier, zero lower bound,
Bayesian estimation.
Introduction
A number of advanced economies, following the global nancial crisis, experienced increases in sovereign debt
that were unprecedented during peacetime. Such an evolution, which is still ongoing, has been particularly
worrying in the periphery of the euro-zone. Even if di¤erent factors are likely to have played a role, the early
stages of the sovereign debt surge were characterized by strong uncertainty about sovereign debt sustainability
in all the peripheral countries, leading to rising bond and credit rates that worsened the stressed public and
private nances. Concerns about the risks of contagion (Guerrieri et al. 2012) led governments and European
institutions to to set-up coordinated measures targeted to gain control over strained public budgets, i.e. to
debt reduction and scal consolidation.
Despite the general acknowledgement of the fact that, historically, a number of alternative and not mutually
exclusive factors played a role in successful debt reductions (Reinhart and Sbrancia 2011)1 , the recently signed
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance ("scal compact"), to be ratied in national parliaments
by the end of 2013, establishes a set of policy measures that are - to a large extent - rooted in the automatic
implementation of austerity plans in the case of structural decits.
The e¤ectiveness of these scal arrangements, backed by the hypothesis of expansionary scal contractions
(Giavazzi and Pagano 1990, 1996, Alesina and Perotti 1997, Alesina and Ardagna 2010), is still highly debated
and miss a widespread scientic consensus (Romer and Romer 2010, Guajardo et. al. 2011, Ramey 2011),
and continue to receive large interest in macroeconomic research.
The hypothesis of a sovereign risk channel, suggested by the observation of a strong unconditional correla-
tion between government bond and private sector spreads (Harjes 2011), has recently provided further support
to the idea of expansionary austerity, aside from the concepts of Ricardian equivalence and crowding-out e¤ects
of private expenditure.
From the theoretical perspective, Corsetti et al. (2013) show that, by modelling the sovereign default
risk as an increasing function of the debt level in a general equilibrium monetary model, and considering a
spillover e¤ect from government bond rates to the private sectors credit conditions, scal contractions lead to
a reduction of the government expenditure scal multiplier. When the economy operates in a liquidity-trap
environment, and for high levels of public debt, the sign of the Keynesian multiplier can even be reversed,
giving rise to expansionary scal contractions. The economic intuition is that, irrespective of the monetary
policy regime, a scal retrenchment, by reducing the level of debt, is expected to lead to a reduction in the
sovereign default risk, which is translated into reduced bond and lending rates to the private sector. The
improved credit conditions, i.e. reduced real interest rates, tend to dampen the size of scal multipliers and,
in the limit condition of a constrained monetary policy regime, can even stimulate an economic expansion.
The consideration of a sovereign risk channel can thus overturn the key result of a recent stream of
literature showing that, when the monetary authority is constrained by a binding zero-lower-bound (ZLB),
scal contractions - because of their deationary implications - induce a rise in the real interest rate of the same
size of the deation, leading to a strong economic contraction. The interaction between scal and monetary
policy regimes is crucial for the e¢ cacy of the scal stimulus, particularly in a liquidity-trap environment, in
which the size of scal multipliers is maximized (Christiano et al. 2011a, Eggertsson 2011, Eggertsson and
1These range from sustained economic growth to nancial repression with inationary commitment, from default or restruc-
turing of debt to the implementation of austerity plans.
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Krugman 2012).
In this paper we develop a monetary model to evaluate the empirical validity of the sovereign risk channel
hypothesis and of the related result of the possible emergence of expansionary scal contractions. We calculate
and compare the country-specic dynamic multipliers of nancially equivalent scal policies a¤ecting govern-
ment consumption, transfers and investments on the expenditure side, and direct and indirect consumption
taxes on the revenue side. The monetary model is estimated with Bayesian techniques on a large set of data
for ve major EZ peripheral countries, i.e. Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (the PIIGS). Policy sim-
ulations consider both a standard environment in which the domestic economies operate at their full potential
and a non standard liquidity-trap environment, with a binding ZLB.
The model is characterized by the joint consideration, in an otherwise standard closed-economy monetary
model with nominal and real imperfections (Christiano et al. 2005, Smets and Wouters 2007), of some
theoretical extensions that are functional to the analysis.
In particular, the design of the monopolistically competitive nancial sector (Gerali et al. 2010, Curdia
and Woodford 2010), in which we assume non zero default probabilities on the side of both private and public
borrowers, is key for the emergence of the sovereign risk channel. On this respect, we basically follow the
strategy adopted by Corsetti et al. (2013) by formalizing a relation between sovereign default probability and
interest rate spreads without providing an explicit model of the default event.
However, we also substantially depart from their formal setting by assuming a di¤erent shape of the
cumulative distribution function for the sovereign default probability, partly di¤erent economic fundamentals,
considering both the debt and the net foreign asset to GDP ratios as arguments of the default probability
function, and by explicitly formalizing a private sector default probability.
The choice of considering the debt to GDP ratio in the place of the debt level has two major justications:
on the one hand, it ensures consistency with the empirical literature, addressing economic growth and the
ability of the government to service its debt as fundamental triggers of the default risk (Yeyati and Panizza
2011, Mendoza and Yue 2012, De Grauwe and Ji 2013); on the other hand, it highlights the close link between
the size of the scal multipliers and the sign of the sovereign risk channel e¤ects. In fact, when the former
are su¢ ciently high, the debt to GDP ratio can increase following a scal contraction, leading to further
deationary pressure through increased bond and lending rate spreads. In other terms, the sovereign risk
channel can operate in the opposite direction than predicted.
The consideration of the net foreign assets position as an important trigger of sovereign default risk is
common in the empirical literature (Edwards 1986, De Grauwe and Ji 2013). Default episodes are in fact
often preceded by large imbalances in the net foreign asset position. A scal retrenchment, by improving the
foreign position through reduced imports, is likely to mitigate the nancial pressure of international lenders.
Results show that i) the default risk channel can be only marginally e¤ective, since the estimated un-
conditional relation between fundamentals and spreads is very weak; ii) conditional to scal retrenchments,
the default risk channel operates in the opposite direction than predicted, such that it tends to amplify the
Keynesian e¤ects of the scal contraction.
The reason for the latter result is that, irrespective of the scal instrument being considered, the scal
contraction leads to a temporary but persistent increase in the debt to GDP ratio, triggering a rise in default
probabilities and interest rate spreads, whilst the improvement in the NFA position to GDP ratio, stimulating
a reduction in default probabilities and spreads, is not su¢ cient to reverse the former e¤ect.
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The analysis also shows that two key factors are responsible for such result: rst, the low estimated
elasticities of the default probability to the debt to GDP and NFA position ratios lead to very small variations
in bond and lending rates; second, the relatively high size of the scal multipliers implies that a decrease in
the debt to GDP ratio is never observed following a scal contraction, ruling out even negligible reductions in
the interest rates.
These results remain valid even under a deep recession characterized by a binding ZLB, since the scal
contraction continue to lead to a worsening of the debt to GDP ratio and thus to an increase of the sovereign
default probability in all countries considered in the analysis. Consistent with the results of a recent literature
addressing the relevance of the interaction between scal and monetary policy regimes (Christiano et al.
2011a, Eggertsson 2011, Eggertsson and Krugman 2012), the consideration of a constrained monetary policy
regime tends to increase the e¢ cacy of the contractionary scal measures directly a¤ecting domestic demand,
while reducing the e¤ectiveness of the contractionary policies that can lead to increased marginal costs and
ination, as are those based on direct taxes increases (Eggertsson 2011) and on expenditure cuts negatively
a¤ecting the production potential. Interestingly, the di¤erences in results obtained under the constrained and
unconstrained monetary policy regime are not as high as predicted by the theoretical literature. This outcome
is related to the degree of monetary policy activism implicit to the policy reaction rule, which is estimated
to be particularly low in the PIIGS, such that the real interest rate variations to shocks in the unconstrained
regime are not much distant from those that would hold in the policy-constrained regime.
The paper is organized as follows: Section one describes the model, focusing in particular on the theoretical
extensions implemented in the design of the nancial sector. Section two provides the details of the Bayesian
estimation of the country-specic models. Here we describe the data and their transformations, we address
issues of empirical identication, the calibration and the elicidation of priors for the structural model and
the Bayesian SVAR parameters, and discuss the posterior estimates. Section three provides a discussion
of simulation results, explaining the propagation mechanics in the constrained and unconstrained monetary
policy environments. Section four concludes.
1 The model
We jointly consider a number of extensions to the now standard set-up of the new-Keynesian monetary model,
characterized by the presence of nominal and real frictions in both goods and labor markets (Christiano et al.
2005, Smets and Wouters 2007). First, we introduce a monopolistically competitive nancial sector (Gerali
et al. 2010, Curdia and Woodford 2010) which is subject to costly Rotemberg pricing and non zero default
probabilities on the side of both public and private borrowers, such that a sovereign default risk channel
emerges (Corsetti et al. 2013). Second, in order to allow the evaluation of the e¤ects of the policies on the
net foreign position,.we consider a small open economy framework, developed along the lines of Adolfson et
al. (2007) and Christiano et al. (2011b), in which the foreign sector is exogenous with respect the domestic
economy and its evolution is described by a structural vector auto-regressive system (SVAR). Third, we
develop a detailed representation of the non Walrasian labor market, basically following Diamond (1982),
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), and Pissarides (2000) for the introduction of hiring costs and matching
frictions, and Gertler et al. (2008) and Gertler and Trigari (2009) for the representation of the staggered
Nash-wage bargaining between unions and rms. The preferred specication of the labor market allows the
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evaluation of the unemployment implications of the alternative scal policies. Fourth, we adopt a reasonably
detailed specication of the scal sector, whose relevance for macroeconomic dynamics is recuperated by
considering that a fraction of households are liquidity constrained. The design of the scal sector marginally
resembles that proposed in Drautzburg and Uhlig (2011). We consider unemployment benets in addition
to the standard scal instruments characterizing the expenditure and revenues sides of scal models, and an
optimal denition of the public investment and capital decisions, ensuring that the production potential is
optimized.
The major novelty in the design of the monopolistically competitive nancial sector is the consideration of
a non zero default probability for both private sector and public sector borrowers, obtained by formalizing a
cumulative distribution function relating the sovereign default probability to the debt and the NFA position
to GDP ratios, and the private sector default probability to the sovereign default probability. Default risks
are traduced in bond and lending rate spreads through the consideration of a no arbitrage condition between
deposits and domestic bond holdings, and an optimality condition for credit institutions including the Loss
Given Default of the bank in the case of counterparty default, respectively.
1.1 Households
1.1.1 Optimizers
A continuum of liquidity unconstrained households indexed by j 2 [0; 1] have access to a complete set of
contingent claims2 . The representative household is assumed to maximize the following lifetime utility function:
max
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where Crt is a composite consumption index, h eCt 1 denotes external habits c is the consumption curvature
parameter and 0  nt  1 denotes the fraction of household members who are employed. ct and t are
two preference shocks which are assumed to follow the i.i.d. processes ct = e
"c;t and t = 
(1 c)tnt ,
respectively, where nt = e
"n;t3 .
Each household purchases consumption and investment goods by means of after tax labor and capital
incomes, after tax unemployment benets, dividends and government transfers. The budget constraint is thus
given by:
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2This standard hypothesis ensures that households are homogeneous with respect to consumption and asset holdings choices,
such that the notation can be simplied by dropping the j-index.
3The peculiar specication of the stochastic scaling factor of labor disutility t is chosen to ensure balanced growth.
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where Irt is private investment, At =
etB

t+1
Pt
is the aggregate net foreign asset position of the domestic economy,
et is the nominal e¤ective exchange rate and
Drt
Pt
denotes households deposits to nancial intermediaries in
real terms. Brt and B

t are domestic and foreign bond holdings, respectively, Pt is the consumption price
index and Rgt = Rtqb;t, R
g
t = R

t q

b;t are the domestic and foreign interest rates on government bonds, where
Rt, Rt denote the respective policy rates and qb;t, q

b;t are the home and foreign spreads on government
bonds, respectively, the latter dened within the SVAR system for the foreign variables. The variable pd;gt
and the parameter zg denote the sovereign debt default probability and the recovery rate on defaulted bonds.
Rkt
Pt
is the real return on capital Kp;rt , u
k
t and a
 
ukt

denote the utilization rate and its adjustment cost4 ,
respectively, and  is the private capital depreciation rate. WtPt is the real wage and
pt
t
Pt
dene real dividends,
where  denotes the long-run trend growth of labor-augmenting productivity. Government transfers TRrt ,
unemployment benets but = b
t5 and the tax rates on consumption  ct , on labor income 
n
t and on capital 
k
t
complete the budget constraint of the Ricardian household. The term t = (AtYt ;
et
et 1
; Rgt   Rgt ; et) in (2)
denotes the risk premium on foreign bond holdings in the modied uncovered interest parity (UIP) equation
Et
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et+1
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
=
Rgt
tR
g
t
, i.e.:
t = exp[ eaAtYt   AY

  er  Rgt  Rgt + es1  etet 1

+ et] (3)
where et is a time varying shock to the risk premium, which is assumed to follow the AR(1) stochastic processet = eet 1e"e;t and ea, es and er are positive elasticities. Our specication ensures the satisfaction of the
usual equilibrium requirements (Lundvik 1992, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 2001) and adds some exibility to
alternative modied UIP equations adopted in the literature (e.g. Adolfson et al. 2008 and Christiano et al.
2011b). The log-linear representation of the modied UIP is the following:
Et (et+1) = eset + 1  er  Rgt  Rgt + ea (At   Yt)  et
were the parameter es denes the autoregressive behavior of the expected change in the nominal exchange rate
and er  0 denotes the elasticity to the interest rate di¤erential on bond holdings, allowing for the emergence
of the "forward premium puzzle" (for er > 1), i.e. the negative correlation between interest rate di¤erentials
and expected exchange rate variations often observed in empirical trials6 .
The law of motion of physical capital is described by the following equation:
Kp;rt = (1  )Kp;rt 1 + qi;t

1  S( I
r
t
Irt 1
)

Irt (4)
where S( I
r
t
Irt 1
) denes the private investment adjustment cost function, with curvature parameter  i, and qi;t
is an investment-specic shock, which is assumed to follow the i.i.d. stochastic process qi;t = e"qi;t .
Aggregate demand for type Xt goods, Xt = (Ct; It), is obtained as a CES index of domestically produced
4The function a
 
ukt

is assumed to be strictly increasing and convex, with curvature parameter  k. The utilization rate
relates e¤ective to physical capital in a standard fashion, i.e. Krt (i) = K
p;r
t 1(i)ut(i).
5 In order to ensure long-run balanced growth, but is assumed to grow at the labor augmenting productivity growth rate .
6 In the modied UIP adopted in Adolfson et al. (2008) the autoregressive component is not independent on the elasticity to
the interest rate di¤erential, and the chosen prior does not allow for a direct emergence of the forward premium puzzle. Compared
to the specication adopted in Christiano et al. (2011b), our modied UIP adds the autoregressive component.
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and imported goods, such that:
Xt =

(1  ) 1  Xdt   1 +  1 (Xmt )  1   1 (5)
where, from householdscost minimization, Xdt (1  )

Pdt
Pt
 
Xt and Xmt = 
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Pt
 
Xt are, respectively,
the aggregate available domestic and foreign produced goods,  denotes the import share parameter and  is
the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods. P dt and P
m
t denote the price indexes of
domestic and imported goods, respectively, such that:
Pt =
h
(1  )  P dt 1  +  (Pmt )1 i 11  (6)
From the rst order condition (F.O.C.) for consumption, the following consumption Euler equation is
obtained:
Crt   hCrt 1 =

Rt
Pt
Pt+1
(1 +  ct)
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 ct+1)
ct+1
ct
  1c  
Crt+1   hCrt
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(7)
1.1.2 The rule-of-thumb household
Liquidity constrained and unconstrained households have the same number of workers:
nt = n
r
t = n
nr
t (8)
From the budget constraint of the liquidity constrained household the following consumption equation is
obtained:
Cnrt =
1
(1 +  ct)

Trnrt + (1  nt )
Wt
Pt
nt + (1  nt )but (1  nt)

(9)
where it is evident that rule-of-thumbers spend all their net income (from labor, government transfers and
unemployment benets) in consumption goods.
1.2 Firms
1.2.1 Intermediate sector
Each intermediate rm (i) operates in a perfectly competitive environment combining private capital public
infrastructures and labor. The production technology is as follows:
Y it (i) = 
a
t
"
Kgt 1R 1
0
Y it (j)dj
# 
1 
[Kt(i)]
 
tnt(i)
(1 )
(10)
where Kgt is public capital,  and  are the private and public capital shares in production, respectively, and
at = 
a
a
t 1 e
"a;t is an AR(1) process dening the evolution of total factor productivity.
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The optimizing rm chooses the optimal quantity of capital by solving the following maximization problem:
max
Kt(i)
P itY
i
t (i) RktKt(i) s.t. (10)
whose re-arranged F.O.C. yields:
Rkt (i) = P
i
t (i)
Y it (i)
Kt(i)
(11)
where P it (i) is the intermediate sector price index.
Since a fraction #b of the wage bill Wtnt is anticipated by borrowing from nancial intermediaries, the cost
of one unit of labor is RttWt, where:
Rtt(i) = #
b
h
1  pdpt (i)
i
Rlt(i) +

1  #b

+ dcpt (i) (12)
is the e¤ective interest rate. pdpt (i) denotes the rms default probability and d
cp
t (i) = #
bpdpt (i)R
l
t(i) is the cost
of default per unit of borrowed cost of labor.
1.2.2 Final sector: wholesalers and retailers in the domestic, import and export sectors
For expositional convenience, a joint description of the structure of the nal good sector, composed of domestic,
import and export wholesalers and retailers, is provided.
Domestic wholesale rms buy the homogenous good Y it from domestic intermediate good producers at the
price P it , and di¤erentiate the homogeneous product into Y
d
t (i) using a linear technology. Wholesalers sell
their goods under monopolistic competition to domestic retailers, who use the di¤erentiated goods Y dt (i) to
produce the composite nal good Y dt .
Wholesale rms in the import sector buy the homogenous good Y t from foreign retailers at the foreign price
P t , and obtain a di¤erentiated good Y
m
t (i). Wholesale importing rms sell their goods under monopolistic
competition to import retailers who use the di¤erentiated goods Y mt (i) to produce the composite nal good
Y mt .
Finally, wholesale export rms buy the homogenous good Y dt from domestic retailers at the price P
d
t and
produce a di¤erentiated good Y xt (i) using a linear technology. Wholesalers in the export sector sell their goods
under monopolistic competition to export retailers, who use the di¤erentiated goods Y xt (i) to produce the
composite nal good Y xt .
We consider a variable demand elasticity in the three sectors, indexed by k = (d;m; x), by assuming a
exible variety aggregator à la Kimball (1995):Z 1
0
G

Y kt (i)
Y kt
;kp;t

di

= 1
such that the domestic retailers demand function for di¤erentiated goods is:
Y kt (i) = Y
k
t G
0 1

P kt (i)
P kt
{kp;t

(13)
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where:
{kp;t 
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Y kt
;kp;t

Y kt (i)
Y kt
di
The optimization problem of wholesalers rms that are allowed to re-optimize their prices reads:
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sector and export sector wholesalers, respectively. The term
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#t+j denotes the stochastic discount factor
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rm, where kp is the Calvo probability of price adjustment. 
k
p;t = e
"kp;t are i.i.d. stochastic processes
dening the time-varying markups7 and Xkt;t+j denote price indexation functions.
The rst order condition for the optimality problem above is given by:
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where kt = G
0 1  kt , kt = Pkt (i)Pkt {kp;t, and the aggregate domestic price indexes read:
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1.3 Financial sector and default risks
1.3.1 Financial intermediaries and private default risk
In each period t a continuum of monopolistically competitive banks receives depositsDt (i) from the households
and supplies loans Lt (i) to banks in the retail sector at the nominal interest rate Rlt (i). Retail banks purchase
di¤erentiated loans from the monopolistically competitive banks and aggregate them in the single composite
loan Lt =
hR 1
0
Lt (i)
(lt 1)=lt
ilt=(lt 1)
, purchased by the intermediate good producer rms at the interest
rate Rlt for anticipated wage payments Wtnt.The term 
l
p;t+j represents the stochastic loan demand elasticity
in the credit sector, which is assumed to follow the AR(1) stochastic process lt = 
l(1  )l( )t 1 e
";t .
Intertemporal cost minimization implies that the optimal loan demand is given by Lt (i) =
 
Rlt (i) =R
l
t
 lt Lt.
At the end of each period, the monopolistically competitive bank pays back the interest-augmented initial de-
7We assume i.i.d. mark-up shocks in order to enhance the identiability of the price equations. For a more in dept explanation
of this point, see the estimation section below and Giuli and Tancioni (2012).
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posits RtDt (i) and ownership prots to households. The representative monopolistically competitive bank
maximizes its prot function facing Rotemberg-type costs for adjusting the interest rate on loans:
max
Dt(i);IBt;Rlt
Et
1X
s=0
s
t+sPt
tPt+s
"
1  pd;pt

Rlt+s (i)Lt+s (i) Rt+sDt+s (i) Rt+sIBt+s (i) 
b
2

Rlt+s (i)
Rlt+s 1 (i)
  1
2
Lt+s (i)
#
(16)
subject to the credit balance sheet constraint:
Dt+s(i) + IBt+s(i) = Lt+s(i) +Qt+s(i)
where IBt(i), Qt(i) = 
qDt(i) and 
q denote interbank borrowing, the bank amount and the bank ratio of
reserves respectively, and b in (16) denotes the Rotemberg adjustment cost parameter.
The observed strong co-movement between government bond and lending rates indicates that the market
valuation of sovereign debt assets a¤ects the private sector credit conditions8 . In order to capture this relation,
we assume a non zero default probability in the private sector, described by the following cumulative density
function:
pd;pt =
1  exp

 's;p

pd;gt
s;p
1  exp

 

's;p +

1  pd;gt
s;p (17)
where 's;p and s;p are the scale and the shape parameters of the private sector default c.d.f., respectively,
such that:
pd;pt =
(
1 if pd;gt = 1
0 if pd;gt = 0
Equation (17) expresses to which degree the probability of default of sovereign debt pd;gt spills-over the
private sector. Given values for the scale and the shape parameters in (17), our preferred formulation ensures
a exible and accurate representation of the actual relations between private sector credit and government
bond spreads emerging in country-specic time series data.
Note that, compared to the formulation adopted in Corsetti et al. (2013), who assume a direct log-linear
relation between government and credit rate spreads, we model the underlying relation between the sovereign
debt and private sector default probabilities.
From the optimality condition of the monopolistically competitive bank, the following lending rate equation
is obtained:
Rlt (i) =
1
1  pd;pt (1  zpzt)
 1
lt   1

ltRt   b

Rlt (i)
Rlt 1 (i)
  1

Rlt (i)
Rlt 1 (i)
  Ptt+1
Pt+1t

Rlt+1 (i)
Rlt (i)
  1

Rlt+1 (i)
Rlt (i)
Lt+1(i)
Lt(i)

(18)
where zp is the share of the Gordons rm value zt =

pdt (i) yt (i)  rkt kt (i)  wtnt(i)

=

rkt   (  1)

,
determining the Loss Given Default (LGD) 1   zpzt of the bank in the case of counterparty default9 . The
8Harjes 2011 provides evidence about these spill-over e¤ects.
9 Instead of considering the standard Gordons rm value model, we consider the value of the entire production and supply
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above expression highlights that, in our setting, the lending rate is determined by the risk free rate, the mark-
up and the cost of adjusting the interest rate as in the standard literature considering imperfect credit markets
(Gerali et al. 2010, Curdia and Woodford 2010), as well as by the survival rate of the private sector rms and
the LGD.
1.3.2 The sovereign default risk
Along the lines of the analysis in Corsetti et al. (2013), we do not model the event of default as the result of a
strategic decision (Eaton and Gersovitz 1981 Yue 2010, Arellano 2008, Mendoza and Yue 2012), but relate the
sovereign default probability to two fundamental triggers addressed in the literature (Edwards 1986, Manasse
and Roubini 2009, De Grauwe and Ji 2013): i) the government debt to GDP ratio Bt=Yt and ii) the NFA
position to GDP ratio At=Yt. Our preferred specication for the sovereign default probability is dened by
the cumulative distribution function:
pd;gt =

1  exp

 's;g

b
Bt
Yt
+ a
A t
Yt
s;g
(19)
such that,@p
d;g
t
@Bt
> 0;
@pd;gt
@At
< 0 and:
pd;gt =
(
1 if BtYt = +1\
A t
Yt
= +1
0 if BtYt =
At
Yt
= 0
where A t is the net foreign indebtedness.
From the optimality condition for deposits and domestic bond holdings, and since Rgt = Rtq
b
t , the following
no arbitrage condition must hold:
Rt = Rtq
b
t
h
1  pd;gt+1

+ zgpd;gt+1
i
(20)
where zg = z
i
i
Y
Y  is the recovery rate on government bond in the case of sovereign debt default. The
parameters i and i denote the domestic and foreign contribution to a hypothetical international insurance
institution (e.g. the IMF) and z is the e¢ ciency parameter dening the relation between contribution and
insurance coverage (e.g. the quota of SDRs to the IMF).
Given the positions above and considering the no arbitrage condition (20), the interest rate spread on
government bonds reads:
qbt =
1h
1  (1  zg) pd;gt
i (21)
where the government bond premium qbt emerges as a result of a non zero probability p
d;g
t of sovereign debt
default.
Note that, aside from the consideration of the net foreign assets position, our preferred specication of
the sovereign default risk depart from the one adopted in Corsetti et al. (2013) in two main respects: rst,
chain, that is, the value of the intermediate and nal sector rm.
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we do not consider a scal limit, i.e. an upper bound for the debt to GDP ratio, on the grounds that such
a limit is neither theoretically nor empirically identiable. Second, in line with the empirical literature, we
consider the debt to GDP ratio in the place of the debt level, in order to take into account the crucial role
of the GDP dynamics in the denition of the sovereign default risk addressed in the literature (Yeyati and
Panizza 2011, Mendoza and Yue 2012), relate the analysis more closely to the available empirical literature,
addressing the debt to GDP ratio as a fundamental measure of the capacity of the government to service its
debt, and consider the evolution of the NFA position to GDP ratio as an additional trigger of sovereign the
default probability (Edwards 1986, De Grauwe and Ji 2013). Note also that the consideration of the debt to
GDP ratio implies that the size and the sign of the default risk channel crucially depends on the size of the
scal multipliers. When scal multipliers are large, scal contractions can lead to transitory but persistent
increases in the debt to GDP ratio, activating a default risk channel operating in an opposite - pro-cyclical -
direction than predicted.
Figure 1 depicts, for di¤erent levels of the debt to GDP ratio and of the sensitivity parameter b, the
behavior of the default probability function and of the government bond spread, considering a parameterization
which is consistent with the data of the ve economies in the analysis. The shape parameter s;g is xed to
a value of 20, whilst the scale parameter 's;g is xed such that, given an elasticity coe¢ cient b = 0:5, the
observed intersections between the debt to GDP ratio and the government bond spread for each country belong
to the default probability surface.
FIGURE 1 about here
It is interesting to note that the second surface denotes a country-specic upper limit in the sovereign debt
interest rate spread. Such a limit is the result of the consideration of a ceiling in the service cost of debt, which
we assume to be reached for bond interest rate levels (and thus spreads) for which the service cost equals the
country-specic value of output. Note that the di¤erent ceilings depend exclusively on the di¤erent steady
state debt to GDP ratios, xed to the 2012 values, and on the di¤erent steady state policy rates10 .
1.4 The labor market
The matching process is described by a standard Cobb-Douglas matching technology:
mt = m
n
t u
1 n
t (22)
where m is the matching e¢ ciency parameter, t is the number of vacancies and ut = 1  nt 1 denotes the
unemployment rate once the labor force stock has been normalized to one. The chosen timing in the unem-
ployment relation shows that individuals entering the labor force stock activate their job search immediately,
whilst workers that loss their job in t are not able to search for a new one in the same period of the separation
event. Given the job lling rate qt = mt=t and the job nding rate st = mt=ut, the labor market tightness
can equivalently be dened as t = t=ut or t = st=qt.
Under the assumption of exogenous separation, the employment law of motion is described by the following
10This implies that the variations in the spreads related to the variations in the debt to GDP ratios should be interpreted as
temporary variations, consistent with stable steady state debt to GDP ratios.
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dynamic equation
nt = (1  )nt 1 +mt (23)
where  is the separation rate.
1.4.1 Workers value functions
Let Wt(wt) be the worker value of being matched to a job evaluated at the wage wt and Ut be the value of
being unemployed at time t. The value of the employment/unemployment states are the following:
Wt(wt) = (1  nt )
wt
Pt
  t
t
+ Et

t+1
t

(1  ) wWt+1(wt) + (1  w)Wt+1(wt+1)+ Ut+1 (24)
Ut = (1  nt )but + Et

t+1
t

st+1
 
wWt+1(wt) + (1  w)Wt+1(wt+1)

+ (1  st+1)Ut+1

(25)
where w is the Calvo parameter dening the probability of being unable to re-optimize the wage in t+ 1, t
is the Lagrange multiplier and wt is the re-optimized wage. From equations (24) and (25) the net value of
being employed, i.e. the workersurplus Wt(wt)  Ut, is obtained.
1.4.2 Firms value functions
Let Jt(wt) be the asset value of a job evaluated at the wage wt:
Jt(wt) = (1  pt )(t  Rtt
wt
P dt
) + (1  )eEt t+1
t
(wJt+1(wt) + (1  w)Jt+1(wt+1))

(26)
where P dt is the domestic price index, 
p
t denotes the business prots tax rate and t = (1   )P itYt=nt the
marginal productivity of labor.
Given the value of a vacancy:
Jvt =  + qt [wJt(wt 1) + (1  w)Jt(wt )] (27)
and imposing the free entry condition, Jvt = 0, the vacancy posting condition is obtained

qt
= wJt(wt 1) + (1  w)Jt(wt ) (28)
1.4.3 Nash wage bargaining
Given the the workersurplus Wt(wt)  Ut, the rms asset value of a job Jt(wt ) and the unions bargaining
power &, the Nash-bargaining solution is given by &(1  nt )Jt(wt ) = (1  &) (1  pt ) [Wt(wt )  Ut]. Plugging
the value functions in the latter equation, the optimal real wage reads:
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wt = t

&t + (1  &)

but +
t
t

+
1
(1  pt )
t& (1  ) eEt t+1
t

qt+1

1  t
nt+1
pt+1

+t
1X
j=1
t+j
t

(1  )ewj (1  &)Et nt+1(wt+1   wt )  st+11   (wt+1   wt)

+ &Et

pt+1

Rtt+1
wt+1
pdt+1
 Rtt
wt
pdt

   pt+1   tnt+1Rtt+1wt+1pdt+1  Rttwtpdt

(29)
where we have used the transformations it = (1    it)=(1    it 1), for i = (n; p), t = (1    st) = (1  ),
t  1=

1  &  1  1=pdt , pdt = P dt =Pt, and wt is the average real wage wt = [wwt 1 + (1  w)wt ]. Note
that, for  it = 0 the real wage equation (29) resolves in a standard Nash wage equation (Gertler and Trigari
2009).
1.5 Government policies
1.5.1 The monetary authority
The Central Bank sets the nominal interest rate Rt  1+ rt according to a contemporaneous rule considering
ination, output and output growth deviations from the respective steady state values. The policy instrument
is adjusted gradually, giving rise to interest rate smoothing:
Rt
R
=

Rt 1
R
R t

 11 R  Yt
Yt 1
 2
+ rt (30)
where R denes the degree of interest rate smoothing,  1 and  2 are the feedback coe¢ cients to CPI ination
t
11 , and output growth, respectively. The stochastic term rt denotes the monetary policy shock, which is
assumed to be white noise rt = e
"rt . Similar to money-growth rules, implementation of this policy rule does
not require knowledge about the natural rate of interest or of the level of potential output, both of which are
unobserved12 .
The fact that the countries being considered in this study all joined a common currency and a centralized
monetary policy since 1999 (2001 for Greece) implies that, at the estimation stage, a regime break has to be
taken into account. To implement such a structural break, we will consider a permanent observed exogenous
shock acting as a multiplicative regime-shift dummy variable on all the three monetary policy coe¢ cients.
11CPI ination is obtained as a weighted average considering domestic and imported price variations, i.e.: t =h
(1  )  pdt dt 1  +  (pmt mt )1 i 11  .
12The hypothesis that the central bank targets trend output instead of the output that would have prevailed in the absence of
nominal rigidities has been adopted in the empirical literature (e.g. Del Negro et al. 2007, Adolfson et al. 2007) and is consistent
with the main objective of our analysis, which is basically empirical.
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1.5.2 The scal authority
By expressing government consumption, government transfers, hiring subsidies and unemployment benets in
terms of domestic goods, the government budget constraint in real terms reads:
P dt
Pt
[Gt + I
g
t + (1  nt ) but (1  nt)] + iYt + TRt +
h
1  pd;gt

+ zgpd;gt
i Bt 1
Pt
+ dc;gt
Bt 1
Pt
=
Bt
PtR
g
t
+  ctCt + 
n
t wtnt + 
k
t

rkt u
k
t   a(ukt )  

Kp;rt 1 + 
p
t (t   wt)
where dc;gt = (1  zg) pd;gt is the unit cost of sovereign default, Gt = G
g
t 1Y
(1 g)gy
t D
gd
t e
"g;t and TRt
= TR
tr
t 1Y
(1 tr)try
t D
trd
t e
"tr;t are the partial adjustment stochastic processes for government expenditures
for consumption and transfers, respectively, with Dt denoting the government nancial need, and "g;t, "tr;t
i.i.d. shocks.
The government nancial need Dt is the following:
Dt  P
d
t
Pt
[Gt + I
g
t + (1  nt ) but (1  nt)] + iYt + TRt +
Bt 1
Pt
+
h
1  pd;gt

+ zgpd;gt
i Bt 1
Pt
+dc;gt
Bt 1
Pt
   ctCt   nt wtnt   kt

rkt u
k
t   a(ukt )  

Kpt 1   pt (t   wt) (31)
A fraction   of Dt is nanced with distortionary taxation on consumption, labor income, capital and on
business prots, such that:
  (Dt  D) = ( ct    c)Ct+(nt   n)wtnt+
 
kt   k

Kpt 1

rkt u
k
t   a
 
ukt
  +(pt   p) (t   wt) (32)
whilst the remaining fraction is nanced by issuing government bonds:
Bt  B
PtR
g
t
= (1    ) (Dt  D) (33)
We assume that the di¤erent tax rates are partially adjusted by choosing the vector of government tax
instruments ! =

!c!n!k!p
0
, where !c + !n + !k + !p = 1.
!c  (Dt  D) = ( ct    c)Ct (34)
!n  (Dt  D) = (nt   n)wtnt (35)
!k  (Dt  D) =
 
kt   k
 kpt 1


rkt u
k
t   a
 
ukt
   (36)
!p  (Dt  D) = (pt   p) (t   wt) (37)
where  it, i = c; n; k; p, denotes the systematic component on the revenue side, which relates to the stochastic
tax rate considering a rst order autoregressive stochastic wedge it denoting the discretionary component,
such that  it = 
i
t
i
t , with 
i
t = 
ii
t 1 e
"n;t .
An optimal rule is considered for government investment expenditures. The scal authority is assumed to
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choose the public capital stock Kgt and public investment I
g
t by maximizing the distance between output Yt
and the nancial need, i.e.:
max
Kgt ;I
g
t
Et
1X
j=t
t+j
t+j
t
[Yt+j  Dt+j ]
s.t. Yt = (
a
t )
(1 )(Kgt 1)
(Kt)
(1 ) tnt(1 )(1 )
Kgt = (1  g)Kgt 1 + qi
g
t

1  Sg( I
g
t
Igt 1
)

Igt
where g is the public capital depreciation rate and Sg( I
g
t
Igt 1
) denotes the government investment adjustment
cost function, with curvature parameter  ig. The rst order conditions for government capital and investment
are, respectively:
Et
h
(1  g) kgt+1qk
g
t + t+1(
a
t+1)
(1 )(Kgt )
 1(Kt+1)(1 )
 
t+1nt+1
(1 )(1 )i  kgt = 0
Et

qi
g
t+1
kg
t+1S
g0(
Igt+1
Igt
)(
Igt+1
Igt
)2

+ k
g
t q
i;g
t

1  Sg( I
g
t
Igt 1
)  Sg0( I
g
t
Igt 1
)(
Igt
Igt 1
)

  P
d
t
Pt
t = 0
where k
g
t is the shadow price of government capital and q
ig
t = q
ig
ig
t 1 e
"ig;t is a stochastic process for the
government investment-specic shock.
1.6 Model closure
Given the presence of intertemporally optimizing households j 2 [0; 1   h] and of rule-of-thumb households
j 2 (1  h; 1], aggregate consumption and government transfers are given by:
Ct =

1  h

Crt + 
hCnrt (38)
and
TRt =

1  h

TRrt + 
hTRnrt (39)
where, given d = TRnrt =TR
r
t , the fraction of government transfers to Ricardian and non Ricardian households
are, respectively: TRrt (i) =
TRt
1+h(d 1) and TR
nr
t (i) =
dTRt
1+h(d 1) .
Since only Ricardian households hold bonds and accumulate capital, aggregate variables are related to the
vector of Ricardian-specic variables as follows:
Xt =

1  h

Xrt
where Xt = [It;K
p
t ;Kt; Bt; B

t ]
0.
Market clearing for the foreign bond market and the nal goods market requires that at the equilibrium
the following two equations for net foreign assets evolution and aggregate resources are satised:
etB

t+1
tRt qbt
= etP
x
t (C
x
t + I
x
t )  etP t (Cmt + Imt ) + etBt (40)
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and:
Cdt + C
x
t + I
d
t + I
x
t +Gt + I
g
t +
b
2

Rlt+s (i)
Rlt+s 1 (i)
  1
2
Lt+s (i)  Yt   a
 
ukt

Kpt 1   tt (41)
where Cxt + I
x
t =
h
Pxt
Pt
i 
Y t are total exports, with  denoting the foreign demand elasticity parameter
13 .
The stationary representation of the model is obtained by scaling the real variables with respect to the
trending technology process. The scaled model is then log-linearized around the deterministic steady state,
taking into account that the presence of a deterministic term in the productivity growth process a¤ects the
coe¢ cients of the dynamic equations.
The resulting log-linearized model is composed of 55 structural equations and of 22 shock processes, of
which eight are assumed to be rst order autoregressive and the remaining 14 are assumed to be i.i.d.. The
economic relations are described by 67 structural parameters (including the scal and monetary policy rules
coe¢ cients), whilst the stochastic component of the model is dened by 30 coe¢ cients (22 for the standard
deviations of shocks and eight for the autoregressive coe¢ cients)14 .
1.7 The foreign economy
Foreign output (yt ), ination (

t ), short and long-term interest rates

rs;t and r

b;t, respectively

are ex-
ogenous to the variables of the small domestic economy and their evolution is described by a fourth-order
structural Bayesian B-VAR, where contemporaneous correlations are dened by the structure of the stochas-
tic component matrix B. Formally:
A (L)
26664
t
yt
rs;t
rb;t
37775 = B
266664
"

t
"y

t
"
rs
t
"
rb
t
377775 , A0 = I4, "t  N (0; I4) (42)
B =
26664
b11 0 0 0
0 b22 0 0
b31 b32 b33 0
b41 b42 b43 b44
37775 , BB0 = 

The assumptions on the contemporaneous correlations matrix B are consistent with the hypothesis that output
and ination do not respond contemporaneously to the other shocks in the system (Adolfson et al. 2008)15 ,
and that the 10-years government bond rate is post-recursive with respect to the short-term interest rate.
13At the estimation stage we will also consider an additive stochastic process %t in the aggregate resources constraint, i.e. a
rst order autoregressive measurement error %t = %
%
t 1e
"%;t . Such a shock is generally considered in the empirical literature in
order to enhance the estimates when these include output and all its components appearing in the model.
14We denote as structural parameters those dening preferences, technology, elasticities, real and nominal rigidities in the good
and labor markets, as well as the coe¢ cients describing the monetary and scal policy reaction rules. The seven autoregressive
coe¢ cients are those describing the memory of the technology process around the deterministic trend, of the structural shock
on government investments, on exports, the home bias, the uncovered interest parity, the long-term interest rate spread and the
memory of a measurement error included in the aggregate constraint.
15Consistently with the results in Adolfson and Lindé (2011), the over-identifying restriction that output does not respond
contemporaneously to the price shock is not rejected by the data at the standard 5% criterion.
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The SVAR system adds four linear stochastic equations to the economic and stochastic relations of the
domestic economy model, resulting in a total of 81 equations and 26 shocks.
2 Bayesian estimation
Even considering a particularly large data-set, the rich parameterization of the model precludes the estimation
of the entire parameter space, since a subset of this space remains empirically unidentiable (Canova and Sala
2009, Iskrev 2010a,b, Koop et al. 2011)16 . For this reason, only the subset of the parameter space that satises
the theoretical and empirical identication conditions is estimated using the Bayesian method, whilst for the
remaining subset we adopt dogmatic priors specied according to the available country-specic evidence and
to conventional calibration values.
A Bayesian approach is adopted also for the estimation of the foreign variables SVAR, in this case consid-
ering a partially modied Minnesota priors specication approach17 .
2.1 Data issues and measurement equations
To enhance the empirical identication of the widest fraction of the structural parameters space, we use a
large set of domestic and foreign quarterly variables to estimate the country-specic models.
Considering the domestic economies, 22 observables are considered: (log di¤erences of) of real per capita
GDP18
 
yobst

, consumption
 
cobst

, investment
 
iobst

, imports
 
mobst

, exports
 
xobst

, the real wage 
wobst

, real government expenditures for consumption
 
gobst

, investment

ig;obst

and transfers
 
trobst

;
the tax rate on labor income

n;obst

, on business prots

p;obst

, on capital

k;obst

and on consumption
 c;obst

; the unemployment rate
 
uobst

, the (quarterly) rates of change of the price deators for consumption
c;obst

, import

m;obst

, export

x;obst

and for the domestic sector

y;obst

; the nominal e¤ective exchange
rate
 
eobst

, the (quarterly) short-term interest rate, the 10-years government bond rate and the lending rate
to non nancial corporations

robss;t , r
obs
b;t and r
obs
l;t respectively

. All real variables are referred to the base-year
2005.
Considering the variables for the foreign sector, the log di¤erence of real output

y;obst

is obtained from the
real world output index (base-year 2005) and short and long-term interest rates

r;obss;t and r
;obs
b;t , respectively

are obtained as weighted averages of the corresponding gures for the US and the EMU area, with weights
given by the relative importance of the two economic areas in domestic capital movements. The foreign price
deator

;obst

is obtained from the real e¤ective exchange rate denition equation using observed data on
domestic ination, the nominal and the real e¤ective exchange rates. A total of 26 variables is thus considered
in the country-specic estimates19 .
16Even if log-linearized around the deterministic steady state, these structures are in fact characterized by relevant nonlinearities
in parameter convolutions, such that the likelihood generated by the model can be uninformative, i.e. multimodal or at with
respect to some parameter values.
17The choice of using the Bayesian method for the estimation of the SVAR is based on recent results showing its good properties
both within sample and in terms of minimization of the predictive variance of the resulting model (Banbura et al. 2010).
18Per capita variables are obtained considering the labor force as the normalizing variable.
19To the best of our knowledge, the use of such a high number of observables in the estimates is unprecedented in the literature
on empirical DSGE models.
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All data are taken from o¢ cial sources and cover the period 1980:1-2012:420 . Real variables of the private
domestic sector, their deators and the nominal short and long-term interest rates are taken from the OECD-
Economic Outlook database. Nominal and real e¤ective exchange rate indexes, dened at the base-year 2005,
the world real output index (2005 = 100) and the lending rates to nonnancial corporations are taken from
the IMF-International Financial Statistics database. Data for government expenditures and revenues are, for
the quarterly frequency (1999   2012), from the IMF Government Financial Statistics database and, for the
yearly frequency, from the OECD-Tax Statistics database and from the IMF Finance Statistics Yearbook 21 .
Before linking the observed variables to the theoretical counterparts, some of the latter are transformed
in order to get full consistency with the statistical denitions. In particular, the transformations take into
account that, di¤erently from the statistical aggregates, consumption and investment in the theoretical model
are composites of domestic and imported goods and output also includes the hiring cost and that related to
changes in the capital utilization rate.
Further transformations are needed in order to make the data consistent with the theoretical steady states
and in particular with the model property of balanced growth (), a theoretical prediction which is not
supported by the evidence in all the countries being considered, in particular for export and import shares.
More specically, the positive/negative excess trends in real variables are removed by considering sample
deviations from the steady state output growth rate  in the measurement equations of all the real variables
in the system, such that the theory-consistent stationary great ratios are restored.
Formally, considering the vector of real per capita variables x0t = (ct, it, mt, xt, wt, gt, i
g
t , trt, y

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t ), of short-term, bond and lending
interest rates r0s;t =
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
, r0b;t =

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
and rl;t, the 26 measurement equations linking the linearized
model variables to the respective observables read as follows:
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(43)
where the coe¢ cients xy denote the excess trend (or excess growth rate) of each observed generic real per
capita variable in xobst from the real per capita GDP growth rate, .  ,   log, , qb, qd;p and s denote
the (steady state) tax rates, the domestic and foreign real interest rates, the ination rates, the domestic and
20Because of the lack of quarterly time series prior to 1990 for Ireland and to 2000 for Greece, quadratic interpolation
methods are applied to yearly observations to obtain the quarterly gures 1980:1-1989:4 and 1980:1-1999:4 for Ireland and
Greece, respectively.
21Even in this case, since quarterly data are available only after 1999:1, adjustments to changing denitions and quadratic
interpolation methods are applied to yearly observations in order to obtain the quarterly frequency for the preceding time span.
A detailed description of the data manipulation is provided in a technical appendix of the paper, available upon request from the
authors
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foreign government bond rate spreads, the lending rate default probability and the nominal e¤ective exchange
rate, respectively, and u denotes the steady state unemployment rate.
2.2 Calibrated parameters
Calibrated values are chosen taking into account both sample and extraneous evidence when informative for
the theoretical parameters, and conventional values when such information is missing.
We impose 29 dogmatic priors on the 67-dimensional structural parameters space. Absent country-specic
information, 17 structural parameters are xed to common values across countries. These are the steady-state
mark-up coe¢ cients dp, 
m
p and 
x
p , xed to the conventional value of 1:2, consistent with prior demand
elasticities for domestic, import and export sector rms equal to 6; the Kimball endogenous demand elasticity
parameters d , 
m
 and 
x
 , xed to the conventional value of 10 (Eichenbaum and Fisher 2007, Smets and
Wouters 2007); the parameter dening the fraction of government transfers to Ricardian and non Ricardian
households d, xed to 1, consistent with an hypothesis of equally distributed transfers; the three parameters
dening the partial indexation mechanism for the domestic, import and export sectors , i.e. dp, 
m
p and 
x
p ,
respectively, all xed to zero in order to allow for an interpretation of the (observed) frequency of price changes
in terms of (theoretical) price re-optimization22 ; the exchange rate sensitivity to the net foreign assets to GDP
ratio ea, xed to the arbitrary small value of 1 3(23); the private and government capital depreciation rates,
 and g, respectively, both xed to the conventional value of 0:025; the steady-state mark-up coe¢ cient
for the credit sector l, xed to the value of 1:025, consistent with a demand elasticity parameter equal to
40; the shape parameter for the government default probability function s;g in (19), xed to 20 in order
to capture the recent observed nonlinear relation between fundamentals and government bond spreads; the
scale parameter for the private sector default probability 's;p in (17), xed to 5 to initialize the estimation of
the corresponding shape parameter s;p in a neigborhood of a unit prior value, consistent with the relatively
stable relation between the lending and the government bond rate spreads observed in the data; the world
contribution to the IMF parameter i, xed to 0:008 according to the observed total SDR (in USD) to world
GDP ratio24 .
The remaining 12 dogmatic priors for structural parameters are xed considering country-specic evidence.
These are the trend growth parameter , xed considering the sample growth rate of per capita GDP, the
discount factor , calibrated considering the country-specic trend growth and the average real interest rate,
the home bias parameter (1 ), xed according to the country-specic sample evidence on import shares, the
separation rate , xed to the country estimates provided by Hobijn and Sahin (2009), the parameter dening
the frequency of wage re-optimization w, xed to the country estimates provided in Druant et al. (2012), and
the parameter dening the unemployment benet bu, xed according to the country-specic replacement rates
provided in the OECD-LFS data base (Christo¤el et al. 2009). The private capital share , the matching
e¢ ciency parameter m and the labor disutility scale parameter  are calibrated such that the labor share,
the unemployment rate and the job nding rate steady-state values evaluated at the prior parameterization
22Under the hypothesis of indexation, prices are changed period by period, ruling out any intepretation of the observed
frequencies of price changes in terms of frequencies of price re-optimizations.
23Such a small value ensures the satisfaction of the stability conditions (Lundvik 1992, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 2001) while
minimizing the exchange rate persistence induced by its "technical" relation with the NFA evolution.
24We assume full equivalence between the amount of resources devoted to the IMF and SDR quotas.
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match the sample counterparts for each country25 . Considering the country-specic dogmatic priors for the
nancial sector parameters, the contribution to the IMF parameter i is set according to the country SDR
quota (in Euro) to GDP ratios, whilst the international insurance e¢ ciency parameters z is xed such that
the debt repayment rate parameter zg in (20) matches the country-specic sample SDR quota. The country-
specic scale parameter of the government default probability function 's;g is xed in the following manner:
given the country-specic zg parameter and the sample government bond rate di¤erential qb (evaluated with
respect to the short-term interest rate), the country-specic government default probability pd;g is obtained
from equation (21). The latter univocally determines the country-specic scale parameter 's;g from (19),
given the common shape parameter s;g, the sample debt to GDP ratio and a prior value for the government
default probability b.
Finally, the coe¢ cients in the system of measurement equations (43), i.e. those in the vector of deviations
from GDP trend xy, in the vectors of tax rates  , of ination rates , of domestic and foreign real interest
rates and bond rate spreads,   log and qb, respectively, and the long-run nominal e¤ective exchange rate e,
are xed to the respective sample means.
The seven exclusion restrictions for the identication of the foreign variablesSVAR, i.e. the zero restriction
for b12, b13, b14, b21, b23, b24 and b34 add further seven dogmatic priors. Table 1 summarizes the common and
country-specic dogmatic priors adopted in model estimation for the structural parameters.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
2.3 Priors for estimated parameters
The subset of (38) structural model parameters who is not a¤ected by evident identication problems, the
34 coe¢ cients dening the stochastic component (30 for the domestic economy model and 4 for the foreign
SVAR) and the 73 coe¢ cients of the SVAR system (nine for the elements of the B matrix and 64 for the
vector autoregressive component) are estimated with the Bayesian method26 .
Outside the Calvo price parameters, the prior distributions are common across countries and are specied
following the standard practice: i) the shape of the probability density functions is the gamma and the
inverted gamma for parameters theoretically dened over the R+ range, the beta for parameters dened in a
[0  1] range and the normal for priors on parameters theoretically dened over the R range; ii) prior means
and standard deviations are dened on the basis of sample information (when available), or considering the
results of previous analyses27 . In order to enhance the estimation of parameters subject to weak empirical
identiability, informative priors are adopted such that a certain degree of curvature in the log-kernel is
obtained.
The prior means for the Calvo parameters of the domestic, import and export sectors, (dp, 
d
p 
d
p, respec-
25Sample data for the job nding rate are obtained by elaborating the information in the OECD Labor Force Survey data-base
series "Unemployment by duration".
26Operationally, posterior modes are obtained by maximizing the log-posterior kernel (resulting from the prior distribution and
the conditional distribution approximated by the Kalman lter) with respect to the model parameters, and posterior distributions
are obtained from the Metropolis-Hastings Monte Carlo Markov chain (MCMC) numerical integration algorithm. Two chains of
500k iterations are considered.
27The standard practice of considering results from previous studies is not free of limitations, since the validity domain of prior
evidence is not independent of the model being considered.
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tively) are specied according to the country-specic micro-evidence provided in Druant et al. (2012)28 , i.e.
0:71 for Greece, 0:75 for Ireland, 0:69 for Portugal and 0:70 for Italy and Spain. Since the available information
does not distinguish across sectors, we adopt a relatively high value for the prior standard deviation, equal to
0:1. A weak gamma-distributed prior with mean 1:5 and standard deviation 0:4 is adopted for the import and
export Armington elasticities  and  (Adolfson et al. 2008, Christiano et al. 2011b).
Considering the modied UIP equation, the autoregressive coe¢ cient es is assumed to be beta-distributed
with prior mean 0:5 and prior s.d. 0:15, whilst for the country risk adjustment coe¢ cient er we basically
follow Christiano et al. (2011b), assuming a (more) di¤use gamma distribution with prior mean 1:25 and prior
s.d. 0:5.
The private and public investment adjustment cost parameters  i and  ig are assumed to be normally
distributed around a prior mean of 5 with a prior s.d. of 2:5, and the utilization rate curvature parameter  k
is assumed to be beta-distributed with prior mean 0:5 and prior s.d. 0:15 (Christiano et al. 2011b).
Concerning the preference parameters, the consumption curvature parameter c is assumed to be normally-
distributed with a prior mean of 2 and a prior s.d. of 0:1, whilst the external habits parameter is assumed to
be beta-distributed and centered around 0:8 with a prior s.d. of 0:1. The prior for the fraction of liquidity
constrained households is rather di¤use, with mean 0:25 and s.d. 0:1029 .
Considering the labor market-specic parameters, a relatively weak beta-distributed prior with mean 0:5
and s.d. 0:15 is assumed for the matching function share parameter n and the unions relative bargaining
power parameter &. The prior for the hiring cost parameter  is assumed to be gamma-distributed with mean
0:05 and s.d. 0:01, a prior mean value consistent with a hiring cost to GDP ratio Y close to 1%.
Considering the nancial sector parameters dening the government and private sector default probabilities
and interest rate spreads, a gamma-distributed prior with mean 0:5 and s.d. 0:25 is adopted for the sensitivity
coe¢ cients b and a (to the debt and net foreign assets to GDP ratios, respectively), and the shape parameter
for the private sector default probability function s;p is assumed to be normally-distributed with a prior mean
of 1 and a prior s.d. of 0:5. These mean values are set jointly with the dogmatic priors on the other nancial
sector parameters and ensure exact correspondence between the steady state government bond and lending
rate spreads and their sample counterparts. The parameter dening the fraction of borrowed wage bill #b is
assumed to be beta-distributed with prior mean 0:5 and s.d. 0:25, whilst the lending rate adjustment cost
parameter b is assumed to be gamma-distributed with prior mean 3 and s.d. 1:5 (Gerali et al. 2010). The
very di¤use prior distributions adopted for these parameters reect our imprecise prior opinions, and imply
that their posterior estimates will be dominated by the conditional distribution.
Concerning the monetary policy parameters, the interest rate smoothness coe¢ cient R is assumed to be
beta-distributed with prior mean 0:75 and prior s.d. 0:2, the ination response parameter  1 is assumed to
be normally distributed with prior mean 2 and s.d. 0:2, whilst the output growth sensitivity parameter  2 is
assumed to be beta-distributed with prior mean (s.d.) of 0:25 (0:1). The three shift parameters accounting
for the monetary policy structural break in the smoothness coe¢ cient and in the feedback coe¢ cients are
assumed to be normally distributed with zero prior mean and s.d. equal to 0:2.
28The Kimball curvature, Calvo and mark-up (or demand elasticity) parameters are not separately identiable, as testied by
the results of preliminary identication checks at the prior values (Iskrev 2010a,b). We adopt the standard practice of xing the
Kimball and mark-up parameters to ensure the empirical identication of the estimated Calvo parameters.
29The preference parameters, even if separately identiable in our setting, are not fully variation-free. The choice of a relatively
tight prior for the consumption curvature parameter enhances the identiability of the other parameters.
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Considering the scal policy parameters, a beta-distributed prior with mean 0:75 and s.d. 0:15 is adopted
for the autoregressive components c , n , k and k in the tax rates partial adjustment equations, and
g, tr in the government consumption and transfers equations, respectively. For the coe¢ cients denoting the
sensitivity of these expenditure components to output, gy and try, an informative and normally distributed
prior with mean 1 and s.d. 0:1 is adopted, consistent with the hypothesis of long-run balanced growth of
public expenditures. A weakly informative beta-distributed prior with mean 0:05 and s.d. 0:02 is chosen for
the parameters gd and trd, dening the sensitivity of public consumption and transfers to the government
nancial need. The latter prior is equivalent to that chosen for the sensitivity of the tax rates to the nancial
need   , basically following the calibration value adopted in Drautzburg and Uhlig (2011). Finally, a weakly
informative beta-distributed prior with mean 0:25 and s.d. 0:10 is adopted for the tax instruments !c, !n and
!k, whilst !p is restricted to be equal to 1   !c + !n + !k.
Considering the stochastic component of the models, the prior opinions for the autoregressive coe¢ cients
of the seven persistent shock processes (i.e., a , ig , e , qb , %,  and x) are commonly described by a
weakly informative beta-distributed prior with mean 0:75 and s.d. 0:1530 . For the standard errors of the 26
innovations, we assume a prior mean of 0:01 with two degrees of freedom for all shocks, except those multiplying
convolutions of parameters whose values are outside the

10 1; 10

range, that are scaled accordingly.
The prior opinions on the estimated structural parameters are summarized in the rst column of the result
Table 2 (panels a-f).
The elicidation of priors for the foreign variables SVAR is based on the partially modied Minnesota
priors approach (Doan et al. 1984, Litterman 1986, Sims and Zha 1998) suggested by Banbura et al. (2010).
Accordingly, priors are specied under the hypothesis of independent AR(1) processes (random walks for
variables close to non-stationarity), with prior variabilities decreasing in the power of the lag order of the
SVAR i (net of an overall shrinkage parameter , calibrated according to the number of variables in the system)
and scaled considering the variableserror variance ratios 2m=
2
n, the latter approximated by the estimated
residuals of univariate autoregressive representations. Formally, the prior moments for the 73 coe¢ cients of
the fourth-order SVAR (42) are specied as follows:
E [(Ai;B)mn] =
# for i = 1; m = n
0 otherwise
, V [(Ai;B)mn] =
2
i2 for m = n
2
i2
2m
2n
otherwise
(44)
where the values for the rst-order autoregressive coe¢ cients # are obtained from the estimates of independent
AR(1) processes.
2.4 Posterior mean estimates
Table 2 summarizes the priors and the posterior mean estimates. Panels a-b-c-d consider the model economy,
the nancial sector, the monetary policy and the scal policy parameters, respectively. Panels e and f re-
port the estimates of the 34 parameters dening the persistence and the size of the 26 exogenous stochastic
30The autoregressive coe¢ cients  and x denote the persisitency of the stochastic component in the import and export
equations, respectively. Analitically, the rst component denes a stochastic home bias parameter, and the second a stochastic
elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic goods. The two stochastic components enter the log-linear representation
of the model additively, such that they do not inuence the empirical identiability of the preference parameters.
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components, respectively31 .
According to the estimated posterior mode standard deviations and the implied pseudo t-values, the struc-
tural parameter estimates, aside from #b, all appear signicant for each of the countries being considered.
The exogenous innovations are all signicant according to their standard errors and a relevant degree of
autocorrelation is obtained for the subset of autoregressive processes.
The posterior mean values for the model economy parameters are generally close to the respective modal
values and indicate reasonable estimates based on our prior opinions and results in the literature. Evident
exceptions are the unconventionally high posterior estimates obtained for the private and public capital adjust-
ment cost parameters  i and  ig, on average more than the double of the prior mean values, implying milder
investment and capital responses than those obtainable under standard calibration values. Furthermore, the
curvature parameter for the capital utilization rate  k is estimated to be very high and distant from the prior
in all countries. These results imply slow adjustments on both the investment and the capital utilization sides,
thus - other things being equal - high persistence in model dynamics.
TABLE 2a ABOUT HERE
A relevant degree of cross-country heterogeneity is obtained with respect to the parameter dening the
fraction of liquidity constrained households h, that are quite high for Portugal (0:49), basically in line with
the EZ estimates in Coenen and Straub (2005) and Forni et al. (2009) for Italy (0:36), Ireland (0:24) and
Spain (0:24) and quite low for Greece (0:13). These di¤erences are expected to a¤ect the size of the scal
multipliers, since a higher degree of rule-of-thumb behavior is reected in a more direct link between current
income and private consumption, i.e. in the breakdown of Ricardian equivalence (Galí et al. 2007).
The posterior mean estimates of the Calvo parameters in the domestic, import and export sectors, dp, 
m
p
and xp , respectively, are generally higher than the prior opinions based on survey evidence and the conven-
tional values used in the literature. This result basically reects the at slope of the NKPCs, which is more
pronounced than that implied by the joint consideration of the Calvo frequency micro-estimates and of the
conventional calibration values for the mark-up (or demand elasticity) parameters32 .
The estimated Armington elasticity , and in particular , are generally smaller than the prior and denote
a di¤erentiated pattern across countries. A similar consideration holds true for the risk premium parameterer, which is estimated to be slightly above unit only for Spain and Italy, thus ruling out a direct emergence
of the forward premium puzzle in the remaining countries.
The labor market parameters show a certain degree of variability across countries, particularly for the
unions relative bargaining power parameter &, estimated to be higher than the conventional value of 0:5
for all countries except Italy (0:34). The posterior mean estimates for the hiring cost parameter  and the
31Mode checks and multivariate M-H convergence plots signal that the estimation process performs correctly for all countries.
The mode estimates intersect the log posterior kernel at its maximum for all parameters. The multivariate diagnostics signal
that the estimates are stable both within (over replications) and particularly between chains. Posterior densities conrm these
encouraging indications, signaling a close to normal shape and a reasonable distance from prior densities (or a more concentrated
distribution), signalling that the estimated parameters are empirically identied. These results are available upon request from
the authors.
32For the countries considered in this study, the introduction of endogenous demand elasticities does not solve the micro-macro
dichotomy in the estimate of the NKPC slope coe¢ cients (Eichenbaum and Fisher 2007).
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matching function share parameter n are not distant from priors, except for the former parameter in the case
of Ireland ( = 0:032).
TABLE 2b ABOUT HERE
Concerning the nancial sector parameters, the coe¢ cient capturing the elasticity of the government default
probability to the debt to GDP ratio b is estimated to be well above the prior in all countries, ranging from a
minimum of 0:66 for Spain to a maximum of 1:64 for Portugal. The elasticity to the net foreign assets to GDP
ratio a is on average smaller and more in line with the prior, ranging from a minimum of 0:31 for Greece to
a maximum of 0:62 for Spain. The estimated shape parameter of private sector default probability function
is more homogeneous across countries and on average twice the prior size. A high degree of heterogeneity is
estimated for the lending rate adjustment cost parameter b, ranging from a minimum of 1:13 for Portugal
to a maximum of 21:5 for Spain. An evaluation of the elasticity of the government and private sector default
probabilities (thus of the government bond and lending rate spreads) to the debt and net foreign assets to
GDP ratios cannot be directly obtained from these parameters. Table 3 reports the expected variation in the
government bond and lending rate spreads consistent with a 20 percentage points temporary increase in the
debt to GDP ratio and in the net foreign assets to GDP ratio in the di¤erent countries.
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
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Considering the estimated monetary policy coe¢ cients adjusted for the break implied by the shift to the
single currency, a low degree of policy activism emerges. The size of the policy rate response to ination  1
is low in all countries, ranging from a minimum of 1:05 for Spain to a maximum of 1:28 for Portugal, whilst
the output growth response coe¢ cient  2 ranges from a minimum of 0:05 for Greece to a maximum of 0:12
for Italy. Joint with the estimated high degrees of inertial behavior (the coe¢ cient R is always well above
0:8), these results indicate a particularly mild monetary policy response to variations in ination and output,
potentially dampening its counter-cyclical e¤ects under standard scal expansions.
It is interesting to note that the posterior estimates of the three shift parameters accounting for the
monetary policy structural break are negative in all countries being considered, signalling that the shift to a
common currency and a centralized authority targeting average EZ ination and output has implied a reduced
degree of monetary policy activism with respect to the single economiesmacroeconomic developments33 .
TABLE 2d ABOUT HERE
Finally, the posterior estimates for the scal policy coe¢ cients conrm the high degree of inertia on both
the expenditure and the revenue sides, with estimated autoregressive coe¢ cients well above the conventional
33Detailed results on the monetary policy break estimates are reported in a technical appendix available upon request from
the authors.
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calibration value of 0:9 (Perotti 2005). It is interesting to note that the posterior estimates for the parameter
denoting the sensitivity of the tax rates to the government nancial need   , even if low and distant from the
prior, are basically consistent with the Galì and Perotti (2003) estimates for OECD countries. interestingly,
the estimated sensitivities of government consumption and transfers to the nancial need (gd and trd,
respectively) are on average higher and more heterogeneous across countries, with a minimum size close to
0:01 for Ireland and a maximum size close to 0:08 for Greece. The parameter dening the link between long-
run expenditure and output levels (gy and try) are always not signicantly di¤erent from unity, such that
the hypothesis of balanced growth in the scal variables, for the sample being considered, cannot be rejected.
TABLE 2e ABOUT HERE
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3 Policy simulations
In this section we provide a comparative analysis of the country-specic expected e¤ects from the implementa-
tion of ve nancially equivalent contractionary scal policies: i) a persistent, albeit not permanent, reduction
in government consumption; ii) an equally persistent reduction in government transfers; iii) a reduction in
government investment; iv) a generalized increase of indirect tax rates (on labor incomes, business prots
and capital gains); v) an increase in the consumption tax rate. These policies are evaluated by simulating
the model stochastically (thus assuming that they are unanticipated) and considering the parameterization
obtained at the country-specic posterior mean estimates.
The di¤erent simulations are made comparable by calibrating the size of each policy shock to be equivalent
to a 1% of GDP on impact and by homogenizing their persistence considering a common memory coe¢ cient
of 0:75, consistent with a one year average duration of the policy shock.
By construction, each policy measure implies government budget and debt variations, thus changes in the
tax rates and in the structure of public expenditure. However,in order to enhance the understanding of the
simulation results, we only consider the estimated systematic components in the revenue equations, i.e., the
specic elasticity of the tax rates to the nancial need, whilst the expenditure side is assumed to be fully
exogenous by setting the elasticities of the expenditure components to the nancial need and to GDP to zero.
The policy simulations are performed assuming both a standard environment, i.e. one in which the mon-
etary policy reacts to ination and output growth deviations from target according to the estimated values
of the Taylor rule feedback coe¢ cients, and a recessionary environment in which the economies are operat-
ing in a liquidity trap. To implement such a scenario, we calibrate a negative preference shock implying an
eight-quarters period non positive equilibrium interest rate for each country, and impose the zero-lower-bound
(ZLB) condition.
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3.1 Government purchase and direct tax shocks: into the mechanics of the risk
channel
Before discussing the results of the specic austerity measures, it is worth providing some details on the
dynamics activated by two alternative policy interventions on expenditure and revenues, i.e. a 1% GDP
negative government consumption shock and a 1% GDP positive shock to direct taxes (on labor income,
business prots and capital gains), depicted in Figures 2 and 3, respectively. The latter multiple shock is
obtained considering that the the 1% GDP scal contraction is obtained by increasing the specic tax rates
according to the estimated policy instruments weights !i, i = n; p; k.
To clarify the functioning of the transmission mechanics under the hypothesis of a default risk channel, the
20 quarters ahead impulse responses of GDP, the debt level, of the debt to GDP ratio, of the NFA evolution
and of the government bond and lending rate spreads are reported. These are normalized such that the GDP
response has an interpretation in terms of the dynamic monetary scal multiplier (i.e. the expected monetary
variation in GDP from a one euro budget variation), the debt to GDP ratio response depicts the deviation
from its steady state in terms of GDP percentage points, and the responses of the spreads refer to annualized
basic points.
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Considering the government consumption contraction, a rst outcome that merits to be highlighted is
the modest variability of the output response across countries, reecting the low sensitivity of the dynamic
multiplier of this measure to the heterogeneity in the estimated parameterization. This is due to the fact that
government purchases a¤ect output mainly directly, inducing only second-round e¤ects on price and wage
dynamics. The peak response is negative and reached on impact, and denotes a monetary multiplier ranging
from values slightly above 1 for Greece, Italy and Spain, to 1:35 for Portugal and above 1:8 for Ireland. These
results are fully consistent with the available average European estimates (Coenen and Straub 2005, Forni et
al. 2009), and highlight the role played by the degree of activism of the centralized monetary policy, which is
estimated to be low in all the peripheral economies in the analysis34 .
In the standard times scenario, there are no evident signals of the operation of a sovereign debt channel,
since the size of the country-specic multipliers are basically aligned with those obtainable from equally
parameterized country models in which the default risk channel e¤ects are eliminated.
As expected, the scal contraction leads to a reduction in the bond level in all countries, signalling that
the positive response of government expenditure, due to the rise in unemployment benets payments, and
the negative response of revenues, due to the tax rate cuts implicit to their endogenous specication, are not
su¢ cient to reverse the positive e¤ects of the scal contraction on the level of debt.
However, since the scal contraction leads to a more than proportional decrease in output, the debt to
GDP ratio temporarily increases in all the PIIGS countries, with a dynamic pattern which is substantially
dominated by the negative output response. The highest increase of the debt ratio, close to 1:7% of GDP, is
obtained on impact for Ireland, consistently with the negative output response; the smallest, close to 0:45%
34A common result of monetary models is that they are geneally unable to replicate the SVAR-based evidence on the size
of scal multipliers, since the standard calibration of monetay policy reaction rules impies an high degree of sterilization of the
inationary and growth-enancing e¤ects of scal expansions. This is not the case with our estimated model.
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of GDP, is obtained on impact for Spain. Conditional to our model and to the estimated parameterization,
scal austerity plans implemented with government purchase cuts are thus expected to be self-defeating in the
short-term.
In line with the expectations, the NFA response is positive in all countries, with evident cross-country
heterogeneity. The e¤ects are stronger in Ireland and Portugal, consistent with the deeper output contraction
and, in the case of Ireland, with the higher estimated elasticity coe¢ cient of imports, leading to even deeper
reductions in imported goods.
The moderate but positive response of both the interest rate spreads in all countries signals that the
improved NFA position relative to GDP is not enough in couterbalancing the pressure on sovereign default
risk due to the increase in the debt to GDP ratio. In other terms, the size of the elasticity of default risk and
thus of the bond spread to the variation in the debt to GDP ratio is high enough to dominate the counteracting
e¤ects implicit in the improvement in the NFA positions.
These results signal that, conditional to a negative government consumption shock, the default risk channel
operates in the opposite direction than predicted in the analysis of Corsetti et al. (2013). Moreover, the size of
the interest rate spreads response is very limited, signalling that, according to our model estimates, the default
risk channel is basically irrelevant. Aside from the role played by the estimated small size of the elasticity of
default risk to the macroeconomic fundamentals, the main responsible for these results is the consideration
of the debt to GDP ratio in the place of the debt level, whose response to a scal contraction is positive for
su¢ ciently large scal multipliers.
The e¤ects of a contractionary direct taxes shock are only qualitatively similar to those obtained considering
a nancially equivalent government consumption reduction. The scal contraction has negative and persistent
e¤ects on real output for all countries, even if the implicit peak multipliers are substantially smaller than those
obtained with the government purchase shock, a result which is basically in line with the abundant SVAR-
based empirical literature on scal multipliers since the seminal analysis of Blanchard and Perotti (2002).
Moreover, the output dynamic multiplier is heterogeneous across countries, mainly because of the di¤erent
fractions of liquidity constrained households estimated in the di¤erent countries. The fraction of rule-of-thumb
households is in fact estimated to be particularly low for Greece, reecting the low correlation between private
consumption and current net incomes in the sample. Considering the recent evolution of the Greek economy,
it is highly probable that the fraction of liquidity constrained households increased strongly. We have veried
that, by including a dummy variable controlling for the recessionary periods, the estimated degree of liquidity
constraints increases by nearly 18 percentage points for Greece.
Following the tax rates shock, the debt level decreases temporarily in all countries but Ireland, partly
because of the higher unemployment response and the resulting increase in unemployment benet payments.
As a result of the debt and the GDP dynamics, a moderate but persistent surge in their ratio emerges.
Even in the case of a revenue-based scal contraction, our results indicate that the hypothesis of expan-
sionary scal contractions is not empirically relevant, such that the implementation of austerity plans can be
self-defeating in the short to medium term, and that the hypothesis of a sovereign risk channel, if e¤ective,
operates in the opposite direction when evaluated conditional to scal shocks.
It is interesting to note that, under the tax-based scal contraction, the positive response of the net foreign
asset position obtained in all countries is always signicantly larger than that obtained under the expenditure-
based contraction, despite the smaller drop in economic activity. This implies that the response of imports is
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much stronger, a result signalling that the tax reduction induces a signicant variation in the relative price of
the domestic production, i.e. a real exchange rate devaluation. The internal devaluation is triggered by the
increased tax pressure, implying an immediate contraction of the after tax incomes and of the consumption
expenditures of liquidity-constrained households. Even if the resulting decrease in labor supply tends to
counterbalance the deationary pressure, the latter tends to prevail.
Concerning the e¤ects of the scal retrenchment on the sovereign default probability on bond and lending
rate spreads, the impulse responses clearly show that the contractionary tax policy, similarly to the contrac-
tionary expenditure policy, stimulates a moderate increase in the government bond and lending rate spreads.
Two key indications from the analysis of the conditional dynamics emerge: rst, the relation between
sovereign debt, net foreign position and interest rate spreads is rather weak in all the peripheral EZ economies
considered in the study, such that the recent surge in government bond and lending rate premia in these
countries should be mainly attributed to idiosyncratic factors only loosely related with macroeconomic fun-
damentals (De Grauwe and Ji 2013); second, the hypothesis that - when monetary policy is unconstrained -
a sovereign risk channel can mitigate the contractionary e¤ects of scal consolidations or even - in a liquidity
trap constrained regime - lead to an economic expansion, is not empirically supported when considering a
short to medium term perspective, since scal contractions are temporarily but persistently self-defeating,
irrespective of the policy instrument being considered.
The explanation for the di¤erent results of our analysis as compared to those in Corsetti et al. (2013) relies
heavily on the measure of indebtness considered in the denition of the default probability. The use of the
debt level basically constrains the direction of change of the default probability to the one of the policy. The
use of the debt to GDP ratio, which is generally accepted as a more appropriate measure of scal fragility,
does not impose such a restriction and highlights the role of the size of the scal multipliers, determining the
direction of the variation in the debt to GDP ratio and thus of the default probability.
3.2 Fiscal contractions in unconstrained and constrained monetary policy regimes
The relative e¢ cacy of alternative scal measures in di¤erent countries depends both on the di¤erent degrees
of nominal and wage rigidity and on the potentially di¤erent interaction between scal and monetary policy
regimes.
Considering a scal retrenchment, an aggressive monetary policy response is expected to reduce the con-
tractionary output response, given the counteracting e¤ects on consumption and investments of the interest
rate drop that follows the induced deation.
In a situation in which the monetary policy response is particularly loose, or constrained by the presence
of a binding ZLB, a restrictive and thus deationary scal policy cannot be accommodated by the automatic
response of the monetary authority, since the nominal interest rate cannot be reduced further. As a result, the
induced deation is entirely translated into increased real interest rates, that further depress internal demand
and economic activity. In these circumstances, that characterize the present economic environment of most
EZ peripheral countries, scal multipliers are likely to be maximized (Christiano et al. 2011a, Eggertsson
2011, Eggertsson and Krugman 2012) and scal retrenchments can hardly resolve in an economic expansion.
The consideration of a sovereign risk channel mainly operating through the dynamics of the debt to GDP
ratio reinforces the latter result, provided that the scal contractions negative e¤ects on output - maximized
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in a constrained monetary policy regime - lead to the increase of the debt to GDP ratio and thus of the bond
and lending rate spreads. The key factor in the sign of the propagation mechanics activated by the presence
of a sovereign risk channel is, even in the constrained regime, the size of the scal multipliers. Note that their
relevance, aside from extreme cases in which the systematic component in the government budget is strongly
counter-cyclical, is ruled out when considering that the default probability depends of the evolution of the
debt level.
Table 4 compares the peak monetary multipliers of alternative contractionary scal policies in both the
constrained and the unconstrained monetary policy regimes. Considering a scal retrenchment implemented
through government consumption cuts, the simulation results indicate that, in all the countries considered in
the analysis, the contractionary e¤ects are maximized on impact in the unconstrained regime and one quarter
later when the ZLB binds. In the latter case, the scal multiplier is signicantly increased, ranging from
a minimum value close to 1:7 for Greece to a maximum close to 2:6 for Ireland. The country-specic scal
multipliers of government transfers are much smaller and heterogeneous than those of government consumption,
and tend to increase in the constrained monetary policy regime.
Following an equivalent contraction in public transfers, the smallest negative output e¤ect is expected for
Greece, given a peak multiplier close to 0:08 in the unconstrained regime and to 0:12 when the ZLB binds,
whilst the highest e¤ects are expected for Portugal, provided that the peak multiplier is close to 0:41 in normal
times and 0:52 in the liquidity trap regime. The heterogeneity of results basically reects the di¤erent fractions
of liquidity constrained households being estimated for the di¤erent economies, as a higher degree of rule of
thumb behavior implies a closer link with after tax and transfers incomes.
Considering the scal multipliers of government investment-based scal retrenchments, the simulations
signals that the peak e¤ects are expected to realize only after 5   6 periods, consistent with the estimated
high public investment adjustment costs and the logic of public capital accumulation, and that the negative
e¤ects on output are smaller than those expected for an equivalent government consumption cut. The implicit
scal multipliers range from a minimum of 0:35 for Italy in the unconstrained regime to a maximum of 0:77
for Portugal, even in this case reached in the standard times regime. Interestingly, the simulations signal that
when the binding ZLB regime leads to a modest increase of the scal multipliers only in the case of Italy (0:38)
and Spain (0:43), whilst for the other countries a signicant drop in size is obtained.
Similar results hold true in all countries for the implicit scal multipliers of direct and indirect tax increases.
In both cases, the simulation results indicate that, in the monetary policy constrained regime, the multipliers
tend to be smaller than in the unconstrained regime. This result is particularly evident in the case of the
direct income taxation, for which the lowest normal times scal multiplier, obtained for Greece, is halved in
the constrained regime (from 0:12 to 0:06), as it is for the highest, obtained for Portugal (from 0:38 to 0:18).
Considering the consumption tax increase, the contraction in scal multipliers observed in the binding
ZLB environment is on average less strong, except for Portugal, for which the implicit scal multiplier changes
from a value of 0:28 in the unconstrained regime to a value of 0:14 in the constrained regime.
The economic reason for such a result is that, in the constrained regime, scal contractions based on
government investment cuts and on tax increases lead to a counteracting inationary pressure, reducing the
increase of the real interest rate that would obtain given the deation and the xed policy rate. A public
investment cut a¤ects both the demand and the supply sides of the economy, activating a deationary pressure
because of decreased demand, and an inationary pressure because of decreased supply, thus of increased
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marginal costs. Our results indicate that the latter e¤ect is high enough to reduce the rise in the response of
real interest rate for Greece, Ireland and Portugal, downsizing the implicit scal multipliers accordingly. A
similar line of reasoning holds also for a general tax increase which, by reducing the after tax incomes, leads
to both decreased demand in the fraction of liquidity constrained households and to decreased labor supply,
the latter activating a counteracting inationary pressure in wages, thus in marginal costs and prices. In the
constrained regime the latter e¤ect tends to prevail in all countries, and the resulting reduction in the real
interest rate response leads to a generalized contraction of the tax multipliers.
On this respect, our empirical results are only marginally consistent with those obtained by Eggertsson
(2011), showing that, in a liquidity trap environment, tax cuts can lead to an output contraction35 . Our
results, emerging in an extended structural model setting estimated on country data show that, for the
economies considered in this analysis, the transmission mechanics addressed by Eggertsson (2011) is at work,
but its strength is not su¢ cient to reverse the sign of the tax multiplier. As a consequence, the direction in
which the default risk channel produces its (modest) e¤ects, continue to be procyclical, i.e. opposite to the
one predicted by Corsetti et al. (2013).
4 Conclusions
We develop, estimate and simulate a model characterized by government bond and lending rate spreads
originating in the sovereign default risk triggered by internal and foreign debt positions. The consideration of
an endogenous default risk channel introduces interesting elements for the conduct of scal policy in highly
indebted economies, especially when the economy is stuck at the ZLB. In principle, for increasing levels of
debt and for small sized scal multipliers, a scal retrenchment can even be expansionary, given the induced
reduction in the domestic and foreign debt positions, triggering a reduction in sovereign and private default
risk and thus of the interest rate spreads.
The analysis, developed at the country-level for a selection of peripheral EZ economies (the PIIGS), is
based on the simulation of the country-specic responses to nancially equivalent contractionary scal policies
a¤ecting government expenditure and revenues.
Results show that, contrary to some conclusions in the recent literature addressing the role of the sovereign
risk channel in determining the size and the sign of the scal multipliers, the default risk channel can at best
be only marginally e¤ective, since the (unconditional) relation between sovereign debts, net foreign positions
and interest rate spreads is rather weak in all the peripheral EZ economies considered in the study.
Furthermore, conditional to scal retrenchments, the default risk channel operates in the opposite direction
than predicted, since sovereign default risk tends to increase in all the economies being considered, such that
the size of the Keynesian multiplier is amplied by the operation of this risk channel. Fiscal contractions lead
to temporary but persistent increases in the debt to GDP ratio, hence to rising sovereign and private default
probabilities and interest rate spreads. The improvement in the NFA position to GDP ratio, emerging after
35Eggertsson (2011) obtain this result in a simplied model setting assuming full Ricardian equivalence. A similar result is
obtained by Beqiraj and Tancioni (2014) with an extended estimated model considering rule of thumb behavior in a fraction of
househlds. In his comment to the Eggertssons (2011) paper, Christiano (2011) provides some useful insights and identies two
major ingredients for the deationary pressure to emerge following a tax cut: i) the persistence of the deationary pressure, i.e.
the presence of relevant price rigidities; ii) the sensitivity of expenditures to the real interest rate, i.e. the empirical relevance of
the Euler consumption equation.
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the implementation of the contractionary scal policy in all the countries considered in the analysis, is not
su¢ cient to stimulate a reduction in default probabilities and spreads to an extent such that the former e¤ects
can be reversed.
Two are the key factors responsible for these results. First, since the estimated elasticity of the observed
sovereign risk (spreads) to macroeconomic fundamentals is weak, the variations in bond and lending rates
resulting from variations in the degree of fragility of domestic and foreign debt positions cannot be of rst
order. Second, since the estimated degree of activism of monetary policy is low, the size of the scal multipliers
is relatively high, such that - jointly with the operation of the systematic component of scal policy, scal
contractions lead to increased the debt to GDP ratios in all the countries considered in the analysis.
The consideration of a liquidity trap environment reinforces our conclusions, since the implicit multipliers
of government expenditure are generally increased, whilst the reduction observed for those of government
revenues is not su¢ cient to generate an inversion in the sign of the response of the debt to GDP ratios, ruling
out the activation of the counter-cyclical e¤ects from the sovereign default risk channel.
The moderate di¤erences in results observed in the constrained and unconstrained regimes are due to a
lack of coordination between scal and monetary policy, a result that, according to our country estimates, is
not entirely specic to the liquidity trap environment.
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TABLE 1 - DOGMATIC PRIORS: STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS
Parameter Description Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
 Discount factor 0:994 0:997 0:996 0:998 0:995
 Production function parameter 0:265 0:220 0:333 0:210 0:220
 Capital depreciation rate 0:025 0:025 0:025 0:025 0:025
g Government capital depreciation rate 0:025 0:025 0:025 0:025 0:025
 Import share 0:206 0:656 0:210 0:262 0:202
 Separation rate 0:028 0:042 0:021 0:039 0:061
m Matching e¢ ciency 0:910 0:200 0:950 0:500 1:500
 Labor disutility scale 0:100 1:000 4:000 0:200 0:600
bu Unemployment benet 0:650 0:650 0:630 0:720 0:610
w Renegotiation wage frequency 0:750 0:800 0:850 0:770 0:750
ip Price markups 1:200 1:200 1:200 1:200 1:200
i Demand elasticity 10:00 10:00 10:00 10:00 10:00
ip Price indixation 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
 Growth rate 0:999 1:007 1:002 1:003 1:002ea Exchange rate elasticity to net asset 0:001 0:001 0:001 0:001 0:001
d Relative government transfers share 1:000 1:000 1:000 1:000 1:000
l Interest rate markups 1:025 1:025 1:025 1:025 1:025
s;g Sovreign default shape parameter 20:00 20:00 20:00 20:00 20:00
's;g Sovreign default scale parameter 0:490 0:565 0:509 0:614 0:759
's;p Private. default shape parameter 5:000 5:000 5:000 5:000 5:000
i Domestic insurance contribution 0:027 0:022 0:013 0:023 0:011
i Foreign insurance contribution 0:008 0:008 0:008 0:008 0:008
z Contribution e¢ ciency 0:228 0:621 0:560 0:340 0:461
Notes : The parameters related to "great ratios" and other observable quantities related to steady state values are
calibrated considering that the time unit is a quarter. The sector specic parameters denoted by i = d, m, x are
assumed to be of equal value.
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TABLE 2a - PRIOR DISTRIBUTIONS AND POSTERIOR MEAN ESTIMATES: MODEL ECONOMY
Prior distribution Posterior mean
Density Mean Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
(s.d.) [c.i.] [c.i.] [c.i.] [c.i.] [c.i.]
dp G 0:69  0:75 0:933 0:892 0:879 0:848 0:924
(0:10) [0:927  0:939] [0:875  0:911] [0:870  0:888] [0:832  0:865] [0:916  0:933]
mp G 0:69  0:75 0:856 0:878 0:848 0:925 0:789
(0:10) [0:819  0:899] [0:843  0:913] [0:816  0:883] [0:903  0:948] [0:753  0:824]
xp G 0:69  0:75 0:821 0:843 0:820 0:875 0:901
(0:10) [0:784  0:860] [0:805  0:886] [0:774  0:878] [0:842  0:915] [0:895  0:906]
c N 2:00 2:074 2:012 1:909 2:024 2:078
(0:10) [1:919  2:227] [1:843  2:178] [1:774  2:048] [1:858  2:193] [1:923  2:240]
h B 0:70 0:828 0:905 0:818 0:910 0:845
(0:10) [0:791  0:866] [0:872  0:940] [0:784  0:853] [0:876  0:941] [0:814  0:877]
h B 0:25 0:127 0:239 0:358 0:490 0:238
(0:10) [0:081  0:174] [0:119  0:360] [0:276  0:443] [0:377  0:598] [0:165  0:311]
 G 1:50 1:050 1:514 0:445 0:601 1:092
(0:40) [0:865  1:218] [0:855  2:167] [0:313  0:580] [0:438  0:764] [0:914  1:273]
 G 1:50 0:526 0:826 0:852 0:527 0:607
(0:40) [0:400  0:658] [0:651  0:998] [0:748  0:955] [0:409  0:647] [0:469  0:736]es B 0:50 0:827 0:834 0:942 0:883 0:960
(0:15) [0:725  0:954] [0:694  0:957] [0:904  0:981] [0:836  0:934] [0:934  0:986]er G 1:25 0:948 0:878 1:010 0:886 1:247
(0:50) [0:885  1:002] [0:778  0:970] [0:964  1:057] [0:841  0:923] [1:097  1:396]
 i N 5:00 13:04 12:40 11:37 10:80 10:89
(2:50) [10:14  15:90] [10:01  14:82] [9:389  13:33] [8:669  12:95] [8:65  13:20]
 ig N 5:00 12:30 15:43 15:11 6:765 13:96
(2:50) [9:380  15:08] [12:66  18:26] [12:57  17:55] [4:275  9:413] [11:33  16:53]
 k B 0:50 0:987 0:645 0:970 0:972 0:949
(0:15) [0:979  0:996] [0:608  0:683] [0:958  0:982] [0:953  0:992] [0:921  0:976]
n B 0:50 0:553 0:571 0:525 0:584 0:501
(0:10) [0:447  0:671] [0:427  0:707] [0:373  0:690] [0:450  0:712] [0:332  0:662]
& B 0:50 0:658 0:780 0:337 0:628 0:571
(0:10) [0:582  0:736] [0:720  0:841] [0:245  0:426] [0:559  0:706] [0:484  0:660]
 G 0:05 0:041 0:034 0:047 0:043 0:050
(0:01) [0:028  0:055] [0:024  0:044] [0:032  0:062] [0:032  0:056] [0:034  0:065]
Notes : N and B are Normal and Beta distributions, respectively. Posterior mean estimates for the model economy
parameters are obtained with 250000 M-H replications on two parallel chains. * denotes the range of values for the
country-specic values Druant et al. (2012).
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TABLE 2b - PRIOR DISTRIBUTIONS AND POSTERIOR MEAN ESTIMATES: FINANCIAL SECTOR
Prior distribution Posterior mean
Density Mean Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
(s.d.) [c.i.] [c.i.] [c.i.] [c.i.] [c.i.]
#b B 0:50 0:201 0:218 0:037 0:270 0:027
(0:20) [0:002  0:452] [0:001  0:475] [0:000  0:081] [0:007  0:533] [0:000  0:050]
b G 0:50 1:093 1:627 1:295 1:643 0:664
(0:25) [0:668  1:502] [1:153  2:079] [0:823  1:765] [1:219  2:061] [0:363  0:961]
a G 0:50 0:311 0:428 0:429 0:462 0:618
(0:25) [0:050  0:535] [0:098  0:748] [0:080  0:766] [0:119  0:782] [0:262  0:963]
s;p N 1:00 1:957 1:933 1:959 2:106 1:733
(0:50) [1:678  2:235] [1:604  2:263] [1:611  2:292] [1:778  2:420] [1:402  2:063]
b G 3:00 3:389 1:516 5:782 1:131 21:55
(1:50) [0:500  6:382] [0:240  2:853] [1:665  9:695] [0:421  1:798] [18:87  23:77]
Notes : B, G and N are Beta, Gamma and Normal distributions, respectively. Posterior mean estimates for the
nancial sector parameters are obtained with 250000 M-H replications on two parallel chains.
TABLE 2c - PRIOR DISTRIBUTIONS AND POSTERIOR MEAN ESTIMATES: MONETARY AUTHORITY
Prior distribution Posterior mean
Density Mean Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
(s.d.) [c.i.] [c.i.] [c.i.] [c.i.] [c.i.]
R B 0:75 0:844 0:900 0:884 0:879 0:877
(0:20) [0:825  0:865] [0:879  0:922] [0:869  0:898] [0:861  0:896] [0:863  0:891]
 1 N 2:00 1:174 1:220 1:115 1:279 1:045
(0:20) [1:129  1:222] [1:099  1:334] [1:053  1:173] [1:203  1:351] [1:019  1:072]
 2 B 0:10 0:051 0:052 0:123 0:055 0:134
(0:05) [0:024  0:081] [0:027  0:075] [0:094  0:149] [0:033  0:076] [0:105  0:163]
Notes : B and N are Beta and Normal distributions, respectively. Posterior mean estimates for the monetary authority
parameters are obtained with 250000 M-H replications on two parallel chains.
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TABLE 2d - PRIOR DISTRIBUTIONS AND POSTERIOR MEAN ESTIMATES: FISCAL AUTHORITY
Prior distribution Posterior mean
Density Mean Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
(s.d.) [c.i.] [c.i.] [c.i.] [c.i.] [c.i.]
!c B 0:25 0:392 0:550 0:223 0:423 0:484
(0:10) [0:274  0:516] [0:427  0:675] [0:144  0:307] [0:318  0:528] [0:380  0:585]
!n B 0:25 0:604 0:244 0:703 0:580 0:477
(0:10) [0:478  0:720] [0:130  0:363] [0:600  0:812] [0:459  0:701] [0:370  0:581]
!k B 0:25 0:007 0:205 0:031 0:001 0:008
(0:10) [0:003  0:011] [0:096  0:309] [0:010  0:051] [0:000  0:001] [0:003  0:012]
  B 0:05 0:013 0:012 0:013 0:019 0:013
(0:02) [0:009  0:016] [0:008  0:016] [0:010  0:016] [0:012  0:026] [0:010  0:015]
c B 0:75 0:969 0:977 0:955 0:953 0:979
(0:15) [0:944  0:995] [0:961  0:995] [0:919  0:991] [0:918  0:987] [0:963  0:996]
n B 0:75 0:986 0:989 0:988 0:988 0:964
(0:15) [0:974  0:997] [0:981  0:998] [0:979  0:998] [0:978  0:999] [0:940  0:990]
k B 0:75 0:975 0:981 0:978 0:987 0:981
(0:15) [0:956  0:994] [0:969  0:994] [0:959  0:997] [0:977  0:999] [0:968  0:995]
p B 0:75 0:977 0:972 0:961 0:992 0:970
(0:15) [0:960  0:995] [0:951  0:993] [0:931  0:993] [0:985  0:999] [0:947  0:993]
g B 0:75 0:924 0:958 0:960 0:976 0:981
(0:15) [0:881  0:966] [0:932  0:982] [0:931  0:991] [0:959  0:995] [0:966  0:998]
tr B 0:75 0:974 0:973 0:971 0:916 0:984
(0:15) [0:953  0:995] [0:960  0:986] [0:953  0:990] [0:870  0:960] [0:971  0:999]
gy N 1:00 0:927 0:974 1:035 1:038 1:044
(0:10) [0:770  1:081] [0:808  1:137] [0:873  1:203] [0:868  1:199] [0:871  1:219]
try N 1:00 0:999 1:016 1:027 1:022 1:034
(0:10) [0:826  1:152] [0:849  1:185] [0:862  1:192] [0:864  1:190] [0:870  1:194]
gd B 0:05 0:032 0:020 0:020 0:021 0:011
(0:02) [0:013  0:049] [0:009  0:030] [0:012  0:028] [0:010  0:031] [0:007  0:016]
trd B 0:05 0:078 0:063 0:019 0:023 0:017
(0:02) [0:041  0:114] [0:048  0:077] [0:012  0:026] [0:011  0:034] [0:010  0:023]
Notes : N and B are Normal and Beta distributions, respectively. Posterior mean estimates for the scal authority
parameters are obtained with 250000 M-H replications on two parallel chains.
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TABLE 2e - PRIOR DISTRIBUTIONS AND POSTERIOR MEAN ESTIMATES: AR(1) COEFICIENTS OF SHOCKS
Prior distribution Posterior mean
Density Mean Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
(s.d.) [c.i.] [c.i.] [c.i.] [c.i.] [c.i.]
a B 0:75 0:994 0:942 0:912 0:936 0:924
(0:15) [0:989  0:999] [0:926  0:960] [0:895  0:930] [0:914  0:957] [0:910  0:938]
ig B 0:75 0:904 0:778 0:154 0:193 0:804
(0:15) [0:855  0:951] [0:758  0:797] [0:059  0:245] [0:084  0:294] [0:734  0:876]
e B 0:75 0:736 0:837 0:890 0:982 0:915
(0:15) [0:332  0:926] [0:776  0:901] [0:865  0:916] [0:973  0:993] [0:889  0:940]
qb B 0:75 0:947 0:953 0:906 0:925 0:923
(0:15) [0:915  0:984] [0:923  0:982] [0:878  0:935] [0:894  0:958] [0:895  0:952]
% B 0:75 0:933 0:995 0:911 0:955 0:934
(0:15) [0:891  0:999] [0:990  0:999] [0:886  0:936] [0:925  0:989] [0:915  0:953]
 B 0:75 0:966 0:973 0:910 0:943 0:945
(0:15) [0:948  0:987] [0:951  0:994] [0:885  0:936] [0:901  0:985] [0:926  0:965]
x B 0:75 0:973 0:982 0:894 0:940 0:904
(0:15) [0:965  0:983] [0:968  0:996] [0:866  0:923] [0:888  0:989] [0:880  0:927]
l B 0:50 0:631 0:863 0:593 0:905 0:840
(0:20) [0:520  0:742] [0:799  0:932] [0:473  0:718] [0:860  0:953] [0:780  0:917]
Notes : B represent the Beta distributions. Posterior mean estimates for the AR(1) coecients of shocks are obtained
with 250000 M-H replications on two parallel chains.
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TABLE 2f - PRIOR DISTRIBUTIONS AND POSTERIOR MEAN ESTIMATES: S.D. OF SHOCK PROCESSES
Prior distribution Posterior mean
Density Mean Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
(s.d.) [c.i.] [c.i.] [c.i.] [c.i.] [c.i.]
"n;t G 1 0:01 0:008 0:003 0:005 0:006 0:003
(2:00) [0:007  0:008] [0:003  0:004] [0:004  0:005] [0:006  0:007] [0:003  0:004]
"p;t G 1 0:01 0:003 0:003 0:003 0:002 0:004
(2:00) [0:002  0:003] [0:003  0:004] [0:003  0:003] [0:002  0:003] [0:004  0:004]
"k;t G 1 0:01 0:004 0:019 0:007 0:001 0:004
(2:00) [0:004  0:005] [0:017  0:021] [0:006  0:008] [0:001  0:001] [0:003  0:004]
"c;t G 1 0:01 0:004 0:005 0:002 0:004 0:004
(2:00) [0:003  0:004] [0:004  0:005] [0:002  0:002] [0:004  0:005] [0:003  0:004]
"g;t G 1 0:01 0:025 0:028 0:019 0:024 0:011
(2:00) [0:022  0:027] [0:025  0:031] [0:017  0:021] [0:021  0:026] [0:010  0:012]
"tr;t G 1 0:01 0:079 0:027 0:014 0:021 0:013
(2:00) [0:071  0:087] [0:024  0:030] [0:012  0:015] [0:019  0:023] [0:011  0:014]
"ig;t G 1 0:1 0:112 0:198 0:994 0:787 0:124
(2:00) [0:088  0:133] [0:164  0:231] [0:822  1:157] [0:477  1:094] [0:092  0:155]
"a;t G 1 0:01 0:012 0:019 0:010 0:013 0:009
(2:00) [0:010  0:013] [0:016  0:021] [0:009  0:011] [0:011  0:015] [0:008  0:010]
"r;t G 1 0:01 0:003 0:004 0:002 0:002 0:003
(2:00) [0:003  0:003] [0:004  0:005] [0:002  0:002] [0:002  0:002] [0:003  0:003]
"dp;t G 1 0:50 7:185 2:747 1:309 0:735 2:836
(2:00) [5:873  8:433] [1:815  3:668] [1:086  1:530] [0:555  0:918] [2:128  3:520]
"mp;t G 1 0:5 3:605 1:744 2:789 12:42 1:565
(2:00) [1:749  5:686] [0:739  2:655] [1:535  3:923] [5:287  19:68] [1:019  2:082]
"xp;t G 1 0:5 2:998 2:002 1:814 3:048 1:096
(2:00) [1:717  4:252] [0:960  3:160] [0:818  3:004] [1:412  5:025] [0:740  1:441]
"qb;t G 1 0:01 0:004 0:004 0:002 0:002 0:002
(2:00) [0:003  0:004] [0:003  0:004] [0:002  0:002] [0:002  0:002] [0:002  0:003]
"qi;t G 1 0:5 0:284 0:855 0:208 0:320 0:269
(2:00) [0:218  0:343] [0:682  1:021] [0:170  0:245] [0:252  0:385] [0:214  0:326]
"e;t G 1 0:01 0:007 0:003 0:003 0:001 0:002
(2:00) [0:002  0:016] [0:002  0:004] [0:002  0:003] [0:000  0:001] [0:002  0:003]
Notes : G represent the Gamma distributions. Posterior mean estimates for the standard deviation.of shock processes
are obtained with 250000 M-H replications on two parallel chains.
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TABLE 2f - (CONTINUED)
Prior distribution Posterior mean
Density Mean Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
(s.d.) [c.i.] [c.i.] [c.i.] [c.i.] [c.i.]
"c;t G 1 0:01 0:185 0:337 0:122 0:423 0:112
(2:00) [0:136  0:231] [0:219  0:451] [0:093  0:151] [0:258  0:591] [0:084  0:140]
"n;t G 1 0:01 0:061 0:043 0:013 0:033 0:025
(2:00) [0:051  0:071] [0:033  0:053] [0:011  0:015] [0:028  0:038] [0:021  0:029]
"x;t G 1 0:01 0:037 0:026 0:030 0:024 0:035
(2:00) [0:033  0:041] [0:023  0:028] [0:027  0:033] [0:021  0:027] [0:031  0:039]
"cpi;t G 1 0:01 0:010 0:011 0:007 0:005 0:012
(2:00) [0:009  0:011] [0:010  0:012] [0:006  0:008] [0:004  0:005] [0:011  0:013]
";t G 1 0:01 0:028 0:032 0:028 0:021 0:033
(2:00) [0:025  0:031] [0:028  0:035] [0:025  0:031] [0:019  0:024] [0:029  0:037]
"%;t G 1 0:01 0:010 0:013 0:007 0:007 0:009
(2:00) [0:009  0:011] [0:011  0:014] [0:007  0:008] [0:006  0:008] [0:008  0:010]
"dp;t G 1 0:005 0:006 0:006 0:006 0:006 0:006
(2:00) [0:006  0:007] [0:006  0:007] [0:006  0:007] [0:006  0:007] [0:006  0:007]
"y;t G 1 0:005 0:006 0:006 0:006 0:006 0:006
(2:00) [0:005  0:006] [0:005  0:006] [0:005  0:006] [0:005  0:006] [0:005  0:006]
"r;t G 1 0:005 0:002 0:002 0:002 0:002 0:002
(2:00) [0:002  0:002] [0:002  0:002] [0:002  0:002] [0:002  0:002] [0:002  0:002]
"rl;t G 1 0:005 0:001 0:001 0:001 0:001 0:001
(2:00) [0:001  0:001] [0:001  0:001] [0:001  0:001] [0:001  0:001] [0:001  0:001]
"
l
;t G 1 0:01 0:133 0:184 0:068 0:103 0:079
(2:00) [0:117  0:149] [0:164  0:204] [0:059  0:077] [0:092  0:114] [0:071  0:088]
Notes : G represent the Gamma distributions. Posterior mean estimates for the standard deviation.of shock processes
are obtained with 250000 M-H replications on two parallel chains.
TABLE 3 - EXPECTED INCREASE IN BOND AND LENDING SPREADS - in basis points
20% Increase in Spread on Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
Bt
Y t r
g
t 213:0 19:6 36:9 39:8 85:4
A t
Y t r
g
t 5:6 1:1 2:3 2:2 23:6
Bt
Y t r
l
t 14:0 1:4 0:6 1:3 1:4
A t
Y t r
l
t 0:4 0:1 0:0 0:1 0:4
Notes : Interest rate spread are expressed in basis points. The lending rate spread does not consider the mark-up.
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FIGURE 1 - DEBT/GDP RATIO, SENSITIVITY PARAMETER, DEFAULT RISK AND BOND RATE SPREAD
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0
2
4
6
8
10 0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Debt/GDP Sensitivity
Debt/GDP
D
ef
au
lt 
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
0
2
4
6
8
10 0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
1
1.05
1.1
1.15
1.2
1.25
1.3
Debt/GDP Sensitivity
Debt/GDP
B
on
d 
R
at
e 
S
pr
ea
d
Notes : In the gure the value of the sovreign default probability and interest rate spreads on government bonds
are reported.The latter consider a scal ceiling based on a maximum value of the service cost equal to the value of
output. The black line represent Ireland, the blue Greece, the cylan Spain, green Portugal and yellow Italy. For all
the periphery countries scal stance binds before default occurs.
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FIGURE 2 - RESPONSE TO A 1% GDP GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION CONTRACTION
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Notes : Impulse response of output (Yt), bond (Bt), bond to output ratio (Bt=Yt), net foreign asset (At),net
foreign asset to output ratio (At=Yt), government interest rate spread (R
g
t   Rt) and lending interest rate spread
(Rlt  Rt) to a one percent GDP government expenditure contraction in the periphery of the eurozone obtained at the
posterior mean estimate. Government and lending interest rate spreads are expressed in basis points.
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FIGURE 3 - RESPONSE TO A 1% GDP DIRECT TAX INCREASE
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Notes : Impulse response of output (Yt), bond (Bt), bond to output ratio (Bt=Yt), net foreign asset (At),net
foreign asset to output ratio (At=Yt), government interest rate spread (R
g
t   Rt) and lending interest rate spread
(Rlt Rt) to a one percent GDP direct taxes increase, such as enterprise, capital and labor income tax increases in the
periphery of the eurozone obtained at the posterior mean estimate. Government and lending interest rate spreads are
expressed in basis points.
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TABLE 4 - PEAK FISCAL MULTIPLIERS (quarter) - STANDARD TIMES AND ZLB
Instrument Multiplier Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
Gov. consumption Stardard Times 1:03 (1) 1:84 (1) 1:05 (1) 1:34 (1) 1:03 (1)
ZLB 1:75 (2) 2:65 (2) 1:79 (2) 2:39 (2) 1:91 (2)
Gov. transfers Stardard Times 0:08 (1) 0:12 (1) 0:27 (1) 0:41 (1) 0:17 (1)
ZLB 0:12 (2) 0:17 (2) 0:44 (2) 0:52 (2) 0:26 (2)
Gov. investment Stardard Times 0:45 (5) 0:36 (5) 0:35 (5) 0:77 (5) 0:38 (5)
ZLB 0:33 (6) 0:30 (6) 0:38 (6) 0:52 (6) 0:43 (6)
Direct taxes Stardard Times 0:12 (1) 0:21 (1) 0:35 (1) 0:38 (1) 0:23 (1)
ZLB 0:06 (1) 0:18 (1) 0:33 (1) 0:18 (1) 0:19 (1)
Consumption.tax Stardard Times 0:14 (2) 0:19 (1) 0:27 (1) 0:29 (1) 0:19 (1)
ZLB 0:12 (2) 0:15 (1) 0:25 (1) 0:14 (1) 0:16 (1)
Notes : The ZLB binds for 8 quarters. The value of the monetary scal multiplier is reported.
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Abstract
We consider a distinction between the wage negotiated by newly hired workers and incumbents in
a monetary, open economy, search and matching model. We evaluate the e¢ cacy of two labor market
targeted scal policies, a hiring subsidy and a wage subsidy for new hires of labor, and compare them
with that implied by standard scal instruments. The model is estimated with Bayesian techniques using
data for high unemployment countries of the EZ periphery (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain).
From posterior simulations we show that, except Greece, the labor market policies are not superior to
standard scal expansions in stimulating economic activity, and their employment-enhanching e¤ects are
clearly dominant only in the long term and at the Greece and Irelands model parameter estimates. The
consideration of a liquidity trap environment reinforces these results, showing that expansionary policy
actions triggering a deation can be procyclical when the interest rate zero-lower-bound binds.
JEL classication: E62, H25, H30, J20, C11
Keywords: Wage and hiring subsidies, search and matching, scal multiplier, zero lower bound,
Bayesian estimation.
Introduction
The recent labor market evolution in the "periphery" of the Euro-zone (EZ), characterized by unprecedented
levels of unemployment and youth unemployment rates on average well above 40%, is receiving increasing
attention from European economic institutions and governments. The social and political implications of such a
labor market performance, basically mirroring the longest and deepest economic downturn even registered since
harmonized data began to be recorded, are currently seen as the main threat to the entire European project,
making the employment issue one of the declared major European policy challenges. The acknowledgement of
the severity of this problem led to formal commitments for action, resulting in a renewed European Employment
Strategy (EES), strengthened with the launch of the Employment Package (EP) in April 2012 and, for a more
specic target, with the endorsement of the Youth Guarantee (YG) in April 2013, a set of measures targeted
to the youth unemployment issue in the most problematic Member States1 .
Some of the policy recommendations within the EP and the YG have already been adopted by the peripheral
EZ countries. Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain have all changed individual dismissal rules, and the collective
bargaining regulation has been relaxed in Greece and Spain in favor of company-level renewable agreements.
Salary increases have been capped or suspended in all countries of the EZ periphery, whilst hiring and wage (or
social contribution) subsidies for new hires of labor have been introduced in Greece and Italy. Other measures
are expected to be adopted within the implementation of the YG programme, or through the prospective
bilateral Contractual Arrangements with the EU2 .
From the perspective of a macroeconomic analyst, the EP and YG-related measures can be categorized
in three main - economically relevant - policy goals: i) the reduction of the hiring cost, to enhance the job
creation process3 ; ii) the reduction of the ring cost, to increase labor market exibility4 ; iii) increase the
e¢ ciency of the matching process5 . Will these policies actually work?
Recent developments in the macroeconomic modelling of monetary economies with frictions, and in partic-
ular those addressing the role of imperfect labor markets, provide some guidance in such evaluations. Zanetti
(2011), proposes a search and matching model calibrated to UK data to analyze the business cycle implications
of unemployment benets and ring costs. More in the specic of policy evaluation, Faia et al. (2013), by
calibrating an open economy labor selection model featuring hiring and ring costs to the available European
data, compare the size of the scal multiplier resulting from hiring subsidies and short-time work to the scal
multipliers emerging with equally nanced more traditional policies, such as government spending and tax
shocks. Both contributions show that labor market institutions and policies play a role in macroeconomic
dynamics and that labor market-targeted scal instruments can be an e¤ective tool in the management of the
1These measures will be partly funded by the EU through the Youth Employment Initiative and by a re-direction European
Social Fund resources.
2Contractual Arrangements are expected to support the requesting country with policy guidance and nancial help in change
of structural reforms.
3Targeted hiring subsidies, the reduction of the labor tax wedge, wage subsidies for new hires of labor, subsidization of
traineeship and apprentienship programmes are the measures devoted to this objective.
4The reform of the labor market regulation in the direction of increased internal exibility, reduced ring costs and width of
the collective bargaining process is recommended for the fulllment of this goal.
5 In this case the suggested policies include the investment in public employment services to improve the shared information
on job opportunities, the anticipation of skill and qualication needs, the cross-border mobility, investments in vocational training
and targeted lifelong learning.
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short term employment uctuations.
The economic argument supporting these conclusions is that these policies, by reducing the labor cost,
generate consistent improvements on both the demand and supply sides of the economy: on the one hand, the
employment expansion increases the level of economic activity; on the other hand, the internal deation triggers
both an interest rate reduction that stimulates private expenditure and an increase in the price competitiveness
of the domestic production that improves the foreign net position through increased net exports. Compared
to more standard expansionary scal policies, the labor market targeted scal instruments thus appear robust
to the usual criticism addressing the inationary and distortionary e¤ects of the traditional scal measures.
There are however some important questions that need further inspection. First, as long as the labor market
policies are often targeted to specic sub-groups of the labor force (as it is with some EP and YG-related
measures), focusing on policies that a¤ect the general cost of labor can lead to a misleading approximation of
the e¤ects of the actual measures within the programmes. Second, since policies are targeted to and adopted
by specic member countries, it is unclear to what degree a model calibrated to the data of a single country,
or to average European data, can approximate the expected e¤ects from the implementation of the same
measures in structurally di¤erent economic realities. Third, it should be recognized that the e¢ cacy of the
scal stimulus crucially depends on the interaction between scal and monetary policy regimes (Christiano et
al. 2011a, Eggertsson 2011a,b, Eggertsson and Krugman 2012). In particular, the size of the scal multipliers
is dampened by the counteracting monetary policy response, generally modeled as targeting ination and
output stabilization. Analyses that do not consider empirically relevant monetary policy reaction rules6 , or
the possibility that the scal stimulus takes place during a strong recession, i.e. in a neighborhood of a liquidity
trap, may produce outcomes that, even if theoretically consistent, can result empirically irrelevant. Such a
concern applies also to the analysis of the e¢ cacy of labor market targeted scal policies.
In this paper we address these points by simulating the country-specic e¤ects on economic activity and
employment from the implementation of two labor market targeted scal measures well rooted in the EP-
YG programmes: a hiring cost subsidy and a selective wage subsidy targeted to new hires of labor7 . The
expected e¤ects of the labor market policies are then compared to those obtainable from nancially equivalent
traditional scal policies a¤ecting government consumption, transfers and investments on the expenditure side,
and labor, consumption, business prots and capital gains taxes on the revenue side.
The di¤erent policy options are evaluated using an extended search and matching monetary model esti-
mated with Bayesian techniques on a large set of data for ve major EZ peripheral countries, i.e. Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (the PIIGS). Policy simulations consider both a standard environment in
which the domestic economies operate at their full potential and a non standard liquidity-trap environment,
with a binding zero lower bound for the nominal interest rate (ZLB). The consistency of the latter scenario
with the EZ economic situation is questionable, but likely. The nominal policy rate is still positive in the
EZ, but very close to the zero, such that further real interest rate cuts are highly improbable, especially if we
6The empirical literature shows that the behavior of the monetary authority is highly inertial, such that the couteracting
monetary policy response has moderate e¤ects in the short term Smets and Wouters 2007, Christiano et al. 2011b).
7 In this respect, the proposed analysis can be considered as an extension of the one developed in the analysis in Zanetti
(2011), which focuses on the role of unemployment benets and ring "taxes", and of the model adopted by Faia et al. (2013),
analyzing the size of the scal stimulus from hiring subsidies and short-term work relative to other scal instruments.
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consider the below-target price dynamics and the lack of credible policy commitments to inate the economy8 .
The model is extended in the design of the labor market structure by considering a distinction between
incumbent workers and new entrants in the search and matching framework, such that both government
hiring and wage subsidies for newly hired workers can be introduced within the policy instruments set. Such
a modication a¤ects both the job creation condition and the Nash bargained wage intertemporally, such that
unions/rms are non-neutral in wages/labor costs with respect to choice of new labor hires. Outside this
modication, the design of the non Walrasian labor market basically follows Diamond (1982), Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994), and Pissarides (2000) for the introduction of hiring costs and matching frictions, and Gertler
et al. (2008) and Gertler and Trigari (2009) for the representation of the staggered Nash-wage bargaining
between unions and rms.
The proposed model considers some additional features that are functional to the analysis. The small
open economy framework, developed along the lines of Adolfson et al. (2007) and Christiano et al. (2011b),
in which the foreign sector is described by a structural vector auto-regressive system (SVAR) estimated with
Bayesian techniques, allows the evaluation of the e¤ects of the policies on the net foreign position. The
rich specication of the scal sector, in which we consider unemployment benets, hiring subsidies and wage
subsidies in addition to the standard scal instruments describing the expenditure and revenues sides of scal
models, allows the consideration of a number of alternative scal policies. The consideration of a wedge
between short and long-term interest rates allows the representation of an interest rate di¤erential between
policy and government bond rates that can a¤ect the dynamics of real variables. Moreover, we assume that
the public capital stock and investment ow are chosen by a maximizing scal player targeting the distance
between output and the government nancial need.
Our results show that, even if the labor market scal measures are an e¤ective tool in stimulating a non job-
less expansion, their superiority to alternative and more standard expansionary scal policies is questionable.
The labor market measures are expected to produce highly heterogeneous e¤ects across countries, depending
on the estimated country-specic model structure. Moreover, the expansionary e¤ects on output and em-
ployment take place only in the medium to long-run, whilst the impact and short-term e¤ects on economic
activity can be recessive for some economies. The comparative analysis shows that, irrespective of the time
horizon being considered, a standard expansionary policy based on government consumption dominates any
other equivalently nanced scal intervention in all the countries but Greece.
The analysis shows that these outcomes are explained by three main hindrance factors in the propagation
mechanics of the policies: First, the high degree of nominal wage rigidity and the role played by the unions
relative power in the intertemporal bargaining over the present and expected gains from government subsi-
dization reduce the size of the initial real wage contraction. Second, the inertial behavior of the monetary
authority response, i.e. the degree to which the interest rate accommodates the internal deation, leads to a
temporary increase in the real interest rate, thus to reduced private consumption and investments. Third, the
high degree of both nominal and real rigidities rules out a timely response of the real variables once the real
interest rate response is back in the negative terrain.
The consideration of a deep recession characterized by a binding ZLB highlights the role played by the
8The persistent economic stagnation, the ongoing scal consolidation processes and the declared commitment to a continuation
of these policies, rule out the feasibility, or credibility, of any inationary commitment.
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monetary policy regime. Results show that, in this situation, the e¤ectiveness of policies based on reduced
marginal costs and internal deations is weakened and delayed, because of the impossibility of accommodating
the deation with a relevant nominal interest rate drop. Such a result holds both for the labor market targeted
scal policies (hiring and wage subsidies for new hires of labor) and for scal expansions based on tax cuts. On
the contrary, and in line with the results of a recent literature (Christiano et al. 2011a, Eggertsson 2011a,b,
Eggertsson and Krugman 2012), the e¢ cacy of standard inationary scal measures, as are the policies based
on increased government expenditure, is increased by the reduced counteracting response of the monetary
policy.
The paper is organized as follows: Section one describes the model, focusing in particular on the theoretical
extensions implemented in the design of the labor market. Section two provides the details of the Bayesian
estimation of the country-specic models. Here we describe the data and their transformations, we address
issues of empirical identication, the calibration and the elicidation of priors for the structural model and
the Bayesian SVAR parameters, and discuss the posterior estimates. Section three provides a discussion of
simulation results, explaining the propagation mechanics in the standard time and binding ZLB environments.
Section four concludes.
1 The model
We introduce a number of extensions to the now standard set-up of the NK-DSGE model, characterized by
the presence of nominal and real frictions in both good and labor markets (Christiano et al. 2005, Smets and
Wouters 2007). First, we consider a small open economy framework, developed along the lines of Adolfson et
al. (2007) and Christiano et al. (2011b), in which the foreign sector is exogenous with respect the domestic
economy and its evolution is described by a structural vector auto-regressive system (SVAR). Second, we
adopt a rich specication of the scal sector, only marginally resembling that proposed in Drautzburg and
Uhlig (2011), in which we consider unemployment benets, hiring subsidies and wage subsidies in addition
to the standard scal instruments characterizing the expenditure and revenues sides of scal models. Third,
we develop a detailed representation of the non Walrasian labor market, basically following Diamond (1982),
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), and Pissarides (2000) for the introduction of hiring costs and matching
frictions, and Gertler et al. (2008) and Gertler and Trigari (2009) for the representation of the staggered
Nash-wage bargaining between unions and rms.
As stressed in the introductory section, the major novelty in the design of the labor market structure is
the introduction in the model of both government wage and hiring subsidies for newly hired workers, which is
obtained by considering a distinction between incumbent workers and new entrants in the search and matching
framework. This modication a¤ects both the job creation condition and the Nash bargained wage, such that
unions/rms are non-neutral in wages/labor costs with respect to new labor hire choices.
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1.1 The labor market
The matching process is described by a standard Cobb-Douglas matching technology:
mt = m
n
t u
1 n
t (1)
where m is the matching e¢ ciency parameter, t is the number of vacancies and ut = 1  nt 1 denotes the
unemployment rate once the labor force stock has been normalized to one. The chosen timing in the unem-
ployment relation shows that individuals entering the labor force stock activate their job search immediately,
whilst workers that loss their job in t are not able to search for a new one in the same period of the separation
event. Given the job lling rate qt = mt=t and the job nding rate st = mt=ut, the labor market tightness
can equivalently be dened as t = t=ut or t = st=qt.
Under the assumption of exogenous separation, the employment law of motion is described by the following
dynamic equation
nt = (1  )nt 1 +mt (2)
where  is the separation rate.
1.2 The household
1.2.1 The optimizing household
We consider a continuum of Ricardian households indexed by j 2 [0; 1] that have access to a complete set of
contingent claims, suggested by Galí et al. (2007). This hypothesis ensures that households are homogeneous
with respect to consumption and asset holdings choices, thus the notation can be simplied by dropping the
j-index. The representative household is assumed to maximize the following lifetime utility function:
max
Crt ;B
r
t ;B
r
t ;K
p;r
t ;I
r
t ;u
k
t
E0
1X
t=0
t
"
ct
(Crt h eCt 1)1 c
1  c   tnt
#
(3)
where Crt is a composite consumption index, h eCt 1 denotes external habits c is the consumption curvature
parameter and 0  nt  1 denotes the fraction of household members who are employed. ct and t are
two preference shocks which are assumed to follow the i.i.d. processes ct = e
"c;t and t = 
(1 c)tnt ,
respectively, where nt = e
"n;t9 .
Each household purchases consumption and investment goods by means of after tax labor and capital
incomes, after tax unemployment benets, dividends and government transfers. The budget constraint is thus
given by:
9The peculiar specication of the stochastic scaling factor of labor disutility t is chosen to ensure balanced growth.
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e
t  Ret ; e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+ (1  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u
t (1  nt)
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(1  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
Rkt
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ukt   a(ukt )

+ 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
Kp;rt 1 +
pt
t
Pt
(4)
where Irt is private investment, At =
etB

t+1
Pt
is the aggregate net foreign asset position of the domestic
economy and et is the nominal e¤ective exchange rate. Brt and B

t denote domestic and foreign bond holdings,
respectively, Pt is the consumption price index and Ret = Rtqb;t, R
e
t = R

t q

b;t are the domestic and foreign
interest rates on government bonds, where Rt, Rt denote the respective policy rates and qb;t, q

b;t are the home
and foreign spreads on government bond, respectively. The domestic spread is assumed to follow the AR(1)
process qb;t = q
1 qb
b q
qb
b;t 1e
"qb;t , whilst the foreign spread is dened within the SVAR system for the foreign
variables. R
k
t
Pt
is the real return on capital Kp;rt , u
k
t and a
 
ukt

denote the utilization rate and its adjustment
cost10 , respectively, and  is the private capital depreciation rate. WtPt is the real wage and
pt
t
Pt
dene real
dividends, where  denotes the long-run trend growth of labor-augmenting productivity. Government transfers
TRrt , unemployment benets b
u
t = b
ut11 and the tax rates on consumption  ct , on labor income 
n
t and on
capital kt complete the budget constraint of the Ricardian household. The term t = (
At
Yt
; etet 1 ; R
e
t  Ret ; et)
in (4) denotes the risk premium on foreign bond holdings in the modied uncovered interest parity (UIP)
equation Et

et+1
et

=
Ret
tRet
, i.e.:
t = exp[ eaAtYt   AY

  er (Ret  Ret ) + es1  etet 1

+ et] (5)
where et is a time varying shock to the risk premium, which is assumed to follow the AR(1) stochastic processet = eet 1e"e;t and ea, es and er are positive elasticities. Our specication ensures the satisfaction of the
usual equilibrium requirements (Lundvik 1992, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 2001) and adds some exibility to
alternative modied UIP equations adopted in the literature (e.g. Adolfson et al. 2008 and Christiano et al.
2011b). The log-linear representation of the modied UIP is the following:
Et (et+1) = eset + 1  er (Ret  Ret ) + ea (At   Yt)  et
were the parameter es denes the autoregressive behavior of the expected change in the nominal exchange rate
and er  0 denotes the elasticity to the interest rate di¤erential on bond holdings, allowing for the emergence
of the "forward premium puzzle" (for er > 1), i.e. the negative correlation between interest rate di¤erentials
and expected exchange rate variations often observed in empirical trials12 .
10The function a
 
ukt

is assumed to be strictly increasing and convex, with curvature parameter  k. The utilization rate
relates e¤ective to physical capital in a standard fashion, i.e. Krt (i) = K
p;r
t 1(i)ut(i).
11 In order to ensure long-run balanced growth, but is assumed to grow at the labor augmenting productivity growth rate .
12 In the modied UIP adopted in Adolfson et al. (2008) the autoregressive component is not independent on the elasticity to
the interest rate di¤erential, and the chosen prior does not allow for a direct emergence of the forward premium puzzle. Compared
to the specication adopted in Christiano et al. (2011b), our modied UIP adds the autoregressive component.
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The law of motion of physical capital is described by the following equation:
Kp;rt = (1  )Kp;rt 1 + qi;t

1  S( I
r
t
Irt 1
)

Irt (6)
where S( I
r
t
Irt 1
) denes the private investment adjustment cost function, with curvature parameter  i, and qi;t
is an investment-specic shock, which is assumed to follow the i.i.d. stochastic process qi;t = e"qi;t .
Aggregate demand for type Xt goods, Xt = (Ct; It), is obtained as a CES index of domestically produced
and imported goods, such that:
Xt =

(1  ) 1  Xdt   1 +  1 (Xmt )  1   1 (7)
where, from householdscost minimization, Xdt (1  )

Pdt
Pt
 
Xt and Xmt = 

Pmt
Pt
 
Xt are, respectively,
the aggregate available domestic and foreign produced goods,  denotes the import share parameter and  is
the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods. P dt and P
m
t denote the price indexes of
domestic and imported goods, respectively, such that:
Pt =
h
(1  )  P dt 1  +  (Pmt )1 i 11  (8)
From the rst order condition (F.O.C.) for consumption, the following consumption Euler equation is
obtained:
Crt   hCrt 1 =

Ret
Pt
Pt+1
(1 +  ct)
(1 +  ct+1)
ct+1
ct
  1c  
Crt+1   hCrt

(9)
1.2.2 The rule-of-thumb household
We assume that Ricardian and non Ricardian households have the same number of workers,hence:
nt = n
r
t = n
nr
t (10)
From the budget constraint of the non Ricardian household, the resulting consumption equation is as follows:
Cnrt =
1
(1 +  ct)

Trnrt + (1  nt )
Wt
Pt
nt + (1  nt )but (1  nt)

(11)
where it is evident that rule-of-thumbers spend all their net income (from labor, government transfers and
unemployment benets) in consumption goods.
1.2.3 Workers value functions
LetWt(wt) be the worker value of being matched to a job evaluated at the wage wt and Ut be the value of being
unemployed at time t. Assuming that the probabilities of wage reoptimization can be di¤erent for incumbent
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workers and hires of new labor, the value of the employment/unemployment states are the following:
Wt(wt) = (1  nt )
wt
Pt
  t
t
+ Et

t+1
t

(1  ) wWt+1(wt) + (1  w)Wt+1(wt+1)+ Ut+1 (12)
Ut = (1  nt )but + Et

t+1
t

st+1
 
wWt+1(wt) + (1  w)Wt+1(wt+1)

+ (1  st+1)Ut+1

(13)
where w and w are the Calvo parameters dening the probability of being unable to re-optimize the wage in
t+1 for incumbent workers and for newly matched workers, respectively. t is the Lagrange multiplier. From
equations (12) and (13) the net value of being employed, i.e. the workersurplus Wt(wt)  Ut, is obtained.
1.3 The intermediate goods sector
Each intermediate rm (i) operates in a perfectly competitive environment. The production technology is as
follows:
Y it (i) = 
a
t
"
Kgt 1R 1
0
Y it (j)dj
# 
1 
[Kt(i)]
 
tnt(i)
(1 )
(14)
where Kgt is public capital,  and  are the private and public capital shares in production, respectively, and
at = 
a
a
t 1 e
"a;t is an AR(1) process dening the evolution of total factor productivity.
The optimizing rm chooses the optimal quantity of capital by solving the following maximization problem:
max
Kt(i)
P it (i)Yt(i) Rkt (i)Kt(i) s.t. (14)
whose re-arranged F.O.C. yields:
Rkt (i) = P
i
t (i)
Y it (i)
Kt(i)
(15)
where P it (i) is the intermediate sector price index.
A distinction between job values to the rm of newly hired and incumbent workers is introduced. Such a
distinction, which - to our knowledge - is new to the literature on models with search and matching frictions,
is necessary to evaluate the relative e¢ cacy of two labor market-targeted scal instruments: hiring and wage
government subsidies. The former basically consists in a reduction of the cost of hiring per vacancy, (1 'ht ),
the latter in a reduction of the wage cost wt(1 'wt ) for new hires of labor, where  is the hiring cost and 'ht ,
'wt are the hiring and wage subsidies, respectively. Note that in this setting the government wage subsidy for
new hires of labor can be considered equivalent to a selective scal instrument a¤ecting the direct taxation on
the labor income of newly hired workers.
Let Jnt (wt) and J
o
t (wt) be the values to the rm of a job evaluated at the wage wt for a newly hired and
an incumbent worker, respectively:
Jnt (wt) = (1  pt )

t   (1  'wt )
wt
P dt

+ (1  )Et

t+1
t
 
wJ
o
t+1(wt) + (1  w)Jot+1(wt+1)

(16)
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and:
Jot (wt) = (1  pt )(t  
wt
P dt
) + (1  )Et

t+1
t
 
wJ
o
t+1(wt) + (1  w)Jot+1(wt+1)

(17)
where P dt is the domestic price index, 
p
t denotes the business prots tax rate and t = (1   )P itYt=nt the
marginal productivity of labor. By re-arranging equations (16) and (17) yields an alternative specication of
Jnt (wt):
Jnt (wt) = J
o
t (wt) + (1  pt )'wt
wt
Pt
(18)
Equation (18) shows that the standard case in the literature, in which the rm does not consider a distinction
in the job values of incumbent and newly hired workers, is restored for 'wt = 0.
Given the positions above, the value of a vacancy is the following:
Jvt =  (1  'ht ) + qt [wJnt (wt 1) + (1  w)Jnt (wt )] (19)
which resolves in a standard vacancy value equation for 'ht = 0 and J
n
t = J
o
t = Jt, i.e. for '
w
t = 0.
By imposing the free entry condition, such that Jvt = 0, and considering that a fraction of the hiring and
wage cost is nanced by the government with subsidies, i.e. 'ht > 0, '
h
t > 0, the vacancy posting condition is
the following:
(1  'ht )
qt
= [wJ
n
t (wt 1) + (1  w)Jnt (wt )]
= [wJ
o
t (wt 1) + (1  w)Jot (wt )] + (1  pt )'wt

(1  w)w

t
P dt
+ w
wt 1
P dt

(20)
where an alternative expression in terms of Jot is provided for analytical convenience. Note that equation (20)
resolves in a standard vacancy posting condition for 'ht = 0 and '
w
t = 0. Considering the recursive solution
of the value to the rm of an incumbent job position (17), the vacancy posting condition (20) becomes:
(1  'ht )
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
wt+1
pdt+1
  wt
pdt
 1X
j=1
t+1
t
[(1  )w]j
9=;
+w
8<:(1  pt )(wtpdt   wt 1pdt 1 )Et
1X
j=0
t+1
t
[(1  )w]j
9=;
 (1  )Et

t+1
t
(1  pt+1)'wt+1

w
wt
pdt
+ (1  w)
wt+1
pdt+1

+(1  pt )'wt

w
wt 1
pdt 1
+ (1  w)w

t
pdt

(21)
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Compared to the job creation condition in the standard search and matching set-up, equation (21) shows that
the wage subsidy inuences vacancy posting intertemporally. Present vacancies posted are positively related
to the present wage subsidy 'wt (last row of equation 21) and negatively related to the loss opportunity of
the gains from wage subsidies due to future job openings (second last row of equation 21). The latter loss
is proportional to the fraction of surviving workers (1   ), i.e. those jobs that will not benet from the
government wage subsidy in the next period, thus the positive contemporaneous e¤ects, other things being
equal, are always dominant. Present and future hiring subsidies 'ht a¤ect vacancy posting directly. For '
h
t = 0
and 'wt = 0, equation (21) resolves in the standard vacancy posting condition.
1.4 Nash wage bargaining
We do not consider a separate Nash wage bargaining scheme for incumbent and newly hired workers on the
grounds that the separation rate is exogenous and unions are assumed to be representative of both types of
labor. In other terms, since ring is not a control variable for the domestic intermediate rm, an optimal ring
strategy distinguishing between incumbents and newly hired workers cannot be implemented13 . A unique wage
is thus Nash-bargained by maximizing the product:
max
wt
[Wt(w

t )  Ut]& Jt(wt )1 & (22)
where the parameter & denotes the unions relative bargaining power and Jt(wt ) denotes the aggregate job
value to the rm, i.e.:
Jt(w

t ) =
Z 1
0
J it (w

t )di =
Z ot
0
Jot (w

t )di+
Z 1
ot
Jnt (w

t )di
= Jot (w

t ) + (1  ot )(1  pt )'wt
wt
P dt
(23)
where ot = (1  )nt 1=nt is the share of incumbent workers.
Considering equations (22) and (23) the following F.O.C. is obtained:
(1  &) (1  pt ) [Wt(wt )  Ut] = &(1  nt )

Jot (w

t ) + (1  ot )(1  pt )'wt wt
1
pdt

(24)
By substituting the value functions in (24), after some algebra, the equation for the individual real wage
13Note that the consideration of an endogenous specication of the ring process along the lines proposed byf the recent
literature on search and matching models (Krause and Lubik 2007, Faia et al. 2013) would not change the theoretical consistency
of our hypothesis. In fact, in these models the endogenous separation rate is in general conditioned to an exogenous, job-specic,
stochastic productivity process, such that the endogeneity would not introduce an additional type-specic control variable to the
rm.
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is obtained:
wt = #t

&

t + (1  ot )'wt
wt
pdt

+ (1  &)

but +
t
t

+#t (1  &)Et
8<:Tnt+1

wt+1  
w
w
st+1
1   (w

t+1   wt)
 1X
j=1
t+j
t
[(1  )w]j
9=;
+#t&Et
8<:

T pt+1  
w
w

T pt+1   St+1Tnt+1


wt+1
pdt+1
1X
j=1
t+j
t
[(1  )w]j
9=;
+
1
(1  pt )
#t& (1  )Et

t+1
t
(1  'ht+1)
qt+1

1  St+1
Tnt+1
T pt+1

+#t&Et

(1    st+1)'wt+1
t+1
t
Tnt+1

(1  w)
wt+1
pdt+1
+ w
wt
pdt
   1  ot+1 wt+1pdt+1

 #t& (1  )Et

t+1
t
T pt+1'
w
t+1

(1  w)
wt+1
pdt+1
+ w
wt
pdt

(25)
where we have used the transformations T it = (1    it)=(1    it 1), for i = (n; p), St = (1    st) = (1  ),
#t  1=

1  &  1  1=pdt , pdt = P dt =Pt, and wt is the average real wage:
wt =
mt
nt
[wwt 1 + (1  w)wt ] +
(1  )nt 1
nt
[wwt 1 + (1  w)wt ]
Equation (25) shows that, in the presence of a wage subsidy 'wt , the real wage is directly related to the
marginal product of labor t, as in the standard model, to the present government wage subsidy for new hires
of labor (1   ot )'wt wt =pdt , and to the future wage subsidy. The latter a¤ects the present real wage from the
perspective of both the rm and the worker expected gains from the measures: i) from the perspective of
rms expected gain, the last row of equation (25) shows that the bargained real wage is negatively related to
the anticipation of the loss of future (after tax) rm gains from wage subsidies, proportional to the fraction of
continuing jobs 1  - i.e. those not beneting from wage subsidization - and to the unions relative bargaining
power &, denoting the workers share; ii) from the perspective of the workers expected gain, the second last
row of equation (25) shows that the anticipation of the loss of future (after tax) worker gains from wage
subsidies, again proportional to both the fraction of continuing jobs 1  and to the relative bargaining power
&, increases the bargained wage, whilst an incentive to reduce the bargained wage comes from the anticipation
of the shared (after tax) worker gains from the wage subsidization of future hires of new labor st+1
For reasonable values of the exogenous separation rate  and of the unions relative bargaining power &, the
rms intertemporal incentive to reduce the present bargained wage dominates the unions net intertemporal
incentive to increase it, because of the consideration of the gains from the subsidization of future hires of
labor, as evident in the terms st+1 and  
 
1  ot+1

wt+1=p
d
t+1 in the second last row of equation (25). Other
things being equal, the wage contraction is thus directly related to the size of the separation rate  and to
the unions relative bargaining power &. Moreover, the staggered bargaining perspective assumed here allows
to highlight that the expected wage subsidy a¤ects the real wage considering the probability of a new hire of
labor to re-negotiate the wage.
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The introduction of a hiring subsidy 'ht negatively a¤ects the present real wage as it directly reduces the
expected hiring costs. Considering a rm negotiating a real wage, the incentive for a reduction comes from
the anticipation of the loss opportunity of a future reduction in the hiring cost.
Note that, for 'ht = 0 and '
w
t = 0, equation (25) resolves in the standard real Nash wage equation.
1.5 The nal goods sector: wholesalers and retailers in the domestic, import and
export sectors
For expositional convenience, a joint description of the structure of the nal good sector, composed of domestic,
import and export wholesalers and retailers, is provided.
Domestic wholesale rms buy the homogenous good Y it from domestic intermediate good producers at the
price P it , and di¤erentiate the homogeneous product into Y
d
t (i) using a linear technology. Wholesalers sell
their goods under monopolistic competition to domestic retailers, who use the di¤erentiated goods Y dt (i) to
produce the composite nal good Y dt .
Wholesale rms in the import sector buy the homogenous good Y t from foreign retailers at the foreign price
P t , and obtain a di¤erentiated good Y
m
t (i). Wholesale importing rms sell their goods under monopolistic
competition to import retailers who use the di¤erentiated goods Y mt (i) to produce the composite nal good
Y mt .
Finally, wholesale export rms buy the homogenous good Y dt from domestic retailers at the price P
d
t and
produce a di¤erentiated good Y xt (i) using a linear technology. Wholesalers in the export sector sell their goods
under monopolistic competition to export retailers, who use the di¤erentiated goods Y xt (i) to produce the
composite nal good Y xt .
We allow for variable demand elasticity in the three sectors, indexed by k = (d;m; x), by assuming a
exible variety aggregator à la Kimball (1995):Z 1
0
G

Y kt (i)
Y kt
;kp;t

di

= 1
such that the domestic retailers demand function for di¤erentiated goods is:
Y kt (i) = Y
k
t G
0 1

P kt (i)
P kt
{kp;t

(26)
where:
{kp;t 
Z 1
0
G0

Y kt (i)
Y kt
;kp;t

Y kt (i)
Y kt
di
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The optimization problem of wholesalers rms that are allowed to re-optimize their prices reads:
maxePkt (i)Et
1X
j=0

kp
j
#t+j
h eP kt (i)Xkt;t+j  MCkt+jiY kt+j (i)
s.t. (26) and Xkt;t+j =
(
1 for j = 0
jl=0
 
kt+l 1
kp 1 kp for s = 1; :::;1
where MCdt = P
i
t , MC
m
t = etP

t and MC
x
t = P
d
t =et are the nominal marginal costs of the domestic, import
sector and export sector wholesalers, respectively. The term

kp
j
#t+j denotes the stochastic discount factor
of the rm, where kp is the Calvo probability of price adjustment. 
k
p;t = e
"kp;t are i.i.d. stochastic processes
dening the time-varying markups14 and Xkt;t+j denote price indexation functions.
The rst order condition for the optimality problem above is given by:
Et
1X
j=0

kp
j
#tt+jY
k
t+j (i)
24 eP kt (i)Xkt;t+j +  eP kt (i)Xkt;t+j  MCkt+s(i) 1G0 1  kt 
G0

kt+j

G00

kt+j

35 = 0 (27)
where kt = G
0 1  kt , kt = Pkt (i)Pkt {kp;t, and the aggregate domestic price indexes read:
P kt =

1  kp

P kt (i)G
0 1

P kt (i)
P kt
{kp;t

+ kpP
k
t 1
 
kt 1
kp 1 kp G0 1
24P kt 1  kt 1kp 1 kp
P kt
{kp;t
35 (28)
1.6 Government policies
1.6.1 The monetary authority
The Central Bank sets the nominal interest rate Rt  1+ rt according to a contemporaneous rule considering
ination, output and output growth deviations from the respective steady state values. The policy instrument
is adjusted gradually, giving rise to interest rate smoothing:
Rt
R
=

Rt 1
R
R "t

 1 Yt
Y
 2#1 R  Yt
Yt 1
 3
+ rt (29)
where R denes the degree of interest rate smoothing,  1,  2,  3, are the feedback coe¢ cients to CPI ination
t
15 , the output level Yt, and output growth, respectively. The stochastic term rt denotes the monetary policy
14We assume i.i.d. mark-up shocks in order to enhance the identiability of the price equations. For a more in dept explanation
of this point, see the estimation section below and Giuli and Tancioni (2012).
15CPI ination is obtained as a weighted average considering domestic and imported price variations, i.e.: t =h
(1  )  pdt dt 1  +  (pmt mt )1 i 11  .
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shock, which is assumed to be white noise rt = e
"rt . Similar to money-growth rules, implementation of this
policy rule does not require knowledge about the natural rate of interest or of the level of potential output,
both of which are unobserved16 .
The fact that the countries being considered in this study all joined a common currency and a centralized
monetary policy since 1999 (2001 for Greece) implies that, at the estimation stage, a regime break has to be
taken into account. To implement such a structural break, we will consider a permanent observed exogeneous
shock acting as a multiplicative regime-shift dummy variable on all the four monetary policy coe¢ cients.
1.6.2 The scal authority
By expressing government consumption, government transfers, hiring subsidies and unemployment benets in
terms of domestic goods, the government budget constraint in real terms reads:
P dt
Pt

Gt + I
g
t + '
h
t t + (1  nt ) but (1  nt)

+ TRt +
Bt 1
Pt
+ 'wt (1  ot ) [wwt 1 + (1  w)wt ]
=
Bt
PtRtqbt
+  ctCt + 
n
t wtnt + 
k
t

rkt u
k
t   a(ukt )  

Kp;rt 1 + 
p
t [t   wt + 'wt (1  ot ) [wwt 1 + (1  w)wt ]]
(30)
where Gt = G
g
t 1Y
(1 g)gy
t D
gd
t e
"g;t and TRt = TR
tr
t 1Y
(1 tr)try
t D
trd
t e
"tr;t are the partial adjustment
stochastic processes for government expenditures for consumption and transfers, respectively, where Dt de-
notes the government nancial need and "g;t, "tr;t are i.i.d. shocks. Finally, 'ht and '
w
t denote the ex-
penditure for hiring and wage subsidies, respectively, described by the partial adjustment processes 'ht =
'h

'h
t 1 u
(1 'h)'h
t e
"
'h;t and 'wt = '
w
'w
t 1 u
(1 'w)'w
t e
"'w;t .
From government budget constraint (30) the nancial need Dt is obtained:
Dt  P
d
t
Pt

Gt + I
g
t + '
h
t t + (1  nt ) but (1  nt)

+ TRt + (1  pt )'wt (1  ot ) [wwt 1 + (1  w)wt ]
+
Bt 1
Pt
   ctCt   nt wtnt   kt

rkt u
k
t   a(ukt )  

Kpt 1   pt (t   wt) (31)
A fraction   of Dt is nanced with distortionary taxation on consumption, labor income, capital and on
business prots, such that:
  (Dt  D) = ( ct    c)Ct+(nt   n)wtnt+
 
kt   k

Kpt 1

rkt u
k
t   a
 
ukt
  +(pt   p) (t   wt) (32)
whilst the remaining fraction is nanced by issuing government bonds:
Bt  B
PtRet
= (1    ) (Dt  D) (33)
16The hypothesis that the central bank targets trend output instead of the output that would have prevailed in the absence of
nominal rigidities has been adopted in the empirical literature (e.g. Del Negro et al. 2007; Adolfson et al. 2007) and is consistent
with the main objective of our analysis, which is basically empirical.
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We assume that the di¤erent tax rates are partially adjusted17 by choosing the vector of government tax
instruments ! =

!c!n!k!p
0
, where !c + !n + !k + !p = 1.
!c  (Dt  D) = ( ct    c)Ct (34)
!n  (Dt  D) = (nt   n)wtnt (35)
!k  (Dt  D) =
 
kt   k
 kpt 1


rkt u
k
t   a
 
ukt
   (36)
!p  (Dt  D) = (pt   p) (t   wt) (37)
where  it, i = c; n; k; p, denotes the systematic component on the revenue side, which relates to the stochastic
tax rate considering a rst order autoregressive stochastic wedge it denoting the discretionary component,
such that  it = 
i
t
i
t , with 
i
t = 
ii
t 1 e
"n;t .
An optimal rule is considered for government investment expnditures. The scal authority is assumed to
choose the public capital stock Kgt and public investment I
g
t by maximizing the distance between output Yt
and the nancial need, i.e.:
max
Kgt ;I
g
t
Et
1X
j=t
t+j
t+j
t
[Yt+j  Dt+j ]
s.t. Yt = (
a
t )
(1 )(Kgt 1)
(Kt)
(1 ) tnt(1 )(1 )
Kgt = (1  g)Kgt 1 + qi
g
t

1  Sg( I
g
t
Igt 1
)

Igt
where g is the public capital depreciation rate and Sg( I
g
t
Igt 1
) denotes the government investment adjustment
cost function, with curvature parameter  ig. The rst order conditions for government capital and investment
are, respectively:
Et
h
(1  g) kgt+1qk
g
t + t+1(
a
t+1)
(1 )(Kgt )
 1(Kt+1)(1 )
 
t+1nt+1
(1 )(1 )i  kgt = 0
Et

qi
g
t+1
kg
t+1S
g0(
Igt+1
Igt
)(
Igt+1
Igt
)2

+ k
g
t q
i;g
t

1  Sg( I
g
t
Igt 1
)  Sg0( I
g
t
Igt 1
)(
Igt
Igt 1
)

  P
d
t
Pt
t = 0
where k
g
t is the shadow price of government capital and q
ig
t = q
ig
ig
t 1 e
"ig;t is a stochastic process for the
government investment-specic shock.
17By denoting with f (Dt) =  it; i = c; n; k; p, the partial adjustment is obtained by assuming the following conditional process
for the tax rates:  it = 
i

i
t 1 f (Dt) e
"it , where "it are i.i.d. tax rates shocks.
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1.7 Model closure
Given the presence of intertemporally optimizing households j 2 [0; 1   h] and of rule-of-thumb households
j 2 (1  h; 1], aggregate consumption and government transfers are given by:
Ct =

1  h

Crt + 
hCnrt (38)
and
TRt =

1  h

TRrt + 
hTRnrt (39)
where, given d = TRnrt =TR
r
t , the fraction of government transfers to Ricardian and non Ricardian households
are, respectively: TRrt (i) =
TRt
1+h(d 1) and TR
nr
t (i) =
dTRt
1+h(d 1) .
Since only Ricardian households hold bonds and accumulate capital, aggregate variables are related to the
vector of Ricardian-specic variables as follows:
Xt =

1  h

Xrt
where Xt = [It;K
p
t ;Kt; Bt; B

t ]
0.
Market clearing for the foreign bond market and the nal goods market requires that at the equilibrium
the following two equations for net foreign assets evolution and aggregate resources are satised:
etB

t+1
tRt qbt
= etP
x
t (C
x
t + I
x
t )  etP t (Cmt + Imt ) + etBt (40)
and:
Cdt + C
x
t + I
d
t + I
x
t +Gt + I
g
t  Yt   a
 
ukt

Kpt 1   tt (41)
where Cxt + I
x
t =
h
Pxt
Pt
i 
Y t are total exports with  denoting the foreign demand elasticity parameter
18 .
The stationary representation of the model is obtained by scaling the real variables with respect to the
trending technology process. The scaled model is then log-linearized around the deterministic steady state,
taking into account that the presence of a deterministic term in the productivity growth process a¤ects the
coe¢ cients of the dynamic equations.
The resulting log-linearized model is composed of 51 structural equations and of 23 shock processes, of
which seven are assumed to be rst order autoregressive and the remaining 16 are assumed to be i.i.d.. The
economic relations are described by 63 structural parameters (including the scal and monetary policy rule
coe¢ cients), whilst the stochastic component of the model is dened by 30 coe¢ cients (23 for the standard
deviations of shocks and seven for the autoregressive coe¢ cients)19 .
18At the estimation stage we will also consider an additive stochastic process %t in the aggregate resources constraint, i.e. a
rst order autoregressive measurement error %t = %
%
t 1e
"%;t . Such a shock is generally considered in the empirical literature in
order to enhance the estimates when these include output and all its components appearing in the model.
19We denote as structural parameters those dening preferences, technology, elasticities, real and nominal rigidities in the good
and labor markets, as well as the coe¢ cients describing the monetary and scal policy reaction rules. The seven autoregressive
coe¢ cients are those describing the memory of the technology process around the deterministic trend, of the structural shock
on government investments, on exports, the home bias, the uncovered interest parity, the long-term interest rate spread and the
memory of a measurement error included in the aggregate constraint.
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1.8 The foreign economy
Foreign output (yt ), ination (

t ), short and long-term interest rates

rs;t and r

l;t, respectively

are exoge-
nous to the variables of the small domestic economy and their evolution is described by a fourth-order structural
Bayesian B-VAR, where contemporaneous correlations are dened by the structure of the stochastic component
matrix B. Formally:
A (L)
266664
t
yt
rs;t
rl;t
377775 = B
266664
"

t
"y

t
"
rs
t
"
rl
t
377775 , A0 = I4, "t  N (0; I4) (42)
B =
266664
b11 0 0 0
0 b22 0 0
b31 b32 b33 0
b41 b42 b43 b44
377775 , BB0 = 

The assumptions on the contemporaneous correlations matrix B are consistent with the hypothesis that output
and ination do not respond contemporaneously to the other shocks in the system (Adolfson et al. 2008)20 ,
and that the long-term interest rate is post-recursive with respect to the short-term interest rate.
The SVAR system adds four linear stochastic equations to the economic and stochastic relations of the
domestic economy model, resulting in a total of 78 equations and 27 shocks.
2 Bayesian estimation
The rich parameterization of the model precludes the estimation of the entire parameter space, because of the
poor empirical identiability of medium and large scale DSGE models (Canova and Sala 2009, Iskrev 2010a,b,
Koop et al. 2011). Even if log-linearized around the deterministic steady state, these structures are in fact
characterized by relevant nonlinearities in parameter convolutions, such that the likelihood generated by the
model can be uninformative, i.e. multimodal or at with respect to some parameter values. On these premises,
only the subset of the parameter space that satises the theoretical and empirical identication conditions
is estimated using the Bayesian method, whilst for the remaining subset we adopt dogmatic priors specied
according to the available country-specic evidence and to conventional calibration values.
A Bayesian approach is adopted also for the estimation of the foreign variables SVAR, in this case consid-
ering a partially modied Minnesota priors specication approach. The choice of using the Bayesian method
for the estimation of the SVAR is based on recent results showing its good properties both within sample and
in terms of minimization of the predictive variance of the resulting model (Banbura et al. 2010).
20Consistently with the results in Adolfson and Lindé (2011), the over-identifying restriction that output does not respond
contemporaneously to the price shock is not rejected by the data at the standard 5% criterion.
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2.1 Data issues and measurement equations
To enhance the empirical identication of the widest fraction of the structural parameters space, we use a
large set of domestic and foreign quarterly variables to estimate the country-specic models.
Considering the domestic economies, 21 observables are considered: (log di¤erences of) of real per capita
GDP21
 
yobst

, consumption
 
cobst

, investment
 
iobst

, imports
 
mobst

, exports
 
xobst

, the real wage 
wobst

, real government expenditures for consumption
 
gobst

, investment

ig;obst

and transfers
 
trobst

;
the direct tax rate on labor income

n;obst

, on business prots

p;obst

, on capital

k;obst

and the indi-
rect tax rate on consumption

 c;obst

; the unemployment rate
 
uobst

, the (quarterly) rates of change of
the price deators for consumption

c;obst

, import

m;obst

, export

x;obst

and for the domestic sec-
tor

y;obst

; the nominal e¤ective exchange rate
 
eobst

, the (quarterly) short and long-term interest rate
robss;t and r
obs
l;t , respectively

, the latter approximated by the 10-years government bond rate. Because of the
lack of time series data for hiring and wage subsidies 'ht and '
w
t , the partial adjustment processes dening their
evolution over time are pinned down at the estimation stage. All real variables are referred to the base-year
2005.
Considering the variables for the foreign sector, the log di¤erence of real output

y;obst

is obtained from the
real world output index (base-year 2005) and short and long-term interest rates

r;obss;t and r
;obs
l;t , respectively

are obtained as weighted averages of the corresponding gures for the US and the EMU area, with weights
given by the relative importance of the two economic areas in domestic capital movements. The foreign price
deator

;obst

is obtained from the real e¤ective exchange rate denition equation using observed data on
domestic ination, the nominal and the real e¤ective exchange rates. A total of 25 variables is thus considered
in the country-specic estimates22 .
All data are taken from o¢ cial sources and cover the period 1980:1-2012:423 . Real variables of the private
domestic sector, their deators and the nominal short and long-term interest rates are taken from the OECD-
Economic Outlook database. Nominal and real e¤ective exchange rate indexes, dened at the base-year 2005,
and real world output index (2005 = 100) are taken from the IMF-International Financial Statistics database.
Data for government expenditures and revenues are, for the quarterly frequency, from the IMF Government
Financial Statistics database and, for the yearly frequency, from the OECD-Tax Statistics database and from
the IMF Finance Statistics Yearbook 24 .
Before linking the observed variables to the theoretical counterparts, some of the latter are transformed
in order to get full consistency with the statistical denitions. In particular, the transformations take into
21Per capita variables are obtained considering the labor force as the normalizing variable.
22To the best of our knowledge, the use of such a high number of observables in the estimates is unprecedented in the literature
on empirical DSGE models.
23Because of the lack of quarterly time series prior to 1990 for Ireland and to 2000 for Greece, quadratic interpolation
methods are applied to yearly observations to obtain the quarterly gures 1980:1-1989:4 and 1980:1-1999:4 for Ireland and
Greece, respectively.
24Even in this case, since quarterly data are available only after 1999:1, adjustments to changing denitions and quadratic
interpolation methods are applied to yearly observations in order to obtain the quarterly frequency for the preceding time span.
A detailed description of the data manipulation is provided in a technical appendix of the paper, available upon request from the
authors
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account that, di¤erently to the statistical aggregates, consumption and investment in the theoretical model
are composites of domestic and imported goods and output also includes the hiring cost and that related to
changes in the capital utilization rate.
Further transformations are needed in order to make the data consistent with the theoretical steady states
and in particular with the model property of balanced growth (), a theoretical prediction which is not
supported by the evidence in all the countries being considered, in particular for export and import shares.
More specically, the positive/negative excess trends in real variables are removed by considering sample
deviations from the steady state output growth rate  in the measurement equations of all the real variables
in the system, such that the theory-consistent stationary great ratios are restored.
Formally, considering the vector of real per capita variables xt = (ct, it, mt, xt, wt, gt, i
g
t , trt, y

t ), of tax
rates  t =
 
nt , 
p
t , 
k
t , 
c
t

, of ination rates t = (ct , 
m
t , 
x
t , 
y
t , 

t ), of short and long-term interest rates
rs;t =
 
rs;t, rs;t

and rl;t =

rl;t, rl;t

, the 25 measurement equations linking the linearized model variables
to the respective observables read as follows:2666666666666664
yobst
xobst
 obst
uobst
obst
robss;t
robsl;t
eobst
3777777777777775
=
2666666666666664
eyt   eyt 1 + logext   ext 1 + log+ logxye t + eut + uet + logers;t   log(:;) + log(c;)erl;t   log(:;) + log(c;) + q(:;)bet + log e
3777777777777775
(43)
where the coe¢ cients xy denote the excess trend (or excess growth rate) of each observed generic real per
capita variable in xobst from the real per capita GDP growth rate, .  ,   log, , qb and s denote the
(steady state) tax rates, the domestic and foreign real interest rates, the ination rates, the domestic and
foreign long-term interest rate spreads, and the nominal e¤ective exchange rate, respectively, and u denotes
the steady state unemployment rate.
2.2 Calibrated parameters
Calibrated values are chosen taking into account both sample and extraneous evidence when informative for
the theoretical parameters, and conventional values when such information is missing.
We impose 27 dogmatic priors on the 63-dimensional structural parameters space. Absent country-specic
information, 18 structural parameters are xed to common values across countries. These are the steady-state
mark-up coe¢ cients dp, 
m
p and 
x
p , xed to the conventional value of 1:2, consistent with prior demand
elasticities for domestic, import and export sector rms equal to 6, the Kimball endogenous demand elasticity
parameters d , 
m
 and 
x
 , xed to the conventional value of 10 (Eichenbaum and Fisher 2007, Smets and
Wouters 2007), the parameter dening the fraction of newly hired workers that are unable to re-optimize the
wage period by period w, xed to 0:5, consistent with the hypothesis of a two quarters average duration
of the new wage contract, the parameter dening the fraction of government transfers to Ricardian and non
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Ricardian households d, xed to 1, consistent with an hypothesis of equally distributed transfers, the four
parameters dening the partial adjustment processes of hiring and wage subsidies 'ht and '
w
t , xed to zero at
the estimation stage, i.e. 'h = 'w = 'h = 'w = 0, the three parameters dening the partial indexation
mechanism for the domestic, import and export sectors , i.e. dp, 
m
p and 
x
p , respectively, all xed to zero in
order to allow for an interpretation of the (observed) frequency of price changes in terms of (theoretical) price
re-optimization25 , the exchange rate sensitivity to the net foreign assets to GDP ratio ea, xed to the arbitrary
small value of 1 3(26) and the private and government capital depreciation rates,  and g, respectively, both
xed to the conventional value of 0:025.
The remaining 9 dogmatic priors for structural parameters are xed considering country-specic evidence.
These are the trend growth parameter , xed considering the sample growth rate of per capita GDP, the
discount factor , calibrated considering the country-specic trend growth and the average real interest rate,
the home bias parameter (1  ), xed according to the country-specic sample evidence on the import share,
the separation rate , xed to the country estimates provided by Hobijn and Sahin (2009), the parameter
dening the frequency of wage re-optimization of incumbent workers w, xed to the country estimates pro-
vided in Druant et al. (2012), and the parameter dening the unemployment benet bu, xed according to the
country-specic replacement rates provided in the OECD-LFS data base (Christo¤el et al. 2009). The private
capital share , the matching e¢ ciency parameter m and the labor disutility scale parameter  are calibrated
such that the labor share, the unemployment rate and the job nding rate steady-state values evaluated at
the prior parameterization match the sample counterparts for each country27 .
Finally, the coe¢ cients in the system of measurement equations (43), i.e. those in the vector of deviations
from GDP trend xy, in the vectors of tax rates  , of ination rates , of domestic and foreign real interest
rates and bond rate spreads,   log and qb, respectively, and the long-run nominal e¤ective exchange rate e,
are xed to the respective sample means.
The seven exclusion restrictions for the identication of the foreign variablesSVAR, i.e. the zero restriction
for b12, b13, b14, b21, b23, b24 and b34 add further seven dogmatic priors. Table 1 summarizes the common and
country-specic dogmatic priors adopted in model estimation for the structural parameters.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
2.3 Priors for estimated parameters
The subset of (35) structural model parameters who is not a¤ected by evident identication problems, the 29
coe¢ cients dening the stochastic component (the i.i.d. hiring and wage subsidy shocks are pinned down at
the estimation stage) and the 73 coe¢ cients of the SVAR (nine for the elements of the B matrix and 64 for
25Under the hypothesis of indexation, prices are changed period by period, ruling out any intepretation of the observed
frequencies of price changes in terms of frequencies of price re-optimizations.
26Such a small value ensures the satisfaction of the stability conditions (Lundvik 1992, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 2001) while
minimizing the exchange rate persistence induced by its "technical" relation with the NFA evolution.
27Sample data for the job nding rate are obtained by elaborating the information in the OECD Labor Force Survey data-base
series "Unemployment by duration".
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the vector autoregressive component) are estimated with the Bayesian method28 .
Outside the Calvo price parmeters, the prior distributions are common across countries and are specied
following the standard practice: i) the shape of the probability density functions is the gamma and the
inverted gamma for parameters theoretically dened over the R+ range, the beta for parameters dened in a
[0  1] range and the normal for priors on parameters theoretically dened over the R range; ii) prior means
and standard deviations are dened on the basis of sample information (when available), or considering the
results of previous analyses29 . In order to enhance the estimation of parameters subject to weak empirical
identiability, informative priors are adopted such that a certain degree of curvature in the log-kernel is
obtained.
The prior means for the Calvo parameters of the domestic, import and export sectors, (dp, 
d
p 
d
p, respec-
tively) are specied according to the country-specic micro-evidence provided in Druant et al. (2012)30 , i.e.
0:71 for Greece, 0:75 for Ireland, 0:69 for Portugal and 0:70 for Italy and Spain. Since the available information
does not distinguish across sectors, we adopt a relatively high value for the prior standard deviation, equal to
0:1. A weak gamma-distributed prior with mean 1:5 and standard deviation 0:4 is adopted for the import and
export Armington elasticities  and  (Adolfson et al. 2008, Christiano et al. 2011b).
Considering the modied UIP equation, the autoregressive coe¢ cient es is assumed to be beta-distributed
with prior mean 0:25 and prior s.d. 0:15, whilst for the country risk adjustment coe¢ cient er we basically
follow Christiano et al. (2011b), assuming a (more) di¤use gamma distribution with prior mean 1:25 and prior
s.d. 0:5.
The private and public investment adjustment cost parameters  i and  ig are assumed to be normally
distributed around a prior mean of 5 with a prior s.d. of 2, and the utilization rate curvature parameter  k
is assumed to be beta-distributed with prior mean 0:5 and prior s.d. 0:15 (Christiano et al. 2011b).
Concerning the preference parameters, the consumption curvature parameter c is assumed to be normally-
distributed with a prior mean of 2 and a prior s.d. of 0:1, whilst the external habits parameter is assumed to
be beta-distributed and centered around 0:7 with a prior s.d. of 0:1. The prior for the fraction of liquidity
constrained households is rather di¤use, with mean 0:25 and s.d. 0:1031 .
Considering the labor market-specic parameters, a relatively weak beta-distributed prior with mean 0:5
and s.d. 0:15 is assumed for the matching function share parameter n and the unions relative bargaining
power parameter &. The prior for the hiring cost parameter  is assumed to be gamma-distributed with mean
0:05 and s.d. 0:01, a prior mean value consistent with a hiring cost to GDP ratio Y close to 1%.
Concerning the monetary policy parameters, the interest rate smoothness coe¢ cient R is assumed to be
beta-distributed with prior mean 0:5 and prior s.d. 0:2, the ination response parameter  1 is assumed to
28Operationally, posterior modes are obtained by maximizing the log-posterior kernel (resulting from the prior distribution and
the conditional distribution approximated by the Kalman lter) with respect to the model parameters, and posterior distributions
are obtained from the Metropolis-Hastings Monte Carlo Markov chain (MCMC) numerical integration algorithm. Two chains of
500k iterations are considered.
29The standard practice of considering results from previous studies is not free of limitations, since the validity domain of prior
evidence is not independent of the model being considered.
30The Kimball curvature, Calvo and mark-up (or demand elasticity) parameters are not separately identiable, as testied by
the results of preliminary identication checks at the prior values (Iskrev 2010a,b). We adopt the standard practice of xing the
Kimball and mark-up parameters to ensure the empirical identication of the estimated Calvo parameters.
31The preference parameters, even if separately identiable in our setting, are not fully variation-free. The choice of a relatively
tight prior for the consumption curvature parameter enhances the identiability of the other parameters.
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be normally distributed with prior mean 2 and s.d. 0:2, whilst the output and output growth sensitivity
parameters  2 and  3 are assumed to be beta-distributed with prior means (s.d.) of 0:1 (0:05) and 0:25 (0:1),
respectively. The four shift parameters accounting for the monetary policy structural break in the smoothness
coe¢ cient and in the feedback coe¢ cients are assumed to be normally distributed with zero prior mean and
s.d. equal to 0:2.
Considering the scal policy parameters, a beta-distributed prior with mean 0:75 and s.d. 0:15 is adopted
for the autoregressive components c , n , k and k in the tax rates partial adjustment equations, and
g, tr in the government consumption and transfers equations, respectively. For the coe¢ cients denoting the
sensitivity of these expenditure components to output, gy and try, an informative and normally distributed
prior with mean 1 and s.d. 0:1 is adopted, consistent with the hypothesis of long-run balanced growth of
public expenditures. A weakly informative beta-distributed prior with mean 0:05 and s.d. 0:02 is chosen for
the parameters gd and trd, dening the sensitivity of public consumption and transfers to the government
nancial need. The latter prior is equivalent to that chosen for the sensitivity of the tax rates to the nancial
need   , basically following the calibration value adopted in Drautzburg and Uhlig (2011). Finally, a weakly
informative beta-distributed prior with mean 0:25 and s.d. 0:10 is adopted for the tax instruments !c, !n and
!k, whilst !p is restricted to be equal to 1   !c + !n + !k.
Considering the stochastic component of the models, the prior opinions for the autoregressive coe¢ cients
of the seven persistent shock processes (i.e., a , ig , e , qb , %,  and x) are commonly described by a
weakly informative beta-distributed prior with mean 0:75 and s.d. 0:1532 . For the standard errors of the 25
innovations, we assume a prior mean of 0:01 with two degrees of freedom for all shocks, except those multiplying
convolutions of parameters whose values are outside the

10 1; 10

range, that are scaled accordingly.
The prior opinions on the estimated structural parameters are summarized in the rst column of the result
Table 2 (panels a-e).
The elicidation of priors for the foreign variables SVAR is based on the partially modied Minnesota
priors approach (Doan et al. 1984, Litterman 1986, Sims and Zha 1998) suggested by Banbura et al. (2010).
Accordingly, priors are specied consistently with the hypothesis of independent AR(1) processes (random
walks for variables close to non-stationarity), with prior variabilities decreasing in the power of the lag order
of the SVAR i (net of an overall shrinkage parameter , calibrated according to the number of variables in
the system) and scaled considering the variables error variance ratios 2m=
2
n, the latter approximated by
the estimated residuals of univariate autoregressive representations. Formally, the prior moments for the 73
coe¢ cients of the fourth-order SVAR (42) are specied as follows:
E [(Ai;B)mn] =
# for i = 1; m = n
0 otherwise
, V [(Ai;B)mn] =
2
i2 for m = n
2
i2
2m
2n
otherwise
(44)
where the values for the rst-order autoregressive coe¢ cients # are obtained from the estimates of independent
AR(1) processes.
32The autoregressive coe¢ cients  and x denote the persisitency of the stochastic component in the import and export
equations, respectively. Analitically, the rst component denes a stochastic home bias parameter, and the second a stochastic
elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic goods. The two stochastic components enter the log-linear representation
of the model additively, such that they do not inuence the empirical identiability of the preference parameters.
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2.4 Posterior mean estimates
Table 2a-b-c-d-e report the prior and the posterior mean estimates. Panel a, b and c contain the estimates of
37-dimensional parameters space for the model economy. the monetary policy and the scal policy coe¢ cients,
respectively. Panel d and e report the estimates of the 30 parameters dening the persistence and size of the
25 exogenous stochastic components, respectively33 .
According to the estimated posterior mode standard deviations and the implied pseudo t-values, the struc-
tural parameter estimates all appear signicant for each of the countries being considered. Concerning the
stationary disturbances, we obtain a high degree of autocorrelation for all the autoregressive shock processes.
The exogenous innovations are all signicant according to their standard errors.
The posterior mean values for the model economy parameters are generally close to the respective modal
values and indicate reasonable estimates based on our prior opinions and results in the literature. Evident
exceptions are the.unconventionally high posterior estimates obtained for the private and public capital ad-
justment cost parameters  i and  ig, on average more than the double of the prior mean value, implying
milder investment and capital responses than those obtainable under standard calibration values.
The curvature parameter for the capital utilization rate  k is estimated to be very high and distant from
the prior for Greece (0:99), Italy (0:97) and Spain (0:96), and very low for Ireland (0:15). These numbers are
expected to be reected in the model dynamics, since a higher curvature parameter indicates less room for
quick adjustments relying on the variation of the utilization rate of capital, thus more persistence.
TABLE 2a ABOUT HERE
A relevant degree of cross-country heterogeneity is obtained with respect to the parameter dening the
fraction of liquidity constrained households h, estimated to be quite high for Portugal (0:36) and Italy (0:34),
and quite low for Greece (0:14) and Spain (0:12). These di¤erences are expected to a¤ect the size of the
scal policy multipliers, as long as a higher degree of rule-of-thumb behavior is reected in a more direct link
between current income and private consumption, i.e. in the breakdown of Ricardian equivalence.
The posterior estimates of the Calvo parameters in the domestic, import and export sectors, dp, 
m
p and
xp , respectively, are somewhat higher than the prior opinions based on survey evidence and the conventional
values used in the literature. The high posterior estimates basically reect the at slope of the NKPCs, which
is more pronounced than that implied by the joint consideration of the Calvo frequency micro-estimates and
of the conventional calibration values for the mark-up (or elasticity) parameters34 .
The estimated Armington elasticities  and  are generally smaller than the prior and denote a di¤eren-
tiated pattern across countries. A similar consideration holds true for the risk premium parameter er, which
33Mode checks and multivariate M-H convergence plots signal that the estimation process performs correctly for all countries.
The mode estimates intersect the log posterior kernel at its maximum for all parameters. The multivariate diagnostics signal
that the estimates are stable both within (over replications) and particularly between chains. Posterior densities conrm these
encouraging indications, signaling a close to normal shape and a reasonable distance from prior densities. These results are
available upon request from the authors.
34Such a result shows that, for the countries considered in this study, the introduction of endogenous demand elasticities does
not solve the micro-macro dichotomy in the estimate of the NKPC slope coe¢ cients (Eichenbaum and Fisher 2007).
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is estimated to be below unity for all countries, ruling out a direct emergence of the forward premium puzzle.
The labor market specic parameters show a certain degree of variability across countries, in particular
for the unions relative bargaining power parameter &, estimated to be higher than the conventional value of
0:5 for all countries except Italy (0:37). The posterior mean estimates for the hiring cost parameter  and
the matching function share parameter n are not distant from priors, except for the former parameter in the
case of Portugal ( = 0:023) and for the latter parameter in the case of Ireland (n = 0:314).
TABLE 2b ABOUT HERE
TABLE 2c ABOUT HERE
Considering the estimated monetary policy coe¢ cients adjusted for the break implied by the shift to the
single currency, relevant di¤erences emerge across countries. The size of the policy rate response to ination
is quite high for Greece (1:8), close to a conventional parameterization for Spain (1:4), and quite low for the
remaining countries (between 1:2 and 1:06). Joint with the estimated high degrees of inertial behavior (the
coe¢ cient R is always well above 0:8), these results indicate, with the exception of Greece, a mild monetary
policy response to variations in ination and output, potentially dampening its counter-cyclical e¤ects under
standard scal expansions and its pro-cyclical e¤ects in the case of scal policies targeted to a reduction of
the labor cost and ination.
It is interesting to note that the posterior estimates of the four shift parameters accounting for the monetary
policy structural break are negative and sizeable in all countries being considered, signalling that the shift to a
common currency and a centralized authority targeting average EZ ination and output has implied a reduced
degree of monetary policy activism with respect to the single economies macroeconomic developments35 .
TABLE 2d ABOUT HERE
Finally, the posterior estimates for the scal policy coe¢ cients conrm the high degree of inertia on both
the expenditure and the revenue sides, with estimated autoregressive coe¢ cients well above the conventional
calibration value of 0:9 (Perotti 2005). It is interesting to note that the posterior estimates for the parameter
denoting the sensitivity of the tax rates to the government nancial need   , even if low and distant from the
prior, are basically consistent with the Galì and Perotti (2003) estimates for OECD countries. The estimated
sensitivities of government consumption and transfers to the nancial need (gd and trd, respectively) are on
average higher and more heterogeneous across countries, with a size ranging from 0:01 for Ireland to 0:06 for
Greece. The parameter dening the link between long-run expenditure and output levels (gy and try) are
always not signicantly di¤erent from unity, such that the hypothesis of balanced growth in the scal variables
cannot be rejected.
35Detailed results on the monetary policy break estimates are reported in a technical appendix available upon request from
the authors.
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3 Policy simulations
In this section we provide a comparative analysis of the country-specic expected e¤ects from the implemen-
tation of the two alternative labor market targeted policies. These are obtained by simulating the model
considering the parameterization obtained at the country-specic posterior mean estimates.
The policy simulation exercise is developed along two main lines: i).a persistent, albeit not permanent,
reduction in the labor cost of newly hired workers through transitory wage subsidies, nanced with public
resources equivalent to 1% of GDP; ii) a transitory reduction in hiring costs through structural LM reforms,
for an equivalent amount of resources. The persistence coe¢ cients of the shocks are set to 0:75, consistent
with a one year average duration of the policy shock.
Even though the mathematical implementation of measure ii) is straightforward in our model, its cali-
bration to the resources being devoted is highly problematic. In order to circumvent these implementation
problems, and possibly optimistically, we assume that, given the estimated equilibrium hiring cost parameter
(which is not observed), the structural measures are expected to induce a reduction of this specic cost on
impact for an amount equivalent to the public nancing of the measure.
We assume that the measures are backed by national resources, so that they necessarily imply scal
nancing, i.e, public budget and debt variations through tax rate and expenditure changes, expenditure
restructuring and bonds issuing. In order to enhance the understanding of the simulation results, we only
consider the estimated systematic components in the revenue equations, i.e., the specic elasticity of tax rates
to the nancial need, whilst the expenditure side is assumed to be fully exogenous by setting the elasticities
of the expenditure components to the nancial need and to GDP to zero.
The results from the labor market targeted policy simulations are then compared with those obtainable from
the implementation of equally nanced scal policy measures based on increased expenditures in government
consumption, transfers and investments and on decreased tax pressure on labor incomes, business prots,
capital gains and consumption. The di¤erent simulations are made comparable by calibrating the size of each
policy shock to be equivalent to a 1% of GDP on impact and by homogenizing their persistence to the one
adopted for the simulation of the labor market targeted scal measures.
The same policy simulations are then repeated considering that the economies are operating in a neigh-
borhood of the liquidity trap. To implement such an environment, we calibrate a negative preference shock
implying an eight-quarters period non positive equilibrium interest rate for each country, and impose the
zero-lower-bound (ZLB) condition.
3.1 The e¤ects of the policies in standard times
Figures 1 and 2 depict the expected e¤ects from government expenditure shocks on hiring costs and wage
subsidization for new hires of labor in the PIIGS, respectively. For simplicity, only the responses of GDP
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and of the unemployment rate are reported. These are normalized such that the GDP response has an
interpretation in terms of the dynamic monetary scal multiplier (i.e. the expected monetary variation in
GDP from a 1 euro budget variation), whilst the unemployment rate response has an interpretation in terms
of percent deviation from the steady-state unemployment rate.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
A rst outcome that merits to be highlighted is the very high variability of results across countries for
both measures, signalling the operation of very di¤erent transmission mechanisms. Considering the hiring
subsidy, the peak output multiplier and the peak percent reduction in unemployment range, respectively, from
a maximum of 3:4 and  2% for Greece, to a minimum of approximately 0:3 for the output in Ireland and
of  0:3% for unemployment in Italy. Qualitatively similar results hold for the wage subsidy, for which the
highest peak e¤ects are obtained for Greece (4:1 the output peak multiplier,  2:5% the peak reduction in
unemployment), and the lowest for Ireland in the case of the output multiplier (0:2) and for Italy in the case
of the maximum unemployment reduction ( 0:3%).
To understand the economic reasons behind these outcomes, it is worth xing two points that are common
to both the labor market targeted measures. First, the impact e¤ect on output is negative for all countries
but Greece and that on unemployment is negligible. Second, the measures are expected to produce positive
e¤ects on output and employment only in the medium to long-term (on average, the peak response is reached
after 16 periods, i.e. four years), with the sole exception of the unemployment response for Ireland, reaching
its peak after three periods.
The negative output response observed in all countries but Greece on impact is mainly related to the delayed
real wage contraction, due to the nominal wage rigidity, and to the temporary increase in the real interest
rate, due to the weak monetary policy reaction to the deation stimulated by the real wage contraction. The
resulting increase in the real interest rate leads to a temporary drop in private expenditures (consumption
and investment), whilst the dampened real wage contraction, which is not compensated by a quick and
signicant increase in employment, tends to depress private consumption in the fraction of liquidity constrained
households. The positive net export response stimulated by the devaluation of the real exchange rate is not
su¢ cient to outweigh the contraction in the internal demand components. The fact that Greece is the country
for which the strongest real wage contraction and the highest degree of monetary policy activism are obtained
explains great part of the fact that for this country the expansionary e¤ects take place even on impact,
consistently with the result and the mechanics discussed in Faia et al. (2013)36 .
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
36We have veried that, by setting the ination response coe¢ cient to 1:2 in the Taylor rule and lowering the estimated
elasticity of import to the value being estimated for the export elasticity (0:67), the responses of output and employment are
more aligned with those obtained for the other countries. The output impact response becomes negative, whilst the peak output
and unemployment multipliers are strongly reduced (1:4 and  0:97%)
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Figures 3 and 4, for the hiring and wage subsidy shocks, respectively, report the impulse responses of the
real wage and of the real interest rate, together with the dynamics of the relative contributions to the output
response of private expenditures and net exports37 .
The induced real wage contraction is at the root of the transmission mechanisms of the policies being
considered. The size and the persistence of this e¤ect depend on the mechanics established by equation (25),
showing the relevance of the degree of nominal wage rigidity, as well as the emergence of both contemporaneous
and intertemporal factors in the wage bargaining process
Considering the introduction of a wage subsidy, the rst row of equation (25) shows that, for a given degree
of nominal wage rigidity, the bargained real wage is directly related to the present wage subsidy, weighted
by the fraction of new hires of labor. The contemporaneous e¤ects are thus dominated by the intertemporal
e¤ects, driving the bargained wage in the opposite direction. In fact, and as expected from the discussion in
section (2:4), given the country-specic calibrated values for the separation rate , and the estimated unions
relative bargaining power parameter &, the rms intertemporal incentive to reduce the present bargained wage
always dominates the unions net intertemporal incentive to increase it. The di¤erent real wage responses in
the countries being considered basically reect the cross-country heterogeneity in these two labor market
parameters and the di¤erent degrees of nominal wage rigidity.
Considering the introduction of a hiring subsidy, the mechanics of the wage contraction is immediately
evident in the third last row of equation (25), showing that the subsidy reduces the present bargained real
wage because of the anticipation of the loss opportunity of a future reduction in the hiring cost.
The delayed output and employment peak e¤ects of the labor market targeted policies are due to, on the
one hand, the high degree of both nominal and real rigidities and, on the other, to the inertial behavior of
the monetary authority. The nominal wage rigidity dampens the speed of the wage contraction, as well as the
estimated high degrees of price rigidity, that reduces the size and delays the resulting price deation.
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
On the real terrain, the estimated high degrees of external habits h introduce a strong memory component
in private consumption behavior, which is not compensated by a su¢ ciently quicker response of private and
public investment, because of the high private and public capital adjustment costs (dened by the estimated
size of parameters  i and  ig), and of the degree of rigidity in varying its utilization.rate (dened by the
estimated size of parameter  k). The latter real rigidity,which is estimated to be particularly low for Ireland,
explains great part of the quicker positive response in employment obtained for this country.
Concerning the relative e¤ects of the two labor market policies, the simulations indicate that, except
Greece, the expected e¤ects from the introduction of hiring subsidies are slightly stronger than those from an
equally nanced wage subsidization. This result is due to the stronger real wage contraction stimulated by
the hiring cost subsidy shock.
Table 3 shows that, compared to more standard expansionary scal policies increasing public spending or
reducing the tax pressure, the labor market targeted scal policies prove less e¢ cient in providing a timely
37The relative contribution to the output variation of private domestic expenditures (consumption and investment) and of net
exports are obtained by weightening the variablesimpulse responses by the respective steady state ratios to output.
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(impact) stimulus to economic activity in all countries being considered. Except Greece, the scal multipli-
ers are maximized both on impact and at the peak response with a government consumption shock. Even
considering a wasteful expenditure, for these countries the range of values for the estimated impact and peak
monetary multipliers are within 1 and 2.
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
It is interesting to compare the e¤ects from hiring costs and newly hired workerswage subsidization with
those from a general labor tax reduction. The latter produces the peak output response on impact in all
economies, even if the size of the multiplier is highly heterogeneous across countries, basically reecting the
estimated fraction of liquidity constrained households38 The reason for the quicker e¤ects is that, since the
tax cut a¤ects the (larger) fraction of incumbent workers, the reduction in the labor tax pressure immediately
increases the current after tax real income, stimulating consumption in the fraction of liquidity constrained
households and labor supply. The increase in labor supply tends to counterbalance the inationary pres-
sure activated by the increased private consumption expenditure. Thus, because of the resulting economic
expansion, private investment also increases. The negative net export response, due to the slightly reduced
competitiveness of the domestic production from increased domestic prices, is not su¢ cient to reverse the sign
of the response in output.
The impact reduction in unemployment stimulated the labor market targeted measures (Table 4) dominates
that obtainable from the alternative measures only in the case of Ireland, whilst the expected peak e¤ects are
stronger than those obtainable with a government consumption expansion for Greece and Ireland, basically
equivalent for Portugal and weaker for Italy and Spain.
The main responsible for the relatively high values of the government expenditure employment multiplier
is again the estimated inertial behavior of the monetary policy. When faced with an expansionary and
inationary policy, the smoothed response of the nominal interest rate tends to downsize the counteracting
e¤ects of the monetary policy stabilization response, whilst it provides weak accommodation to policies relying
mainly on the dynamics activated by wage and price deations, as it is in the case of the wage and hiring costs
subsidization policies.
To summarize: i) the labor market targeted policies lead in general to a higher degree of heterogeneity of
results across countries than that resulting from standard scal policies (in particular government consumption
expenditures); ii) aside Greece, their growth-enhancing e¤ects are always inferior than those obtainable from
government consumption expenditure; iii) even if the employment e¤ects can be superior than those of the
alternative scal policies, their potential is reached only with a signicant delay.
These results signal that, even if the labor market targeted policies reduce the labor cost both directly
and indirectly, whereas standard scal expansions based on government expenditure lead to an increase in the
real wage that tends to counterbalance the employment-enhancing e¤ects of the economic expansion, these
38The fraction of rule-of-thumb households is in fact estimated to be particularly low for Spain and Greece, reecting the low
correlation between private consumption and current net incomes in the sample. Considering the recent evolution of the Greek
and Spanish economies, it is highly probable that the fraction of liquidity contrained households increased strongly. We have
veried that, by including a dummy variable controlling for the recessionary periods, the estimated degree of liquidity constraints
increases by 0:14 points for Spain and 0:18 points for Greece.
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mechanisms are not strong enough to make the labor market targeted policies a set of instruments to be
preferred to more standard scal policies, especially under a business cycle management perspective.
It is worth highlighting that, under the small open economy assumption adopted in this study, the estimated
e¤ects of the labor market targeted policies are likely to be maximized, since we cannot control for the situation
in which the same policy is adopted in the foreign economy. It would be interesting to evaluate to which degree
their generalized adoption in a highly integrated single currency area has the same e¢ cacy.
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
3.2 The e¤ects of the policies in a liquidity trap
The analysis developed so far has shown that the relative e¢ cacy of the alternative measures in the di¤erent
countries depends both on the di¤erent degrees of nominal and wage rigidity and on the interaction between
scal and monetary policy regimes. In particular, an aggressive monetary policy increases the expected e¤ects
of scal measures targeted to induce a price deation through the reduction of the labor cost, and dampens
those of policies stimulating the general economic activity, because of their inationary implications.
The fact that the labor market targeted scal policies being evaluated are expected to be implemented in
economies operating well below their potential, as is the case of the countries considered in this study, suggests
to extend the analysis to the situation of a binding ZLB. In these circumstances, a deationary scal policy
cannot be accommodated by the automatic response of the monetary authority, since the nominal interest
rate cannot be reduced further (Eggertsson et al. 2014)39 . On the contrary, an expansionary and inationary
scal policy, until it does not succeed in taking the economy out of the liquidity trap, will not face the same
counteracting e¤ects originating in the stabilizing response of the monetary policy during standard times
(Christiano et al. 2011a, Eggertsson 2011a,b, Eggertsson and Krugman 2012). Tables 5 and 6 replicate, for
a below potential-liquidity trap economic environment, the information on the scal multipliers and on the
employment e¤ects of the alternative policies provided by Tables 3 and 4 for the economis operating at thei
potential output levels. Since strongly negative output multipliers are often found, one row reporting the peak
negative multiplier is added in Table 5.
The consideration of a liquidity trap environment a¤ects the e¢ cacy of the labor market targeted scal
policies in di¤erent directions in the short and in the long term. Considering the hiring cost subsidization
policy, the short-term output multipliers are signicantly negative in all countries but Greece, (between  0:04
for Spain and  2:6 for Portugal), whilst the long-term peak output multipliers are increased and delayed
further (between 0:5 for Ireland and 3:2 for Greece). Qualitatively similar results are obtained considering the
subsidization of the wage of the new hires of labor, for which the short term multipliers are again negative
(between  0:03 for Spain and  2:5 for Portugal), whilst in the long run their peak values are conrmed to be
increased (between 0:4 for Ireland and 5:2 for Greece). The employment e¤ects are instead always positive,
even if the stronger peak employment reduction is in general delayed further as compared to the standard
time simulations.
39Eggertsson et al. (2014), by simulating a monetary model calibrated to average EZ data, show that a permanent reduction
in product and labor market markups (a structural policy in authors terms), can have contractionary short term e¤ects when
the economy is in a liquidity trap.
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The transmission mechanics explaining these results is the same described for the simulations assuming
a not binding ZLB environment. Even in this case, the subsidization policy generates a deation through
the real wage contraction. The main di¤erence here is that, for the eight periods in which the ZLB binds,
the monetary authority cannot accommodate the policy with a nominal interest rate reduction, such that the
resulting increase in the real interest rate is of the same size of the price deation. The transitory but sizeable
negative output response amplies the real wage contraction and the deation during the liquidity trap period.
As the economy recovers, the monetary authority decreases the policy rate by a larger amount than
in a not binding ZLB environment, because of the stronger deation, and rms are willing to hire more
workers, because of the stronger real wage contraction. This justies the expansion following the transitory
but persistent depression activated by the labor market policies.
Notwithstanding the amplied and delayed long run output responses, and with the exception of Greece, the
labor market targeted policies are conrmed to be inferior to a scal policy expansion based on government
consumption. As expected, the output and employment e¤ects of scal expansions based on government
expenditures are signicantly increased, with the peak government consumption output multipliers in the
range 1:7   3:3, and the unemployment reduction within  0:8% and  1:3%. When the ZLB binds, the
counteracting response of the monetary authority does not take place until the economy is out of the liquidity
trap. In this circumstance, the real interest rate tends to decrease with the increased ination, adding a
positive private expenditure response to the government stimulus.
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE
It is interesting to note that, under a binding ZLB, scal expansions based on tax rate cuts are counter-
productive in all countries in the short term, and basically ine¤ective in the long run. This result is only
apparently surprising. On the one hand, a labor tax cut increases the after tax current income, leading to
both increased labor supply and to increased consumption demand in the fraction of liquidity constrained
households. On the other, the increased labor supply induces a real wage and thus marginal cost contraction,
activating a deationary pressure. Since only a minor fraction of households are liquidity constrained, the
deation stimulated by the reduced tax pressure prevails such that, given the xed policy rate, an increase in
the real interest rate emerges, leading to reduced private expenditures40 .
40The mechanics behind this result has been explained in detail by Eggertsson (2011a) in a simplied model setting assuming
full Ricardian equivalence. In his comment to the Eggertssons (2011a) paper, Christiano (2011) provides some useful insights and
identies two major ingredients for the deationary pressure to emerge following a tax cut: i) the persistence of the deationary
pressure, i.e. the presence of relevant price rigidities; ii) the sensitivity of expenditures to the real interest rate, i.e. the empirical
relevance of the Euler consumption equation. Our results, emerging in an extended structural model setting estimated on country
data, provide evidence in support to Eggertssons result giving an empirical assesment of both key factors.
30
4 Conclusions
We develop, estimate and simulate a model characterized by a detailed representation of the non Walrasian
labor market. We introduce both government hiring and wage subsidies for newly hired workers, obtained by
considering a distinction between incumbent workers and new entrants in the search and matching framework,
in order to formalize a modication a¤ecting both the job creation condition and the Nash bargained wage,
such that unions/rms are non-neutral in wages/labor costs with respect to new hires of labor.
The analysis, developed at the country-level for a selection of peripheral EZ economies (the PIIGS), is
based on the simulation of the country-specic response of output and employment to a general hiring shock
and a wage subsidy shock targeted to new hires of labor only, and on their comparison with the expected e¤ects
from nancially equivalent scal policies a¤ecting government expenditure and revenues. Results show that,
contrary to some conclusions in the recent literature and the policy recommendations within the European EP
and YG programmes, the labor market targeted scal measures, in a short term perspective, are not superior
to more standard scal instruments in the management of the business cycle. The analysis also indicates that,
even in a longer term perspective and aside Greece, the output multiplier of government consumption is higher
than that from hiring costs and newly hired workerssubsidization. Considering the employment e¤ects, these
policies prove to be clearly superior to more standard scal expansions only in the long term and at the Greece
and Ireland model parameter estimates.
The consideration of a liquidity trap environment reinforces these conclusions, as both output and em-
ployment multipliers of government expenditures are signicantly increased. On the contrary - and with the
exception of Greece - the output multiplier of the labor market targeted measures are strongly negative in
the short term, and their peak e¤ects are reached with an increased delay as compared with the standard
environment simulations.
These results basically highlight the importance of the scal-monetary policy coordination in the business
cycle management, an option which might be out of reach during a deep recession.
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TABLE 1 - DOGMATIC PRIORS: STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS
Parameter Description Spain Greece Ireland Italy Portugal
 Discount factor 0:995 0:994 0:997 0:996 0:999
 Production function parameter 0:220 0:265 0:220 0:333 0:210
 Capital depreciation rate 0:025 0:025 0:025 0:025 0:025
g Government capital depreciation rate 0:025 0:025 0:025 0:025 0:025
 Import share 0:340 0:335 0:920 0:281 0:350
 Separation rate 0:061 0:028 0:042 0:021 0:039
m Matching e¢ ciency 1:150 0:650 0:300 0:600 0:250
 Labor disutility scale 0:800 0:300 1:000 4:070 0:200
bu Unemployment benet 0:610 0:650 0:650 0:630 0:720
w Renegotiation frequency incumbent workers 0:750 0:750 0:800 0:850 0:770
w Renegotiation frequency new workers 0:500 0:500 0:500 0:500 0:500
'j Labor subsidies 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
ip Price markups 1:200 1:200 1:200 1:200 1:200
i Demand elasticity 10:00 10:00 10:00 10:00 10:00
ip Price indixation 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
 Growth rate 1:002 0:999 1:007 1:002 1:003ea Exchange rate elasticity to net asset 0:001 0:001 0:001 0:001 0:001
d Relative government transfers share 1:000 1:000 1:000 1:000 1:000
'j Labor subsidies autoregressive parameters 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
'j Labor subsidies partial adjustment parameters 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
Notes : The parameters related to "great ratios" and other observable quantities related to steady state values are
calibrated considering that the time unit is a quarter. The sector specic parameters denoted by i = d, m, x are
assumed, as for the wage and hiring subsidy j = w, h, to be of equal value.
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TABLE 2a - PRIOR DISTRIBUTIONS AND POSTERIOR MEAN ESTIMATES: MODEL ECONOMY
Prior distribution Posterior mean
Density Mean Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
(s.d.) [c.i.] [c.i.] [c.i.] [c.i.] [c.i.]
dp G 0:69  0:75 0:894 0:905 0:877 0:844 0:873
(0:10) [0:865  0:923] [0:884  0:926] [0:867  0:887] [0:822  0:866] [0:861  0:884]
mp G 0:69  0:75 0:906 0:842 0:840 0:900 0:837
(0:10) [0:876  0:937] [0:815  0:868] [0:802  0:877] [0:873  0:929] [0:797  0:885]
xp G 0:69  0:75 0:822 0:850 0:808 0:847 0:790
(0:10) [0:784  0:864] [0:807  0:904] [0:759  0:861] [0:816  0:880] [0:748  0:833]
c N 2:00 1:961 1:864 1:983 1:921 2:017
(0:10) [1:799  2:121] [1:705  2:029] [1:845  2:124] [1:766  2:071] [1:849  2:179]
h B 0:70 0:821 0:801 0:822 0:762 0:905
(0:10) [0:782  0:859] [0:755  0:848] [0:785  0:862] [0:705  0:819] [0:883  0:928]
h B 0:25 0:137 0:252 0:343 0:361 0:123
(0:10) [0:081  0:187] [0:158  0:346] [0:251  0:438] [0:280  0:445] [0:049  0:191]
 G 1:50 0:941 1:432 0:439 0:667 0:663
(0:40) [0:764  1:112] [0:807  2:017] [0:299  0:569] [0:480  0:847] [0:490  0:837]
 G 1:50 0:626 0:893 0:851 0:700 0:374
(0:40) [0:502  0:747] [0:751  1:043] [0:723  0:980] [0:571  0:830] [0:247  0:497]es B 0:25 0:494 0:644 0:872 0:876 0:876
(0:15) [0:390  0:613] [0:514  0:779] [0:767  0:966] [0:816  0:939] [0:802  0:953]er G 1:25 0:612 0:692 0:958 0:598 0:751
(0:50) [0:517  0:706] [0:575  0:806] [0:880  1:027] [0:467  0:721] [0:667  0:842]
 i N 5:00 13:01 7:90 11:81 8:86 10:73
(2:50) [13:20  15:65] [5:12  10:67] [9:74  13:90] [6:85  10:86] [8:48  12:88]
 ig N 5:00 12:92 13:43 15:08 5:34 13:49
(2:50) [10:21  15:65] [10:84  16:04] [12:63  17:53] [2:99  7:57] [10:74  16:18]
 k B 0:50 0:988 0:148 0:971 0:461 0:957
(0:15) [0:981  0:996] [0:107  0:189] [0:959  0:982] [0:347  0:566] [0:935  0:980]
n B 0:50 0:494 0:314 0:559 0:541 0:481
(0:10) [0:374  0:613] [0:189  0:438] [0:418  0:708] [0:413  0:664] [0:303  0:664]
& B 0:50 0:724 0:762 0:367 0:842 0:606
(0:10) [0:659  0:794] [0:685  0:841] [0:274  0:455] [0:783  0:902] [0:525  0:691]
 G 0:05 0:053 0:045 0:043 0:024 0:052
(0:01) [0:037  0:068] [0:032  0:058] [0:029  0:057] [0:018  0:030] [0:034  0:069]
Notes : N and B are Normal and Beta distributions, respectively. Posterior mean estimates for the model economy
parameters are obtained with 250000 M-H replications on two parallel chains. * denotes the range of values for the
country-specic values Druant et al. (2012).
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TABLE 2b - PRIOR DISTRIBUTIONS AND POSTERIOR MEAN ESTIMATES: MONETARY AUTHORITY
Prior distribution Posterior mean
Density Mean Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
(s.d.) [c.i.] [c.i.] [c.i.] [c.i.] [c.i.]
R B 0:50 0:888 0:896 0:909 0:830 0:908
(0:20) [0:869  0:905] [0:878  0:915] [0:894  0:925] [0:809  0:852] [0:897  0:920]
 1 N 2:00 1:80 1:10 1:23 1:06 1:42
(0:20) [1:58  2:02] [1:03  1:16] [1:09  1:36] [1:02  1:10] [1:19  1:65]
 2 B 0:10 0:061 0:021 0:017 0:010 0:008
(0:05) [0:037  0:086] [0:011  0:031] [0:002  0:032] [0:003  0:016] [0:001  0:014]
 3 B 0:25 0:063 0:064 0:119 0:055 0:084
(0:10) [0:030  0:096] [0:045  0:085] [0:093  0:147] [0:036  0:075] [0:042  0:125]
Notes : N and B are Normal and Beta distributions, respectively. Posterior mean estimates for the monetary authority
parameters are obtained with 250000 M-H replications on two parallel chains.
.
.
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TABLE 2c - PRIOR DISTRIBUTIONS AND POSTERIOR MEAN ESTIMATES: FISCAL AUTHORITY
Prior distribution Posterior mean
Density Mean Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
(s.d.) [c.i.] [c.i.] [c.i.] [c.i.] [c.i.]
!c B 0:25 0:399 0:438 0:238 0:420 0:494
(0:10) [0:276  0:514] [0:296  0:576] [0:150  0:320] [0:315  0:525] [0:383  0:608]
!n B 0:25 0:595 0:375 0:690 0:580 0:470
(0:10) [0:477  0:717] [0:240  0:515] [0:580  0:800] [0:459  0:701] [0:355  0:581]
!k B 0:25 0:007 0:159 0:034 0:001 0:009
(0:10) [0:003  0:011] [0:057  0:252] [0:011  0:055] [0:000  0:002] [0:003  0:014]
  B 0:05 0:014 0:018 0:013 0:021 0:013
(0:02) [0:009  0:017] [0:012  0:024] [0:009  0:016] [0:014  0:028] [0:010  0:016]
c B 0:75 0:962 0:967 0:953 0:956 0:982
(0:15) [0:933  0:990] [0:947  0:989] [0:916  0:992] [0:922  0:992] [0:969  0:998]
n B 0:75 0:981 0:988 0:988 0:990 0:968
(0:15) [0:968  0:995] [0:979  0:998] [0:979  0:998] [0:981  0:999] [0:945  0:993]
k B 0:75 0:980 0:968 0:979 0:987 0:982
(0:15) [0:964  0:997] [0:955  0:982] [0:962  0:998] [0:976  0:999] [0:969  0:996]
p B 0:75 0:978 0:971 0:958 0:990 0:972
(0:15) [0:963  0:995] [0:949  0:994] [0:927  0:992] [0:982  0:999] [0:951  0:993]
g B 0:75 0:976 0:953 0:966 0:964 0:971
(0:15) [0:949  0:999] [0:926  0:980] [0:938  0:993] [0:943  0:984] [0:954  0:988]
tr B 0:75 0:949 0:965 0:980 0:911 0:972
(0:15) [0:923  0:975] [0:950  0:980] [0:966  0:995] [0:866  0:956] [0:958  0:986]
gy N 1:00 0:985 0:958 1:02 1:05 1:06
(0:10) [0:819  1:15] [0:793  1:12] [0:860  1:20] [0:888  1:23] [0:893  1:23]
try N 1:00 0:994 1:03 1:01 1:02 1:00
(0:10) [0:829  1:16] [0:868  1:20] [0:850  1:17] [0:858  1:18] [0:842  1:17]
gd B 0:05 0:028 0:030 0:019 0:016 0:016
(0:02) [0:015  0:041] [0:013  0:046] [0:010  0:028] [0:006  0:025] [0:010  0:021]
trd B 0:05 0:056 0:098 0:018 0:024 0:023
(0:02) [0:023  0:089] [0:070  0:125] [0:011  0:025] [0:013  0:036] [0:016  0:030]
Notes : N and B are Normal and Beta distributions, respectively. Posterior mean estimates for the scal authority
parameters are obtained with 250000 M-H replications on two parallel chains.
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TABLE 2d - PRIOR DISTRIBUTIONS AND POSTERIOR MEAN ESTIMATES: AR(1) COEFICIENTS OF SHOCKS
Prior distribution Posterior mean
Density Mean Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
(s.d.) [c.i.] [c.i.] [c.i.] [c.i.] [c.i.]
a B 0:75 0:949 0:934 0:915 0:911 0:954
(0:15) [0:927  0:973] [0:918  0:950] [0:890  0:942] [0:889  0:934] [0:936  0:973]
ig B 0:75 0:913 0:838 0:154 0:194 0:847
(0:15) [0:868  0:953] [0:751  0:928] [0:059  0:245] [0:088  0:296] [0:761  0:929]
e B 0:75 0:887 0:843 0:888 0:897 0:881
(0:15) [0:846  0:931] [0:800  0:889] [0:836  0:942] [0:843  0:951] [0:812  0:954]
qb B 0:75 0:873 0:910 0:874 0:905 0:927
(0:15) [0:846  0:900] [0:876  0:945] [0:838  0:910] [0:877  0:933] [0:900  0:955]
% B 0:75 0:972 0:902 0:758 0:971 0:945
(0:15) [0:953  0:992] [0:857  0:949] [0:657  0:857] [0:952  0:992] [0:909  0:985]
 B 0:75 0:956 0:976 0:928 0:918 0:963
(0:15) [0:932  0:981] [0:964  0:988] [0:891  0:965] [0:864  0:971] [0:940  0:986]
x B 0:75 0:987 0:962 0:885 0:928 0:899
(0:15) [0:983  0:991] [0:947  0:977] [0:827  0:950] [0:871  0:993] [0:852  0:946]
Notes : B represents the Beta distribution. Posterior mean estimates for the AR(1) coecients of shocks are obtained
with 250000 M-H replications on two parallel chains.
.
.
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TABLE 2e - PRIOR DISTRIBUTIONS AND POSTERIOR MEAN ESTIMATES: S.D. OF SHOCK PROCESSES
Prior distribution Posterior mean
Density Mean Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
(s.d.) [c.i.] [c.i.] [c.i.] [c.i.] [c.i.]
"n;t G 1 0:01 0:008 0:003 0:005 0:006 0:003
(2:00) [0:007  0:008] [0:003  0:003] [0:004  0:005] [0:006  0:007] [0:003  0:004]
"p;t G 1 0:01 0:003 0:003 0:003 0:003 0:004
(2:00) [0:002  0:003] [0:003  0:004] [0:003  0:003] [0:002  0:003] [0:004  0:004]
"k;t G 1 0:01 0:004 0:019 0:007 0:001 0:004
(2:00) [0:004  0:005] [0:017  0:021] [0:006  0:008] [0:001  0:001] [0:003  0:004]
"c;t G 1 0:01 0:004 0:005 0:002 0:004 0:004
(2:00) [0:003  0:004] [0:004  0:005] [0:002  0:002] [0:004  0:005] [0:003  0:004]
"g;t G 1 0:01 0:026 0:028 0:019 0:024 0:011
(2:00) [0:023  0:028] [0:025  0:031] [0:017  0:021] [0:021  0:026] [0:010  0:012]
"tr;t G 1 0:01 0:080 0:027 0:014 0:021 0:013
(2:00) [0:072  0:087] [0:024  0:030] [0:013  0:015] [0:019  0:023] [0:011  0:014]
"ig;t G 1 0:1 0:161 0:225 0:985 1:104 0:123
(2:00) [0:118  0:203] [0:140  0:305] [0:759  1:213] [0:696  1:542] [0:074  0:171]
"a;t G 1 0:01 0:012 0:019 0:010 0:014 0:008
(2:00) [0:011  0:014] [0:017  0:021] [0:009  0:011] [0:012  0:016] [0:007  0:009]
"r;t G 1 0:01 0:003 0:005 0:002 0:002 0:003
(2:00) [0:003  0:003] [0:004  0:005] [0:002  0:002] [0:002  0:002] [0:003  0:003]
"dp;t G 1 0:5 2:139 2:240 1:123 0:703 0:668
(2:00) [1:655  2:605] [1:636  2:854] [0:909  1:335] [0:579  0:827] [0:518  0:806]
"mp;t G 1 0:5 2:324 1:128 2:063 2:299 2:113
(2:00) [1:638  3:014] [0:787  1:461] [1:509  2:619] [1:691  2:903] [1:454  2:790]
"xp;t G 1 0:5 2:001 1:512 0:889 1:104 1:096
(2:00) [1:320  2:658] [0:920  2:046] [0:595  1:161] [0:817  1:378] [0:740  1:441]
"qb;t G 1 0:01 0:004 0:004 0:002 0:002 0:002
(2:00) [0:004  0:004] [0:003  0:004] [0:002  0:002] [0:002  0:002] [0:002  0:002]
"qi;t G 1 0:5 0:230 0:819 0:215 0:157 0:252
(2:00) [0:186  0:274] [0:678  0:960] [0:178  0:250] [0:125  0:190] [0:209  0:295]
"e;t G 1 0:01 0:003 0:003 0:003 0:003 0:003
(2:00) [0:002  0:004] [0:002  0:003] [0:002  0:004] [0:002  0:003] [0:002  0:004]
Notes : G represents the Gamma distribution. Posterior mean estimates for the standard deviation.of shock processes
are obtained with 250000 M-H replications on two parallel chains.
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TABLE 2e - (CONTINUED)
Prior distribution Posterior mean
Density Mean Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
(s.d.) [c.i.] [c.i.] [c.i.] [c.i.] [c.i.]
"c;t G 1 0:01 0:249 0:292 0:127 0:299 0:200
(2:00) [0:171  0:323] [0:215  0:366] [0:091  0:164] [0:189  0:408] [0:132  0:270]
"n;t G 1 0:01 0:097 0:037 0:014 0:050 0:031
(2:00) [0:076  0:118] [0:029  0:045] [0:012  0:016] [0:042  0:057] [0:026  0:037]
"x;t G 1 0:01 0:039 0:026 0:030 0:025 0:036
(2:00) [0:035  0:043] [0:023  0:029] [0:027  0:034] [0:023  0:028] [0:032  0:040]
"cpi;t G 1 0:01 0:010 0:009 0:006 0:004 0:009
(2:00) [0:009  0:011] [0:008  0:010] [0:006  0:007] [0:004  0:004] [0:008  0:010]
";t G 1 0:01 0:030 0:029 0:029 0:022 0:031
(2:00) [0:027  0:034] [0:026  0:032] [0:026  0:032] [0:020  0:025] [0:028  0:034]
"%;t G 1 0:01 0:012 0:011 0:007 0:007 0:008
(2:00) [0:011  0:013] [0:010  0:012] [0:006  0:008] [0:006  0:008] [0:007  0:008]
"dp;t G 1 0:005 0:006 0:006 0:006 0:006 0:006
(2:00) [0:006  0:007] [0:006  0:007] [0:006  0:007] [0:006  0:007] [0:006  0:007]
"y;t G 1 0:005 0:006 0:006 0:006 0:006 0:006
(2:00) [0:005  0:006] [0:005  0:006] [0:005  0:006] [0:005  0:006] [0:005  0:006]
"r;t G 1 0:005 0:002 0:002 0:002 0:002 0:002
(2:00) [0:002  0:002] [0:002  0:002] [0:002  0:002] [0:002  0:002] [0:002  0:002]
"rl;t G 1 0:005 0:001 0:001 0:001 0:001 0:001
(2:00) [0:001  0:001] [0:001  0:001] [0:001  0:001] [0:001  0:001] [0:001  0:001]
Notes : G represents the Gamma distribution. Posterior mean estimates for the standard deviation.of shock processes
are obtained with 250000 M-H replications on two parallel chains.
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FIGURE 1 - RESPONSE TO A 1% OF GDP HIRING COSTS REDUCTION
GDP (monetary multiplier) Unemployment Rate (% deviation from s.s.)
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Notes : Impulse response of output (Yt) and unemployment (ut) to a one percent shock in hiring cost reduction in the
periphery of the eurozone obtained at the posterior mean estimate.
FIGURE 2 - RESPONSE TO A 1% OF GDP WAGE SUBSIDIZATION OF NEWLY HIRED WORKERS
GDP (monetary multiplier) Unemployment rate (% deviation from s.s.)
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-1
0
1
2
3
4
Spain Portugal Italy Greece Ireland
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
Spain Portugal Italy Greece Ireland
Notes : Impulse response of output (Yt) and unemployment (ut) to a one percent shock in wage subsidization of newly
hired workers in the periphery of the eurozone obtained at the posterior mean estimate. The variables are expressed
in terms of percent deviations from the steady states.
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FIGURE 3 - RESPONSE TO A 1% OF GDP HIRING COSTS REDUCTION
Real Wage Real Interest Rate
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Private Expenditure Net Export
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Notes : Impulse response of real wage (wt), real interest rate (Rt), private expenditure (Ct) and net export (Xt  Mt)
to a one percent shock in hiring cost reduction in the periphery of the eurozone obtained at the posterior mean
estimate. The variables are expressed in terms of percent deviations from the steady states.
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FIGURE 4 - RESPONSE TO A 1% OF GDP WAGE SUBSIDIZATION OF NEWLY HIRED WORKERS
Real Wage Real Interest Rate
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Notes : Impulse response of real wage (wt), real interest rate (Rt), private expenditure (Ct) and net export (Xt  Mt)
to a one percent shock in wage subsidization of newly hired workers in the periphery of the eurozone obtained at the
posterior mean estimate. The variables are expressed in terms of percent deviations from the steady states.
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TABLE 3 - FISCAL MULTIPLIERS - STANDARD TIMES
Instrument Multiplier Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
Hiring subsidy Impact 0:23  0:76  0:18  1:30  0:02
Peak (quarter) 3:36 (17) 0:28 (21) 0:56 (22) 1:24 (18) 0:94 (19)
Wage subsidy Impact 0:31  0:66  0:16  1:17  0:02
Peak (quarter) 4:15 (18) 0:23 (21) 0:50 (22) 1:16 (18) 0:78 (20)
Gov. consumption Impact 1:00 2:04 0:98 1:60 1:00
Peak (quarter) 1:00 (1) 2:04 (1) 0:98 (1) 1:60 (1) 1:00 (1)
Gov. transfers Impact 0:08 0:20 0:22 0:31 0:07
Peak (quarter) 0:08 (1) 0:20 (1) 0:22 (1) 0:31 (1) 0:07 (1)
Gov. investment Impact 0:20 0:31 0:15 0:55 0:18
Peak (quarter) 0:47 (6) 0:52 (5) 0:34 (5) 1:07 (5) 0:42 (5)
Wage.tax Impact 0:11 0:24 0:29 0:37 0:09
Peak (quarter) 0:11 (1) 0:24 (1) 0:29 (1) 0:37 (1) 0:09 (1)
Prot.tax Impact 0:01 0:07  0:18 0:03  0:01
Peak (quarter) 0:10 (17) 0:11 (2) 0:60 (21) 0:23 (20) 0:61 (19)
Capital gains.tax Impact 0:01 0:03 0:02 0:02 0:01
Peak (quarter) 0:03 (7) 0:05 (5) 0:04 (6) 0:04 (5) 0:03 (6)
Consumption.tax Impact 0:12 0:27 0:23 0:40 0:08
Peak (quarter) 0:12 (2) 0:27 (1) 0:23 (1) 0:40 (1) 0:09 (2)
Notes : Fiscal multipliers on output (Yt) in standard times for the PIIGS countries are reported for di¤erent potential
government instruments. In order to get a clear view, not only for their value on impact, the peak of scal multipliers
and the time, in brackets, in whitch it is realized is also reported.
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TABLE 4 - UNEMPLOYMENT EFFECTS - STANDARD TIMES
Instrument Multiplier Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
Hiring subsidy Impact  0:23  0:84 0:00  0:15  0:05
Peak (quarter)  2:06 (15)  0:88 (3)  0:35 (17)  0:86 (15)  0:58 (18)
Wage subsidy Impact  0:29  0:73 0:00  0:15  0:04
Peak (quarter)  2:51 (16)  0:77 (3)  0:31 (17)  0:80 (15)  0:48 (18)
Gov. consumption Impact  0:74  0:40  0:75  0:80  0:70
Peak (quarter)  0:74 (2)  0:40 (2)  0:75 (2)  0:80 (2)  0:70 (2)
Gov. transfers Impact  0:06  0:04  0:17  0:16  0:05
Peak (quarter)  0:06 (2)  0:04 (2)  0:17 (2)  0:16 (2)  0:05 (2)
Gov. investment Impact  0:15  0:10  0:12  0:35  0:13
Peak (quarter)  0:26 (5)  0:13 (4)  0:18 (5)  0:51 (4)  0:21 (5)
Wage.tax Impact  0:08  0:04  0:22  0:18  0:06
Peak (quarter)  0:08 (2)  0:04 (2)  0:22 (2)  0:18 (2)  0:06 (2)
Prot.tax Impact  0:01 0:11  0:02 0:06  0:04
Peak (quarter)  0:06 (15)  0:02 (17)  0:38 (16)  0:21 (17)  0:38 (17)
Capital gains.tax Impact  0:01  0:01  0:01  0:01  0:01
Peak (quarter)  0:02 (5)  0:02 (4)  0:02 (4)  0:02 (5)  0:02 (5)
Consumption.tax Impact  0:09  0:06  0:18  0:21  0:06
Peak (quarter)  0:09 (2)  0:07 (3)  0:18 (2)  0:21 (2)  0:06 (2)
Notes : Fiscal multipliers on unemployment (ut) in standard times for the PIIGS countries are reported for di¤erent
potential government instruments. In order to get a clear view, not only for their value on impact, the peak of scal
multipliers and the time, in brackets, in whitch it is realized is also reported.
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TABLE 5 - FISCAL MULTIPLIERS - ZLB BINDS FOR 8 PERIODS
Instrument Multiplier Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
Hiring subsidy Impact 0:20  0:50 0:04  1:30  0:03
Peak + (quarter) 3:20 (18) 0:52 (22) 1:07 (23) 2:48 (19) 1:83 (21)
Peak - (quarter)    2:41 (3)  0:17 (4)  2:58 (3)  0:04 (2)
Wage subsidy Impact 0:27  0:66  0:16  1:18  0:02
Peak + (quarter) 7:23 (21) 0:44 (23) 0:91 (24) 2:32 (19) 1:52 (21)
Peak - (quarter)    2:44 (3)  0:49 (3)  2:55 (2)  0:03 (2)
Gov. consumption Impact 1:00 2:05 0:98 1:60 1:00
Peak + (quarter) 1:75 (2) 3:33 (2) 1:72 (2) 2:52 (2) 1:76 (2)
Peak - (quarter)  0:04 (23)  0:08 (26)    0:18 (22)  
Gov. transfers Impact 0:08 0:20 0:22 0:32 0:07
Peak + (quarter) 0:14 (2) 0:31 (2) 0:38 (2) 0:49 (2) 0:12 (2)
Peak - (quarter)  0:01 (19)  0:01 (22)    0:04 (21)  0:00 (40)
Gov. investment Impact 0:20 0:31 0:15 0:55 0:18
Peak + (quarter) 0:95 (6) 1:12 (5) 0:68 (6) 2:37 (5) 0:87 (6)
Peak - (quarter)        0:28(25)  
Wage.tax Impact  0:11  0:24  0:29  0:37  0:09
Peak + (quarter) 0:01 (22) 0:01 (27)   0:05 (22) 0:00 (40)
Peak - (quarter)  0:19 (2)  0:39 (2)  0:52 (2)  0:58 (2)  0:16 (2)
Prot.tax Impact  0:01 0:07 0:19  0:03 0:00
Peak + (quarter)  0:01 (1) 0:18 (3) 0:51 (3) 0:38 (5) 0:00 (2)
Peak - (quarter)  0:18 (19)  0:07 (9)  1:09 (23)  0:48 (21)  0:08 (20)
Capital gains.tax Impact  0:11  0:03  0:01  0:02  0:01
Peak + (quarter) 0:01(21)     0:01(27)  
Peak - (quarter)  0:19(2)  0:12(6)  0:07(6)  0:09(6)  0:06(7)
Consumption.tax Impact  0:12  0:27  0:23  0:40  0:08
Peak + (quarter) 0:03(30) 0:02(29)   0:08(23) 0:01(40)
Peak - (quarter)  0:25(3)  0:49(2)  0:45(2)  0:68(2)  0:17(2)
Notes : Fiscal multipliers on output (Yt) in ZLB times for the PIIGS countries are reported for di¤erent potential
government instruments. In order to get a clear view, not only for their value on impact, the peak of scal multipliers
and the time, in brackets, in whitch it is realized is also reported. The timing of the exit from the ZLB is endogenously
determined by implementing the non-negativity constraint along with Taylor-rule.
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TABLE 6 - UNEMPLOYMENT EFFECTS - ZLB BINDS FOR 8 PERIODS
Instrument Multiplier Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
Hiring subsidy Impact  0:21  0:91  0:17  0:15  0:04
Peak (quarter)  1:98 (16)  1:76 (3)  0:73 (18)  1:73 (16)  1:15 (19)
Wage subsidy Impact  0:26  0:73 0:01  0:14  0:04
Peak (quarter)  4:84 (19)  1:41 (3)  0:61 (18)  1:61 (16)  0:95 (19)
Gov. consumption Impact  0:74  0:40  0:76  0:80  0:70
Peak (quarter)  1:24 (3)  0:79 (3)  1:32 (3)  1:32 (3)  1:22 (3)
Gov. transfers Impact  0:15  0:04  0:17  0:16  0:05
Peak (quarter)  0:10 (3)  0:07 (3)  0:29 (3)  0:26 (3)  0:08 (3)
Gov. investment Impact  0:15  0:10  0:12  0:36  0:13
Peak (quarter)  0:52 (6)  0:29 (4)  0:36 (5)  1:15 (4)  0:44 (6)
Wage.tax Impact 0:08 0:05 0:23 0:18 0:06
Peak (quarter)  0:01 (21)  0:01 (18)  0:02 (27)  0:03 (19)  0:00 (36)
Prot.tax Impact 0:01 0:11 0:01  0:05 0:00
Peak (quarter) 0:01 (2)  0:04 (17)  0:15 (4)  0:14 (4) 0:00 (2)
Capital gains.tax Impact 0:08 0:01 0:01 0:01  0:01
Peak (quarter)  0:01 (21)  0:01 (22)  0:01 (20)  0:02 (25)  0:01 (25)
Consumption.tax Impact 0:09 0:06 0:18 0:21 0:06
Peak (quarter)  0:01 (28)  0:02 (20) 0:03 (35)  0:05 (21)  0:01 (40)
Notes : Fiscal multipliers on unemployment (ut) in zlb times for the PIIGS countries are reported for di¤erent potential
government instruments. In order to get a clear view, not only for their value on impact, the peak of scal multipliers
and the time, in brackets, in whitch it is realized is also reported. The timing of the exit from the ZLB is endogenously
determined by implementing the non-negativity constraint along with Taylor-rule.
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Agents Heterogeneity in the Theory of Search and Matching
Abstract
The introduction of heterogeneous consumers in general equilibrium models is a useful and
powerful assumption from both the theoretical and empirical perspectives. In this paper we show
that most of the analyses considering such an assumption are characterized by somehow strong
assumptions which make the apparent heterogeneity illusory in many respects. We relax some of
the commonly adopted hypotheses in the labor market dimension that seem to be crucial in the
previous literature, by considering type-specic workers, and show that substantial di¤erences
emerge in model dynamics. These di¤erences are shown to be relevant not only for the labor
market-specic dynamics but also for that of real and monetary variables.
JEL classication: E52, J64, E24, E32, E31.
Keywords: Heterogeneity, Type-Specic Worker, Labor Market,Search, Busines Cycle.
1 Introduction
Since the seminal work of Campell and Mankiw (1989), a large body of literature has considered
the role of rule-of-thumb/non-asset holders/liquidity constrained (heterogeneous) households. The
assumption of heterogeneous households enhances the explanation of some stylized facts of macroeco-
nomic dynamics. Farther, the abundant literature addressing the e¢ cacy of scal policy in monetary
models highlights the need of considering heterogeneous agents in order to reconcile the theoretical
predictions to the existing empirical evidence, often consistent with the breakdown of the Ricardian
equivalence result. The need for models accounting for deep agent heterogeneity has been empha-
sized by Mankiw (2000), who underlines the fact that an empirically-relevant model of scal policy
needs a particular sort of heterogeneity, including a reepresentation of the type-specic behavior of
both low and high-wealth households.
Questioning which among habit persistence, nonseparability between consumption and leisure and
rule-of -thumb consumers accounts better for the predictability of consumption growth, Kiley (2010)
shows support for rule-of-thumb behavior and little support for nonseparability between consumption
and leisure.
Using a slightly di¤erent denition, but similar reasons for introducing heterogeneity, Bilbije
and Straub (2013a, 2013b) argue that introducing limited asset market participation, i.e. asset and
non-asset holders, is crucial in explaining the U.S. macroeconomic performance and monetary policy
before the 1980s and their changes thereafter. The consideration of limited asset market participation
in their theoretical model, explains why a loose Fed policy in the pre-1980 years was consistent with
equilibrium determinacy and minimization of macroeconomic volatility. They also provide empirical
evidence consistent with this hypothesis and study the relative merits of structural changes and
shocks for reproducing the so called "conquest of the Great Moderation".
The crucial importance of heterogeneity is also emphasized by Guvenen (2006) that, by allowing
for the presence of two types of agents, stockholders and non-stockholders, reconciles two opposing
views about the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS).
Based on the evidence that consumption rises in response to an increase in government con-
sumption spending Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2007) (henceforth GLV) extend the standard new
1
Keynesian model to allow for the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers, an hypothesi which lies at
the heart of the paper results. They show how the interaction of the latter with sticky prices and
decit nancing can account for the existing evidence on the e¤ects of government spending.
Mertens and Ravn (2011) evaluate the extent to which a DSGE model can account for the impact
of tax policy shocks. They estimate the response of macroeconomic aggregates to anticipated and
unanticipated tax shocks in the US and nd that unanticipated tax cuts have persistent expansion-
ary e¤ects on output, consumption, investment and hours worked. As in Campbell and Mankiw
(1989) and GLV, Mertens and Ravn consider rule-of-thumb consumption behavior, which allows for
a signicantly better replication of the empirical response of nondurables consumption to changes in
taxes, in particular for the absence of a strong consumption response to expected tax cuts.
In order to estimate the e¤ects of scal policy in the Euro area, Forni Monteforte Sessa (2009)
introduce a fraction of non-Ricardian agents in a monetary general equilibriun model. Estimation
results point to a signicant share of non-Ricardian agents and to the prevalence of mild Keynesian
e¤ects of scal policy.
The crucial importance of introducing rule-of-thumb consumers into a dynamic model is empha-
sized, also, by Boscá, Doménech and Ferri (2011). The authors conclude that the introduction of
rule-of-thumb consumers allows for a deeper comprehension of the e¤ects of shocks on some key
macroeconomic variables and on their interaction, also improving the capability of the labor market
search model in reproducing some of the stylized facts characterizing the US labour market. Kri-
woluzky (2012) uses a dynamic model with consumer heterogeneity in the same spirit of GLV, i.e.
optimizing and rule-of-thumb consumers, and nd that the response of private consumption is signif-
icantly negative on impact, rises and becomes signicantly positive two quarters after the realization
of the policy shock.
By incorporating households heterogeneity in the form of limited asset market participation in
a dynamic general equilibrium model, Bilbije (2008) nds out that, while "moderate" participation
rates strengthen the role of monetary policy, low enough participation causes an inversion of results
dictated by conventional wisdom. The slope of the "IS" curve changes its sign, the "Taylor principle"
is inverted, welfare-maximizing discretionary monetary policy requires a passive policy rule and the
e¤ects and propagation of shocks are changed.
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Taking up from the work of Bilbije (2008), Motta and Tirelli (2012) demonstrate that the limited
asset market participation has potentially strong policy implications when the central bank is the
sole policymaker, but a well-made system of automatic scal stabilizers dampens the undesirable
e¤ects of limited asset market participation. Bilbije, Meier and Müller (2008) estimate the struc-
tural parameters of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model featuring limited asset market
participation suggesting that most of the changes in scal policy transmission are accounted for by
increased asset market participation and the more active monetary policy of the VolckerGreenspan
period.
The key behind the main insights of the Natvik (2009) study, that government consumption
may render the Taylor principle insu¢ cient as a condition for equilibrium determinacy and that
the interest rate may have to respond far more aggressively than one for one to ination when the
government share is large, is that some households, referred to as rule-of-thumb consumers, have no
access to nancial markets but consume their entire disposable income each period. Colciago (2011)
paper instead, show that the non standard results, obtained by the introduction of rule-of-thumb
consumers, can be restored to the standard one when, together with non-asset holders, nominal wage
stickiness is introduced.
Rule-of thumb-consumption has been incorporated also in important quantitative tools for policy
analysis, such as in Erceg, Guerrieri and Gust (2006, 2009), Coenen et al. (2008), Corsetti, et al.
(2010), Furlanetto (2011), Coenen et al. (2013).
Freedman et. al. (2010), instead, complaining that most part of the earlier analyses tended to
focus on the short-run to medium-run e¤ects of the scal stimulus, employ a modeling framework
considering liquidity-constrained households that is suitable for analyzing not only the short-run but
also the longer-run results of permanent changes in saving rates, and that is also suitable for jointly
simulating a wide array of realistic scal and monetary policy measures.
Starting from the empirical evidence that consumption volatility is negatively correlated with the
size of the government, Andrés, Doménecha and Fatás (2008) explore a variation of classical business
cycle model in which they introduce rule-of-thumb consumers and nd out that consumption volatility
is in fact reduced when the government size increases.
Drautzburg and Uhlig (2011), in quantifying the scal multipliers in response to the American
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Recovery and Reinvestment Act and extending a benchmark model in order to allow for credit-
constrained households, nd out that the multiplier is sensitive to the fraction of transfers given to
credit-constrained households.
These results are conrmed by Farhi and Werning (2013). The authors, providing an explicit
solution for government spending multipliers, nd out that the interplay between the increase in
future spending by hand-to-mouth agents, the ination that it generates, and the current and future
spending decisions of optimizing agents is, clearly, extremely potent and can generate very large
multipliers.
Instead, the New Neoclassical Synthesis model of Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2006), augmented
for the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers, fails to assign a signicant role to scal and demand
shocks generally.
Consumer heterogeneity, even if in a di¤erent form, is also considered in the works of Curdia and
Woodford (2009), Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) and Corsetti et. al. (2013).
In order to analyze policy issues in the presence of credit spreads, Curdia and Woodford (2009)
and, more recently, Corsetti et. al. (2013), also introduce consumer heterogeneity, which assumes
crucial importance for their results.
Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) note that making some agents debt-constrained is a surprisingly
powerful assumption for letting Fisherian debt deation, the possibility of a liquidity trap, the
paradox of thrift and toil, Keynesian-type multipliers, and a rationale for expansionary scal policy
all emerge naturally from the model.
The list of relevant studies relying on the introduction of agent heterogeneity now considered is
decisively not exhaustive. There are a lot of works related to this topic that, for pure space reasons,
we do not mention here but deserve the same attention.
The point that we rise in this paper is that most of these works are in fact characterized only by
a limited degree of heterogeneity. More specically, we argue that agents heterogeneity is generally
limited to the consumption dimension. The minority of works that try to deal with heterogeneity
also in labor supply, beside the fact that they assume a unique wage for di¤erent types of agents,
rely on some other strong assumptions used in the aggregation process making the former an illusory
labor supply heterogeneity.
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Our interest here is to show how, and to which degree, the consideration of a limited heterogeneity
is transmitted in a serious limitation of the static and dynamic properties of the models that rely
on these commonly adopted hypotheses. In order to do so, we assume heterogeneity in both the
consumption and labor dimensions by considering a micro-founded theory of the labor market under
agents heterogeneity.
Technically, we start from the work of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and relax the assumption
of the same union that makes di¤erent types of households enjoy (su¤er) the same wage and su¤er
(enjoy) the same unemployment rate.
Furthermore, by introducing a sta¢ ng agency in the model, we relax the common practice of
pooling optimizing and rule-of-thumb households, on the grounds that it not only gives rise to
di¤erent static and dynamic results, but also leads to a second-best Nash bargained wage.
A further assumption that we relax is the equality between the composition of household types
that populate the economy and the coposition of labor and sta¢ ng agencies, on the grounds that
there is no economic reason, outside model tractability, to adopt such a homogeneity hypothesis for
a composition that in reality is driven by prot choices.
From a static perspective, we show that in the proposed model, consumers are not only di¤erent
in consumption behavior but also in the equilibrium wage, in the equilibrium labor supply, and more
generally in all the labor market variables. From the perspective of the dynamic model properties,
we show that the extended heterogeneity yields some new insights and rises some doubts about the
relevance of results on scal and monetary policy e¤ectiveness addressed by the previous literature.
The paper is organized as follows. Section one describes the model, Section two describes the
model properties by settig-up a calibration experiment, Section three concludes.
2 The Model
In order to allow for heterogeneity in the labor market we introduce sta¢ ng agencies in a model with
search and matching frictions in the labor market.
The framework is a variation of the Mortensen and Pissarides search and matching model
(Mortensen and Pissarides 1994; Pissarides 2000). The main di¤erence is that we allow for full
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labor market heterogeneity and introduce a sta¢ ng agency which supplies labor to the intermediate
good producing rms in outsourcing.
2.1 Households
As in Gali et al. (2007), the economy is populated by a continuum of households indexed by  2
[0; 1]. A fraction  2 [0; 1  ] of households enjoys unlimited access to capital markets, so its
members substitute consumption intertemporally. We use the term "Ricardians" or "intertemporally
optimizing households" to refer to this subset of households. The remaining fraction  2 [1  ; 1]
do not have access to capital markets, so its members not owning any asset or having any liability
cannot use their wealth to smooth consumption over time. Both types of workers supply labor to
the sta¢ ng agencies in a frictional, search and matching, labor market.
2.1.1 Intertemporally Optimizing Households
The intertemporally optimizing household chooses consumption cot , investment i
o
t , capital k
o
t , gov-
ernment bond bot and utilization rate of capital ut to maximize the following utility function
Et
1X
s=0
s
"
log
 
cot+s   hocot+s 1
  {oho1+t+s
1 + 
not+s
#
(1)
where ho is the degree of habit persistence, not is the fraction of members of the optimizing household
that are working and hot is the intensity with which each worker works.
Let  t be the lump sum tax, t the lump sum prots, b
u;o
t the unemployment benet, ut the
capital utilization rate, a() the strictly increasing and strictly convex cost function of varying capacity
utilization, pt the nominal price level, rt the quarterly nominal interest rate, and rkt the rental rate
of e¤ective capital. Then the household budget constraint is:
cot + i
o
t +
bot
ptrt
+  t  w
o
th
o
tn
o
t
pt
+ (1  not ) bu;ot +
bot 1
pt
+

rkt
pt
ut   a (ut)

kp;ot 1 +
t
pt
(2)
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The physical capital kp;ot evolves according to the following law of motion:
kp;ot = (1  )kp;ot 1 + qit

1  S( i
o
t
iot 1
)

iot (3)
whilst capital services are related to the physical stock of capital kp;ot by:
kot = utk
p;o
t (4)
where  is the depreciation rate of capital, S( i
o
t
iot 1
) represents investment adjustment costs, and qit
denotes the stochastic marginal e¢ ciency of investment, described by the rst order autoregressive
process qit = q
iqi
t 1e
"qi;t .
The optimizing household choose the set of processes fcot ; iot ; kot ; bot ; utg1t=0 given the set of processes
fpt; rt; not ;  t; wot ; hotg1t=0 in order to maximize the sum of discounted utilities subject to (2). The
following optimality conditions holds:
[cot ] : 
o
t =
1 
cot   hocot 1
 (5)
[bot ] : 
o
t = rt
ot+1
pt+1=pt
(6)
[kp;ot ] : q
k
t = 
ot+1
ot
"
rkt+1
pt+1
ut+1   a(ut+1) + (1  )qkt+1
#
(7)
[iot ] : 1 = q
i
tq
k
t

1  S( i
o
t
iot 1
)  S0( i
o
t
iot 1
)(
iot
iot 1
)

+ qit+1q
k
t+1
ot+1
ot
S0

iot+1
iot

iot+1
iot
2
(8)
[ut] :
rkt
pt
= a0(ut) (9)
where ot is the marginal utility of income, whereas q
k
t represents the shadow price of a unit of
physical capital, i.e. Tobins Q.
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2.1.2 Liquidity Constraint Households
The liquidity constrained households can neither save nor borrow and hence cannot benet from the
access to the capital markets. Their consumption expenditure is determined by the specic liquidity
constraint:
clt 
wlth
l
tn
l
t
pt
+

1  nlt

bu;lt    t (10)
From the maximization problem faced by the liquidity constrained household:
maxEt
1X
s=0
s
"
log

clt+s   hlclt+s 1

  {l h
l1+
t+s
1 + 
nlt+s
#
(11)
subject to (10), the marginal utility of consumption for liquidity constrained households is obtained:
lt =
1 
clt   hlclt 1
 (12)
where hl is the degree of habit persistence in consumption of liquidity constrained households.
Though the liquidity constrained households are not allowed to use their income to smooth consump-
tion over time, they take into account the fact that a matching today will, with some probability, be
continued in the future, providing labor income to be spent to consume tomorrow.
2.2 The Labor Market
Every period, each sta¢ ng agency i operating in the labor market j posts ji;t vacancies and employs
nji;t workers. The number of job matches mj;t in labor market j depends on the matching technology,
which is assumed of the form:
mjt = 
j
m

ujt
j 
jt
1 j
(13)
where jt =
R 1
0 
j
i;tdi and u
j
t = 1 njt 1, and njt =
R 1
0 n
j
i;tdi are the total number of vacancies, the un-
employed and the employed workers in labor market of type j, respectively, jm denotes the matching
e¢ ciency and j captures the elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment. In
period t, the probability that a rm lls a vacancy in the labor market j is denoted by qj = mjt=
j
t ,
whilst sjt = m
j
t=u
j
t denotes the probability that an unemployed worker j nds a job. Finally, at the
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beginning of each period t, new hires enter the employment stock, and at the end of each period a
fraction of workers loses the job with probability 1  jt , where:
jt = 
j
m
j
a
 
1  n
a;i
j;t
na;jt
!
(14)
denotes the survival probability of an employment relationship until the next period, 1   ja is the
sta¢ ng agency exit probability from labor market j, and

1  na;ij;t=na;jt

denotes the time-varying
probability of a sta¢ ng agency operating in market j of not moving in market i. Consequently, the
total employment for sta¢ ng agencies operating in the labor market j is:
nji;t =

jt + x
j
i;t

nji;t 1. (15)
2.3 Sta¢ ng Agencies
In order to relax the assumption of labor homogeneity adopted in the literature, and to shed some
light on how labor heterogeneity a¤ects the behavior of a worker, we introduce the sta¢ ng agencies.
These supply labor to intermediate goods rms in a homogenous, perfectly competitive, labor market.
The labor market is populated by a continuum of sta¢ ng agencies indexed, as the intermediate
goods producers, by i 2 [0; 1]. The sta¢ ng agencies operating in the labor market are of two types,
j = o; l. The former operates in the optimizing households labor market and the latter in the liquidity
constrained households labor market.
The total number of sta¢ ng agencies operating in the labor market j, na;jt , evolves according to
na;jt = 
j
a
"
jm
 
1  n
a;i
j;t 1
na;jt 1
!
na;jt 1 + n
a;j
e;t 1 + 
i
a
i
m
 
1   t 1

na;ji;t 1
#
(16)
where a;je;t and n
a;i
j;t 1 are the mass of new sta¢ ng agencies entering in the labor market j and the
mass of sta¢ ng agencies who move from labor market j into labor market i, respectively;  t is the
fraction of sta¢ ng agencies that, once leaving the labor market j and not reaching the labor market
i, exit the market.
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FIGURE 1.- LABOR MARKET DYNAMICS AND STAFFING AGENCIES
Once the job request nt is made by the intermediate goods producer rm, it will be captured,
with time-varying probability:
!t =
a  bt
a  c =
na;jt
na;it + n
a;j
t
(17)
by the sta¢ ng agencies operating in the labor market j, whilst it will be captured with time-varying
probability 1  !t by the sta¢ ng agencies operating in the labor market i.
In the light of the labor market mechanics specied above, the total employment in the labor
market j is:
nt =
Z 1
0
Z

njt (i) di d
Let zji;t be the value of the sta¢ ng agency of type i operating in the j type labor market:
zji;t

wji;t; n
j
i;t 1w
i
i;t; n
i
i;t

=
 
wi;t
pt
  w
j
i;t
pt
!
hji;tn
j
i;t  
jt
2

xji;t
2
nji;t 1
+jaEt
ot+1
ot
 
1  n
a;i
j;t
na;jt
!
zji;t+1

wji;t+1; n
j
i;t; w
i
i;t+1; n
i
i;t+1

+ja
i
aEt
ot+1
ot
na;ij;t
na;jt
qit+1
na;it+1
zii;t+1

wii;t+1; n
i
i;t; w
j
i;t+1; n
j
i;t+1

 f jm
"
with
i
t + 
i
aEt
ot+1
ot
 
1  n
a;j
i;t+1
na;it+1
!
it
2
 
xii;t+1
2#
(18)
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where
xji;t =
qji;t
j
i;t
nji;t 1
(19)
denes the hiring rate, jt denotes the hiring cost and wi;t is the cost of labor services paid by the
intermediate good producer to the sta¢ ng agency for one unit of labor intensity. Since the sta¢ ng
agencies supply labor services in a perfectly competitive market, wi;t is the same for all agencies and
hence taken as given. As before, the discount factor for the sta¢ ng agency 
ot+1
ot
equals the discount
factor for the intertemporally optimizing household satisfying the assumption on the ownership
structure of the economy.
In order to explore, by micro-foundation, the dynamics of the labor market we allow for a non
zero endogenous time-varying probability of movement, na;ij;t=n
a;j
t , from one labor market to the other
for the sta¢ ng agencies.
Once a new agency decides to enter, or an incumbent agency j decides to leave, for pure prot
reasons, the labor market j in order to access the labor market i, a positive time-varying probability
of posting a vacancy 1=na;it is faced. Moving from one labor market to the other is costly. The sunk
movement cost, prior to entry, is dened as a share f jm of the sta¢ ng agencys j total costs.
Every period t, each sta¢ ng agency i optimally demands labor at the intensive margin in the
labor market j until the workers j marginal cost equals the sta¢ ng agencys i marginal benet:
wi;t
pt
= {l
hj

t+s
jt
. (20)
In the labor market j, the sta¢ ng agencys optimization problem is to choose njt , by setting x
j
t , to
maximize the value function (18) subject to the employment evolution equation (15). The rst-order
necessary condition is:
jtx
j
i;t =
 
wi;t
pt
  w
j
i;t
pt
!
hji;t + 
j
a
 
1  n
a;i
j;t
na;jt
!
Et
ot+1
ot
"
jt+1
j
t+1x
j
i;t+1 +
jt+1
2

xji;t+1
2#
(21)
Let J ji;t

wji;t

= @zji;t

wji;t; n
j
i;t 1

=@nji;t be the surplus that a sta¢ ng agency i bargaining in
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period t enjoys from a match with an individual worker of type j, given by:
J ji;t

wji;t

=
 
wi;t
pt
  w
j
i;t
pt
!
hji;t   jaEt
ot+1
ot
 
1  n
a;i
j;t+1
na;jt+1
!
jt+1
2

xji;t+1
2
+jaEt
ot+1
ot
 
1  n
a;i
j;t+1
na;jt+1
!h
jt+1 + x
j
i;t+1
i
J ji;t+1

wji;t+1

. (22)
The mass of new sta¢ ng agencies entering in the labor market j, na;je;t , and the mass of sta¢ ng
agencies who move from labor market j into labor market i, na;ij;t 1, are determined, respectively, by
the free entry condition:
ja
ot+1
ot
1
na;jt+1
qjt+1J
j
t+1

wjt+1

= f je
"
wjth
j
t + 
j
a
ot+1
ot
 
1  n
a;i
j;t+1
na;jt+1
!
jt
2

xji;t+1
2#
(23)
and the free movement condition:

ot+1
ot
J jt+1

wjt+1

= ia (1   t)
ot+1
ot
qit+1
1
na;it+1
J it+1
 
wit+1

 f im (1   t)
"
wjth
j
t + 
j
a
ot+1
ot
 
1  n
a;i
j;t+1
na;jt+1
!
jt
2

xji;t+1
2#
(24)
Due to time-to-build, once entered in the labor market, the entry and movement sunk costs, dened as
a share f je and f
j
m of the sta¢ ng agencys j total costs w
j
th
j
t+
j
a
o
t+1=
o
t

1  na;ij;t+1=na;jt+1

jt=2

xji;t+1
2
,
respectively, are paid in t, whilst the sta¢ ng agencies become active in the labor market j in t+ 1.
2.4 Firms
The production sector is populated by a representative nal good producer and a continuum of inter-
mediate goods producers indexed by i 2 [0; 1], characterized by staggered price setting as described
by Calvo (1983).
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2.4.1 Final Good Producer
The nal good producer buys the di¤erentiated intermediate goods yi;t from the intermediate goods
producers, produces the composite homogenous good yt as in Kimball (1995):Z 1
0
 

yi;t
yt
; pt

di = 1 (25)
and re-sells it to consumers in a perfectly competitive market. The Kimball aggregator   (:) is a
strictly concave and increasing function, such that   (1; pt ) = 1. 
p
t is a stochastic component hitting
the aggregator function, or a shifter o, and is described by the rst order autoregressive process
pt = 
pp
t 1 e
"p;t .
The optimization problem of the nal good producer is:
max
Yt;Yit
ptyt  
Z 1
0
pi;tyi;tdi (26)
subject to (25), where pi;t and pt are the prices of intermediate and nal goods respectively. From
the rst order condition for yi;t and yt, the demand for input i is given by:
yi;t = yt 
0 1

pi;t
pt
Z 1
0
 0

yi;t
yt

yi;t
yt
di

(27)
2.4.2 Intermediate Goods Producers
In the intermediate goods sector there is a continuum of monopolistic suppliers indexed by i 2 [0; 1].
The intermediate goods producer rent capital services ki;t and hire labor hi;t in a perfectly competitive
market to produce the intermediate good i using the following technology
yi;t = 
a
t k

i;t

thi;t
1    t (28)
where 0 <  < 1 and  > 1 denotes the xed cost of production. The intermediate good producer i
chooses capital services ki;t and labor hi;t by minimizing the rms total time t costs given by rkt ki;t+
wi;thi;t, subject to: (28). From the minimization programme, the following optimality conditions
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holds:
ki;t =

1  
wi;t
rkt
hi;t (29)
and:
mci;t =
rkt w
1 
i;t
 [t (1  )]1  at
(30)
where mci;t is the marginal cost of rm i, which equals the Langrange multiplier associated with the
production function.
The price-setting problem of the intermediate rms follows Calvo (1983). In any period t every
intermediate rm i faces a random probability
 
1  p

to re-optimize its price. The re-optimized
price is denoted by pi;t. With a probability p, the rm is not allowed to re-optimize and indexes its
price to an average of current and past ination
sY
l=1
1 p
p
t+l 1. It follows that from equations (25)
and (27) the aggregate price index can be expressed as:
pt =
 
1  p

pi;t 
0 1

pi;t
pt
{t

+ p
1 p
p
t 1pt 1 
0 1
 
1 p
p
t 1pt 1
pt
{t
!
(31)
where:
{t =
Z 1
0
 0

yi;t
yt

yi;t
yt
di
Under Calvo-style pricing with partial indexation, the problem of the i-th re-optimizing interme-
diate goods producer is to choose a target price pi;t to maximize the stream of discounted prots:
Et
1X
s=0
sp
s 
o
t+spt
otpt+s
"
pi;t
sY
l=1
1 p
p
t+l 1  mci;t+s
#
yi;t+s
subject to the demand curve given by (27). The nominal discount factor for rms s
ot+spt
ot pt+s
equals
the discount factor for the intertemporally optimizing households satisfying the assumption on the
ownership structure of the economy.
The optimality condition for the target price is:
1X
s=0
sp
s 
o
t+spt
otpt+s
yi;t+s
"
pi;t
sY
l=1
1 p
p
t+l 1 +
 
pi;t
sY
l=1
1 p
p
t+l 1  mci;t+s
!
t+s
#
= 0 (32)
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where:
t =
1
 0 1

pi;t
pt
{t
  0
h
 0 1

pi;t
pt
{t
i
 00
h
 0 1

pi;t
pt
{t
i
Finally, the log-linearization of (31) and (32) yields the familiar equation relating the dynamics
of ination to movements in real marginal costs.
2.5 Labor Contract
Sta¢ ng agencies and workers bargain over the surplus of their match in shares determined by the
exogenous bargaining power . As in Gertler and Trigari (2009), we allow for some degree of wage
stickiness in the model introducing staggered Nash bargaining. We assume that in any period t
every household j faces a random probability (1  w) to be able to bargain the wage wj;t, and
with probability w she will start working at the nominal hourly wage of the existing contract in
t, partially indexed to ination wji;t
1 wwt 1. Accordingly, the average nominal wage w
j
t evolves
according to the following equation:
wjt = (1  w)wj;t + w
Z 1
0
wji;t 1
1 wwt 1
jm + x
j
i;t
jm + x
j
t
nji;t
njt
di. (33)
Let W ji;t

wji;t

be the worker value function, given by:
W ji;t

wji;t

=
wji;t
pt
hji;t   {j
hj
1+
t
1 + 
njt + 
jt+1
jt
h
jW ji;t+1

wji;t+1

+
 
1  jU jt+1i , (34)
where the nominal wage wji;t+1 is:
wji;t+1 =
8<: w
j
;t+1 with probability 1  w
wjt
1 wwt with probability w
(35)
Let the value of being unemployed U jt be given by:
U jt = b
j
t + 
jt+1
jt
h
sjt+1W
j
x;t+1 +

1  sjt+1

U jt+1
i
(36)
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where W jx;t is the period t value function of a new worker of type j who does not know which sta¢ ng
agency she is matched with:
W jx;t =
Z 1
0
W ji;t

wji;t
 xji;tnji;t 1
xjtn
j
t 1
.
In the light of the above denitions, the contract nominal wage wj;t is chosen to maximize the
Nash product given by the joint surplus of a match over the workers and sta¢ ng agencys outside
options: h
W ji;t

wji;t

  U jt
ij h
J ji;t

wji;t
i1 j
(37)
subject to the nominal wage equation (35).
Finally, the optimal wage equation wj;t is obtained from the optimal sharing rule:
j
@W ji;t

wji;t

@wji;t

wji;t=w
j
;t
J ji;t

wj;t

=    1  j @J ji;t

wji;t

@wji;t

wji;t=w
j
;t
h
W ji;t

wj;t

  U jt
i
. (38)
given the unemployed, workers, and sta¢ ng agencys value functions, equation (36), (34), and (22),
respectively.
2.6 Aggregation, Monetary and Fiscal Policy, and Resource Constraint
Given the assumption on the types of households that populate the economy, the aggregate per-capita
level of household key quantity variable xt() is:
xt =
Z 1
0
xt()d =
Z 1 
0
xotd+
Z 1
1 
xltd
for xt() = [ct(); k
p
t (); kt(); it(); bt()] and
xt =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
xt (i; j) didj
=
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
xt(; i; j)ddidj =
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
Z 1 
0
xot (i; j) ddidj +
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
Z 1
1 
xlt (i; j) ddidj
for xt(; i; j) = nt(; i; j).
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Government purchases the nal public consumption good as a fraction of total output, gt, makes
unemployment benet payments to households, bu (1  nt), issues bonds to renance its outstanding
debt, bt, and levies lump-sum taxes,  t. The scal authoritys period-by-period budget constraint is
then given by:
gt + b
u (1  nt) + bt 1 =  t + bt
rt
(39)
where  t and gt are exogenously determined, and assumed to be described by the rst order autore-
gressive processes  t = 

t 1e
";t and gt = g
g
t 1e
"g;t , respectively, and bu (1  nt) = (1  ) bu;o (1  not )+
bu;l
 
1  nlt

.
The monetary authority adopts the standard augmented Taylor-type rule for the nominal interest
rate
rt
r
=
rt 1
r
r t

  yt
yt 1
y1 r
"rt (40)
where r and  are the equilibrium values of the gross nominal interest and ination rate respectively
and "rt is the zero-mean i.i.d. monetary policy shock.
Finally, we close the model with the economys aggregate resource constraint given by:
yt = ct + it + gt +
Z 1
0
t()
2
Z 1
0
[xt (i; )]
2 nt 1 (i; ) did+ a (ut) k
p
t 1
+
Z 1
0
fe ()
Z 1
0
"
wjth
j
t + 
j
a
ot+1
ot
 
1  n
a;i
j;t+1 (i; )
na;jt+1 (i; )
!
jt+1
2
[xt+1 (i; )]
2
#
nae;t+1 (i; ) di d
+(1   t)
Z 1
0
fm ()
Z 1
0
"
wjth
j
t + 
j
a
ot+1
ot
 
1  n
a;i
j;t+1 (i; )
na;jt+1 (i; )
!
jt+1
2
[xt+1 (i; )]
2
#
na;ij;t+1 (i; ) di d
where yt is the nal good quantity dened in equation (25).
2.7 Model Properties
2.7.1 Calibration
The model is calibrated to be consistent with quarterly U.S. time series and cross-sectional data,
whilst we consider conventional values when such information is missing. The calibrated parameters
values are summarized in table 1. In order to better capture the e¤ects from the consideration
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TABLE. 1.PARAMETER VALUES IN SIMULTAIONS OF THE MODEL
Discount factor  .995
Capital depreciation rate  .025
Capital share in production  .33
Habit in consumption parameter h .71
Elasticity of labor supply j 1.85
Liquidity constraint households share  .50
Workersseparation rate j .09
Elasticity of matches to unemployment j .72
Workersbargaining power j .72
Matching function constant jm .30
Disutility of labor parameter {j 20.00
Sta¢ ng agency exit probability ja .01
Entry cost f je .75
Movement cost f jm .25
Notes: Parameters related to "great ratios" and other observable quantities related to steady state values are
calibrated considering that the time unit is a quarter. The type specic parameters denoted by j = o, r are
assumed to be of equal value in order to capture better all the di¤erencies due to non calibration.
of agents heterogeneity in both the consumption and labor market dimensions, and to allow the
comparability of results with those in the existing literature considering consumer heterogeneity only,
we consider the same parameters values for both optimizing and liquidity constrained households.
The discount factor  is set to be consistent with a steady-state real interest rate of 1 percent, the
capital depreciation rate is assumed to depreciate at the rate of 10 percent per year, hence  is xed
at 0:025, the CobbDouglas production function parameter  is set at 0:33. Additional parameters
are: the external habit parameter h, set at 0:71, as estimated by Smets and Wouters (2007), the
inverse of the Frisch elasticity j , set at 1:85 based on Chetty et al. (2011), and the share of liquidity
constrained households , xed at 0:5, consistently with the estimates in Campbell and Mankiw
(1989).1
Considering the labor market model district, the search and matching-specic parameters are:
the separation rate j is set at 0:09 based on evidence provided by Shimer (2007) for the US quarterly
1 In estimating the Frisch elasticity, Christiano et al. (2012), choose a prior based on the microevidence provided
by McCurdy (1981). Such a calibration is not legal given that in McCurdy the hours of work are chosen freely by the
worker, whilst in Christiano et al. (2012) hours are choosen unilateraly and e¢ cently by the rm.
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worker separation rate, and adjusted for quarterly job destruction via rm exit evidence reported in
Samaniego (2008) and based on Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), the elasticity of matches to unem-
ployment j is xed at 0:72 as suggested by the estimates reported in Shimer (2005a), the workers
bargaining power j is set at 0:72 in order to satisfy the Hosios e¢ ciency conditions (see Hosios
(1990)). The last two parameters of the standard search and matching model, the matching function
constant jm and the scaling parameter for disutility of labor {j are set, respectively, at 0:3 and 20,
i order to match the average job-nding and unemployment rates, respectively.
Finally, the sta¢ ng agency parameters are: the entry and movement costs share f je and f
j
m set at
0:75 and 0:25 respectively, while the sta¢ ng agency exit probability ja, are set to 0:01, a mean value
based on the work of Campbell (1998), Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and Broda and Weinstein
(2010), which coincide with the ndings in Davis and Haltiwanger (1992).
2.7.2 Results
In order to study whether macroeconomic uctuations a¤ect di¤erent agents di¤erently and whether
heterogeneity in turn a¤ects macroeconomic uctuations, we examine the behavior of the model
considering a technology shock as the exogenous driving force. For comparison and simplicity, we
report in gure 1 the responses for both the full-heterogeneity model, solid line, and the limited-
heterogeneity model, dashed line, of key aggregate macroeconomic variables.
The full-heterogeneity model is consistent with the fact that di¤erent types of agents are not only
paid di¤erently but also work di¤erently, both in the intensive and in the extensive sense, and hence
su¤er/enjoy di¤erent unemployment rates as well as di¤erent wages. In the limited-heterogeneity
model, instead, we consider the heterogeneity in consumption and employment but do not extend
such di¤erences to the wage, which remains the same for di¤erent types of agents.
In the limited-heterogeneity case, in which the type-specic agents are paid the same wage, it
can be easily noticed that the response of aggregate employment to a positive technology shock, nt,
is overstated. The excess response of aggregate employment leads to an excess response not only
of output, yt, and investment, it, but also of key monetary variables, such as ination t and the
interest rate rt.
In contrast to the ination and interest rate response, which, by immediately reverting, experience
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only a relatively sharp rise on impact, employment and output share a hump-shaped response.
On the contrary, in the full-heterogeneity model, where for di¤erent types of agents di¤erent
wage and di¤erent labor supply and demand are considered, the smoothed and moderate response of
aggregate employment is entirely due to the di¤erent responses to the technology shock of wage and
labor of di¤erent types of households, with the heterogeneity in labor reected in both the intensive
and extensive margins.
Faithful to the behavior of employment, the output follows a relatively smoothed and moderate
response in the wake of the technology shock. Furthermore, the same smoothed and moderate
response are obtained also for investment and the monetary variables, ination and interest rate.
In order to get the intuition of the di¤erences in the dynamic responses for the key macroeconomic
variables and to have a clear view of the results presented above, gure 2 presents the impulse
responses of both types of households for the key macroeconomic type-specic variables. The solid
and dotted line in each graph illustrate the response of liquidity and non-liquidity constraint workers,
respectively.
Di¤erently from the standard literature, it can be easily noted how di¤erent, in a heterogeneity
microfounded model, the response of the key macroeconomic variables are for the two types of workers
in the wake of an increase in total factor productivity.
The strongly di¤erent responses of employment for the liquidity and non-liquidity constrained
workers are the result of a strongly di¤erent response of their wages, being inuenced by and in-
uencing the high heterogeneity in the responses of the labor market variables. The heterogeneous
responses of the full-heterogeneity model are reected in the excess output response in the limited-
heterogeneity model, where the type-specic response of wages are not considered. More precisely,
the shortcut of the equal response for the wage of liquidity constrained and unconstraint workers,
minimizes the distance of the response of employment of the former type from the response of em-
ployment of the latter type. Given that the response of employment of the non-liquidity constraint
worker is overstated, the substantial rise in output emerges in the limited heterogeneity model.
By contrast, in the model with full heterogeneity, the substantially di¤erent responses of wages,
reected in a moderate response of total employment (by denition a convex combination of the two
strongly di¤erent responses of type-specic employment) result in a relatively moderate response of
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FIGURE 2.- IMPULSE RESPONSES TO A TECHNOLOGY SHOCK: KEY AGGREGATE VARIABLES
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
Output
full heterogeneity
limited heterogeneity
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
Employment
full heterogeneity
limited heterogeneity
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
Consumption
full heterogeneity
limited heterogeneity
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
Investment
full heterogeneity
limited heterogeneity
0 5 10 15 20
-0.08
-0.07
-0.06
-0.05
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02
-0.01
0
Inflation
full heterogeneity
limited heterogeneity
0 5 10 15 20
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
Interest rate
full heterogeneity
limited heterogeneity
Notes: The gure shows impulse response of output (yt), employment (nt), private expenditure (ct), invest-
ment (it), ination (t) and interest rate (rt) to a one percent shock in total factor productivity. Solid and
dashed lines represent the full heterogeneity and limited heterogeneity models respectively. The variables are
expressed in terms of percent deviations from the steady states.
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FIGURE 3.- IMPULSE RESPONSES TO A TECHNOLOGY SHOCK: TYPE-SPECIFIC VARIABLES
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Notes: The gure shows impulse response of type-specic employment (njt ), real wage (w
j
t ), labor market
tightness (jt ), vacancies (
j
t ), labor share (w
j
th
j
tn
j
t=yt) and hours (h
j
t ) to a one percent shock in total factor
productivity. Solid and dashed lines represent the dynamic responses of liquidity and non-liquidity constraint
workers respectively. The variables are expressed in terms of percent deviations from the steady states.
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output.
As it can be easily noted, there is substantial di¤erence in the dynamics of key macroeconomic
and labor-specic variables when a microfounded, full heterogeneity model is, somehow, polluted
by some homogeneity assumptions. What seems to be interesting, and troubling for the validity of
previous analyses, is the fact that the e¤ects of the di¤erent responses are experienced not only by
the labor market variables but also by the real and monetary variables.
2.8 Conclusions
We have modied the Mortensen and Pissarides model of unemployment dynamics to allow for deep
heterogeneity in the labor market. By micofounding the labor market, strongly di¤erent results
emerge for the di¤erent type-specic labor market variables.
Contrary to what is commonly assumed in the literature, not only the steady state solutions, but
also the dynamics of the model is a¤ected, since the two labor-types are quantitatively di¤erent with
respect to key variables dening the labor market dynamics, such as the real wage, unemployment, the
labor market tightness and vacancies, and also qualitatively di¤erent for few of them, the dynamics
of the labor share among others.
A distinguishing feature of our analysis is that, in trying to microfound the distinction of the two
types of household-workers we are able to capture some relevant di¤erences in the steady state and
in dynamic properties of both type-specic and key aggregate macroeconomic variables.
We suspect that the practice of not considering a full heterogeneity model puts into serious doubt
the validity of the results obtained so far in the research on these issues, namely the role of liquidity-
constrained or rule-of-thumb agents in various areas where they are introduced. We leave these issues
for further research.
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